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Abstract 
This thesis examines the alignment between regulation, government guidelines 
and fraud governance practices in the Australian public sector in efforts to minimise 
procurement fraud. Through analysis of three recent fraud cases studies, the interface 
between public sector anti-fraud governance frameworks and how they translate into 
workplace enforcement practices is considered for purposes of identifying enhanced 
ways for reducing this type of crime in the future.  
The Australian Institute of Criminology (2013) estimates that the cost of crime 
in Australia is nearly AUD36 billion per annum, of which 40% or AUD8.5 billion is 
attributed to fraud. This equates to approximately 1.6% of gross domestic product. 
Fraud and the associated costs are not expected to abate in the short term, with 
various sources tracking trends that demonstrate an increase in the prevalence of this 
crime (ABS, 2012; Kroll, 2014; PwC, 2014; ABS, 2016). Asset misappropriation, 
perpetrated through invoice fraud has been found in Australia to constitute ‘by far the 
greatest fraud risk in the public sector…accounting for 68% of all economic crime in 
the public sector’ (PWC, 2015, p 7). With 41% of government departments 
experiencing at least one instance of economic crime in the past 24 months, reported 
incidents have more than doubled since 2012 (PWC, 2015, p.7).  
This thesis analyses three case studies involving major invoice fraud for 
purposes of identifying misalignment in legislative, governance and workplace 
practices around risk management. The three case studies were; Queensland CMC 
Report (2013) - Queensland Department of Health (Fraud, financial management 
and accountability in the Queensland public sector—an examination of how $16.9 
million fraud was committed in Queensland Health), ICAC (NSW) Report (2006) – 
(Investigation into defrauding the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) and RailCorp 
in relation to invoice fraud relating to provision of traffic management services in 
NSW (Operation Quilla)) and ICAC (NSW) Report (2015) – (Investigation into the 
conduct of a university manager and others in relation to false invoicing).  Using 
qualitative content analysis on invoice based asset misappropriation; a three-step 
inquiry is undertaken as to whether: 
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- public sector entities were, at the time of the fraud, compliant with existing 
legislation requirements, guidelines and departmental risk management 
frameworks.   
- anti-fraud governance practices  adequately met the legislative 
requirements and guidelines;   
- fraud governance practices should be aligned with legislative requirements 
and anti-fraud guidelines to achieve fraud minimisation.  
A Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model was developed from literature focused 
on prevention, detection and response. Control measures considered included those 
designed to change employee behavior (“hard controls’) as well as those around 
culture and behavior of both management and employees (“soft controls’) (Combee 
et al., 2015). The Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model was used as a mechanism to 
investigate how the case study frauds occurred.  
Analysis identified that all of the case study entities were compliant with the 
relevant fraud related legislation and guidelines despite being victims of fraudulent 
acts perpetrated over extended periods of time. The findings highlight that legislative 
compliance alone is not sufficient to inhibit fraud, which aligns with Falkenberg and 
Herremans (1995), who argue that the most effective internal controls exist when 
hard and soft systems are congruent. The evidence suggests that each case study 
entity placed too much emphasis on hard controls to the detriment of soft controls, a 
finding that concurs with Chtioui & Thiéry-Dubuisson (2011). The corrupted soft 
controls lead to a misalignment between the mandated requirements, public sector 
guidelines and the actual work practices, resulting in weakened fraud minimisation.  
This study makes a valuable contribution into the research area of fraud 
minimisation by providing a Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model that has been 
developed, tested and further refined following a review of this study’s critical 
findings. The model is also a useful tool available for organisations aiming to review 
and improve their fraud minimisation practices. If adopted, the simplicity of the 
model will aid public entities in avoiding compliance myopia and improve their 
fraud minimisation practices.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Corruption, embezzlement and fraud exist everywhere and can never 
be eliminated; what successful economies do is keep fraud to a 
minimum (Greenspan, 2007).  
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the last century, fraud and unethical corporate behaviour have 
occurred regularly across the globe, which has resulted in new regulations and 
studies calling for ethical behaviour (H. Rockness & Rockness, 2006). Australia has 
not been immune to fraudulent and unethical practices. The Australian Institute of 
Criminology (AIC) (Smith, 2001, para. 1) estimates that the cost of crime in 
Australia is nearly AUD36 billion per annum, of which 40% or AUD8.5 billion is 
attributed to fraud. This equates to approximately 1.6% of gross domestic product.  
Fraud and the associated costs are not expected to abate in the short term, with 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) tracking trends that demonstrate an 
increase in the prevalence of fraud (ABS, 2012; ABS, 2016). Further evidence of the 
growth of fraud in Australia is provided by survey findings from the Global Fraud 
Report (2014)1 and the PwC Global Economic Crime Survey (2014).2 
High-profile fraud cases often compel governments to introduce legislation to 
counter corporate abuses (Bittle & Snider, 2011) and to protect public interest. 
Domestic examples of high-profile cases where internal governance controls have 
failed include HIH Insurance Pty Ltd, One.Tel Limited, and ING Australia in the 
private sector; as well as Queensland Health, Centrelink,3 the Department of 
                                                
 
1 The Global Fraud Report (2014) is based on surveys conducted with 901 senior executives from 
around the world and from across business sectors. The report was funded by Kroll (2014) and 
undertaken by the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
2 The PwC Global Economic Crime Survey (2014) was based on 5,128 respondents from 99 countries.    
3 The Daily Telegraph (NSW). 2015. Welfare frauds stealing $5 billion of taxpayers money. Retrieved 
November 27, 2015. http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/welfare-frauds-stealing-5-billion-
of-taxpayers-money/story-fni0cx12-1227623207866 
 2 Chapter 1: Introduction 
Defence,4 and the NSW Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) in the Australian public 
sector.  
The high cost of fraud in Australia, coupled with its increased prevalence and 
ever-changing fraud-related legislation, are all factors that support the need for 
research in this area. 
This chapter introduces the topic of fraud and outlines the approach adopted for 
this research study. Fraud is defined in the first section. To provide this definition, a 
variety of sources are referenced to demonstrate the common characterisation of this 
crime, and the definition used throughout this study is provided. The estimated cost 
of fraud in Australia is provided; along with evidence demonstrating that this type of 
crime is on the rise. The study’s research problem and objectives are defined in 
Sections 1.2 and 1.3 respectively, with the research design (Section 1.4) and case 
study summaries (Section 1.5) also provided.   
1.1.1 Definition of fraud 
In seeking to define fraud, a variety of sources are available; including, for 
example, general reference organisations; academic literature; legislation and case 
law; and government departments’ policies, regulations, and handbooks. Whilst the 
various definitions may have some subtle differences, they all include the element of 
deception.   
The AIC is the national research and knowledge centre for crime and justice. 
The AIC is responsible for the conduct of fraud surveys each year and for reporting 
data5 relating to fraud against the Commonwealth (Cth). The AIC defines fraud as 
involving the use of dishonest or deceitful conduct in order to obtain some unjust 
advantage over someone else, Fraud Prevention and Control in Australia, (Graycar, 
2000, p.2). Another government publication, the Attorney-General’s Department’s 
Resource Management Guide (No. 201)—Preventing, detecting and dealing with 
fraud (Cth, 2014b, p.7), states that it is “… a mental or fault element to fraud 
requiring intent; it requires more than carelessness, accident or error”. 
                                                
 
4 Canberra Times. 2015. Defence is watching the odometer after $585,000 fuel card fraud. Retrieved 
November 27, 2015. http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/public-service/defence-is-watching-
the-odometer-after-585000-fuel-card-fraud-20150717-giemij?rand=1438306274829 
5 Australian Institute of Criminology. (2016). Fraud against the Commonwealth monitoring program. 
Retrieved August 10, 2016, from 
http://www.aic.gov.au/about_aic/research_programs/nmp/fraud_comm.html 
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Fraud has also been described as “a generic term that embraces all of the 
multifarious means that human ingenuity can devise, which are resorted to by one 
individual, to gain an advantage over another by false representations” (W. S. 
Albrecht et al., 2012, p. 657).  
In Part 7.3 of Criminal Code Amendment (Theft, Fraud, Bribery and Related 
Offences) Act 2000, ‘fraudulent conduct’ is defined as a deception, either intentional 
or reckless, whether by words or other conduct, and whether as to fact or as to law, 
and includes: 
• a deception as to the intentions of the person using the deception or any 
other person; 
• conduct by a person that causes a computer, a machine, or an electronic 
device to make a response that the person is not authorised to cause it to 
do.  
The definition of fraud adopted in this thesis is from the Australian 
Government’s Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, which defines fraud 
against the Commonwealth as “dishonestly obtaining a benefit by deception” (Cth, 
2011, p. 5). This definition was selected for its conciseness and its inclusion of 
elements described in other definitions. 
1.1.2 The cost of fraud in Australia  
Annually, the cost of fraud substantially impacts both Australia’s private and 
public sector entities.  The AIC (AIC, 2013, para. 1) estimates the cost of crime in 
Australia to be nearly AUD36 billion per annum, of which 40% or approximately 
AUD8.5 billion – 1.6% of Australia’s gross domestic product - is attributed to fraud.  
Although the public sector in Australia has been assessed as transparent and ‘clean’, 
with a global ranking of 11 out of 174 countries in 2014 (Transparency International, 
2015), AIC researchers further estimate that between 2010-2013, Commonwealth 
departments and agencies alone, as victims of fraud, passed losses in excess of half a 
billion dollars on to taxpayers. The problems identified by the AIC indicate that 
despite a positive Transparency International global ranking, fraud in the Australian 
public sector is a significant problem. The AIC’s concerns are supported by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) who stated in their publication Fighting Fraud in the 
Public Sector III (2015), that 41% of public sector entities experience fraud, with 
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34% of these victim entities experiencing in excess of 10 frauds within a two-year 
period. 
Moreover, as fraud estimates such as these are generally believed to understate 
the problem, the magnitude of loss to Australia’s economy is substantially more 
grave, especially considering that most estimates do not include the broader social 
and community costs, risks to reputation, or productivity costs (Rollings, 2008, p.12). 
Graycar (2000) emphasised that encouraging the victims of fraud to report their 
complaint to the authorities is the first barrier in achieving criminal prosecution of 
fraudsters. Less than 50% of incidents of fraud are estimated as being reported to 
police or other authorities.6  Moreover, it is important to note that despite the most 
robust methodologies being used to determine the cost of crime, AIC reports are only 
estimates. Improved methods for estimating the cost of crime could be developed if 
more reliable data were available, especially for acts such as fraud, arson, and drug 
offences (Rollings, 2008), and if there were uniform counting rules across the 
different jurisdictions in Australia (Hayes & Prenzler, 2003). Smith, Jorna, Sweeney, 
and Fuller (2011) further contend that complexities around cost calculation are 
further compounded due to the intangible nature of some variables, such as the use of 
differing IT systems, data collection practices, legislative provisions and definitions, 
and prosecution activity.  
Rollings (2008), diagrammed the proportionate interrelationship between fraud 
and other criminal activities based on the 2008 AIC report, as shown in Figure 1.1. 
Fraud accounts for 40% of the total (estimated) community costs of crime in 
Australia. That nearly half of all crime in Australia is fraud based, as shown in Figure 
1.1, supports the relevance of this study. While there are difficulties in determining 
the exact cost of fraud, these problems do not impair the validity of analysis provided 
in Figure 1.1.  
 
 
                                                
 
6 AIC. (2015). Fraud. Retrieved October 21, 2015, from 
http://www.aic.gov.au/statistics/hightech/fraud.html. 
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Figure 1.1:  Contribution of crime (by category) to Australian community costs 
Source: AIC. The Cost of Crime. Retrieved July 4, 2015, www.aic.gov.au 
 
Fraud against the Commonwealth is a criminal offence that impacts directly on 
Australians. It reduces the funds available for delivering public goods and services 
and undermines public confidence in the Government (Cth, 2014a, p.III). Against 
this bottom line, the following section examines the continual growth in fraud, 
providing context for considering the importance of the alignment between policy 
and governance practice in its reduction. It is anticipated that achieving better 
alignment between these two elements will help to stem the growth of fraud. 
1.1.3 Increases in fraudulent activity in Australia  
There is much evidence of a rise in fraud across all sectors in Australia. The 
ABS (2012) reported that in the financial year 2011-12, 1.2 million Australians over 
the age of 15 years were victims of personal fraud, an increase of 10%, or over 
806,000 victims, when compared to the 2007 surveys. In the corporate sector, the 
Global Fraud Report7 (2014) identified that 70% of all respondent organisations in 
2014 had experienced fraud, up from 60% in 2013. The PwC Global Economic 
                                                
 
7 The Global Fraud Report (2014) is based on surveys conducted with 901 senior executives from 
around the world and from across business sectors. The report was funded by Kroll (2014) and 
undertaken by the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
 6 Chapter 1: Introduction 
Crime Survey (2014) was based on 5,128 respondents from 99 countries. This survey 
reflected the findings of the ACFE Global Fraud Report, and as set out in Figure 1.2, 
demonstrates the increase in cases, based on historical data from PwC global 
surveys. Despite a significant decline in reported global fraud cases during the 
reporting period 2007/09, the last three surveys all reflected an increase in 
occurrence. 
 
:  
Figure 1.2:  Reported global fraud rates 
Source: PwC Global Economic Crime Survey (2014) 
 
A variety of reasons are provided for the increase in incidences of fraud 
(Australian Standard for Fraud and Corruption—AS 8001, Standards Australia, 
2008, p.8), including:  
• continual striving for greater efficiencies in business, which leads to 
reduced staffing levels and a consequent reduction in internal control 
adherence; 
• increasing use of, and reliance on technology and the associated changes in 
payment systems and channels;  
• continuing trend towards the ‘flattening’ of organisational structures and 
the resulting reduction in management focus on enforcing internal controls 
and managing risk;  
• rapid and continuous changes to business operations;  
• increasing pace of business;  
• the inability of the criminal justice system, the police, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, other law enforcement agencies, 
and the courts to keep pace with the ever-increasing workload and greater 
complexity of matters reported; 
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• accessibility of gambling, which has become a significant motivator for 
employees to commit fraud against their employer;  
• greater complexity around commercial, legal reporting, and accounting 
structures and forms (Standards Australia, 2008, p.8). 
The introductory section of this chapter has demonstrated the importance of 
investigating the phenomenon of fraud in the public sector. This section defined 
fraud, provided an estimated cost, and demonstrated that incidences of these crimes 
are on the rise. The next section outlines this study’s research problem. 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The research problem examined in this study relates to how Australian public 
sector entities can achieve fraud minimisation. The study focuses on three public 
sector fraud cases and investigates the elements required to establish and maintain 
fraud minimisation, through the establishment of an alignment between fraud-related 
legislation and fraud governance practices.  
The premise of this study is that public sector entities are likely to achieve 
fraud minimisation, provided an alignment between fraud related legislative and 
fraud related governance practices are achieved. To date, focus on this alignment 
within the Australian public sector has been very limited.8  
The term alignment is used throughout this study to describe the relative 
positioning of fraud related legislative requirements and the actual work practices 
within a public sector entity. In an ideal setting, or closed system, pragmatic 
legislation specifically designed to reduce the risk of fraud, would, in principle, align 
perfectly with fraud-related governance practices. To create this ideal environment in 
which the probability of fraudulent activity is low, the alignment of prescribed 
legislative requirements and fraud-related governance practices must occur 
seamlessly. However, obtaining this alignment is a unique and delicate balancing act.  
The next section of this chapter outlines this study’s research objectives. 
                                                
 
8 See, for example, broader comparative studies between public and private sector approaches, such as 
Anona Armstronga, Xinting Jiab and Vicky Totikidisc, “Parallels in Private and Public Sector 
Governance”. Centre for International Corporate Governance Research, Victoria University, PO Box 
14428, Melbourne, VIC 8001, Australia; Western Australian Auditor General’s Report Fraud 
Prevention and Detection in the Public Sector Report 7 – June 2013 
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1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to provide evidence that will assist policy 
formation, which could subsequently contribute to the reduction of fraud in the 
public sector. Whilst this study investigates examples of public-sector fraud, it is 
expected that the findings will be applicable across all industries. It is anticipated that 
the research findings will encourage organisations, both public and private, to re-
examine their approach towards combating fraud, and to focus on ensuring a proper 
alignment is achieved between legislation and fraud governance practices.  
The next section describes the two-phased approach to data collection adopted 
for this study. 
1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The methodology adopted in this study is qualitative content analysis, based on 
data collected from publicly available secondary sources. Three case studies 
involving fraud within the Australian public sector were selected. The first case study 
selected involved fraud within Queensland Health; the second dealt with fraud within 
the RTA and RailCorp; the third case study involved several NSW based 
universities. Each case study report was analysed to identify key events undertaken 
by the perpetrators, the victim organisation, and external organisations. This tripartite 
examination of case studies was designed to explore the relationship between fraud-
related legislation and fraud governance practices. Chapter 4 details the criteria used 
to select the three case studies and the research design used in this study. The next 
section provides a short summary of each of the selected cases. 
1.5 CASE STUDIES 
The following is a short summary of each case study utilised within this 
research. A full summary of the Queensland Health invoice fraud case and the two 
ICAC (NSW) cases is provided in Chapter 5.2. 
• Queensland CMC Report (2013) - Queensland Health 
Fraud, financial management and accountability in the Queensland public 
sector—an examination of how $16.9 million fraud was committed in Queensland 
Health. 
 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction 9 
• ICAC (NSW) Report (2006):   
Investigation into defrauding the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) and 
RailCorp in relation to invoice fraud relating to provision of traffic management 
services in NSW (Operation Quilla). 
• ICAC (NSW) Report (2015):  
Investigation into the conduct of a university manager and others in relation to 
false invoicing.   
1.6 PUBLICATIONS EMERGING FROM THIS STUDY 
The author intends to publish an article in an academic journal following 
submission of the finalised thesis. The journal will be selected in consultation with 
the supervisory team. 
1.7 CONCLUSION AND THESIS OUTLINE 
To demonstrate the relevance of this study, this chapter examined the high cost 
of fraud and the prevalence of invoice fraud within Australia. Whilst difficulties 
associated with the accuracy of cost estimation were discussed, evidence from the 
AIC9 (see Figure 1.1) stated that fraudulent activities in Australia account for 40% of 
costs to communities; equating to AUD8.5 billion or approximately 1.6 per cent of 
gross domestic product.   
This study investigates how public entities can achieve fraud minimisation 
through the alignment of fraud-related legislation and fraud governance practices. To 
accomplish this, the factors required to establish and maintain an alignment between 
fraud-related legislation and fraud governance practices have been analysed.  
Chapter 2 – Literature Review, delivers an examination of contemporary fraud 
theory and public sector fraud, as well as fraud related legislation and governance 
procedures. The aim of Chapter 2 is to create a theoretical framework to support the 
attainment of fraud minimisation within the public sector. The academic literature 
and evidence-based best practices listed within Chapter 2 are then used in the study 
to create the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model in Chapter 3 – Conceptual Model. 
                                                
 
9 AIC. (2015). Counting the Cost of Crime in Australia. Retrieved July 4, 2015, from 
http://aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tandi/241-260/tandi247.html 
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 Chapter 4 – Methodology, describes and justifies why a qualitative content 
analysis research design was adopted for this study. This chapter outlines the sample 
strategy and defines the data collection methods. In addition, this chapter includes a 
summary of reliability and validity issues, along with a discussion of the overall 
research limitations.  
Chapter 5 – Analysis examines the findings from the Queensland Health, RTA 
and RailCorp, and NSW universities fraud cases using the Conceptual Fraud 
Alignment Model as the mechanism to test fraud minimisation practices. The 
findings are used to determine how Australian public sector entities can more 
effectively achieve fraud minimisation.  
In Chapter 6 – Conclusion, key findings from the analysis chapter are reviewed 
and the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model is refined. Chapter 6 also recaps the 
justification of the study and highlights the anticipated academic contribution. 
The following chapter reviews the literature relevant to the research problem 
for this study.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This thesis seeks to examine how prescribed government regulatory controls 
designed to reduce the risk of fraud, align with fraud governance practices within the 
public sector. To this end, this chapter is broken into five main components: fraud 
theory, types of fraud, public sector fraud, public sector fraud related legislation, and 
public sector fraud related governance.  
Section 2.1 examines fraud theory to deliver an understanding of contemporary 
literature on fraud concepts and theories. The work of Donald Cressey (1953), and in 
particular the element of opportunity from his ‘Fraud Triangle’ model, is examined 
along with alternative fraud models. Section 2.2 provides an insight into the highly 
diverse and numerous categories of fraud. This section describes how invoice fraud, 
the focus of this study, resides within the category of asset misappropriation. Section 
2.3 examines fraud in the public sector; this section reviews common types of public 
sector fraud and the associated consequences of these crimes.  
Section 2.4 examines Australian fraud-related legislation, with specific 
reference to the importance of the Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act (Cth, 2013) (PGPA Act), the Commonwealth Fraud Control 
Framework (Cth, 2014a), and Australian Standard 8001 (Standards Australia, 2008). 
Section 2.5 reviews fraud related governance methodologies. Towards the end of this 
chapter, Section 2.6 discusses the gaps in current literature, with Section 2.7 
outlining selected research questions. 
The information presented within this chapter provides the background 
information required to understand the context of the research problem. This chapter 
is used to inform this study’s Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model presented in 
Chapter 3. The academic literature is used to analyse the research findings and to 
enlighten the conclusion chapter of this study. 
2.1 FRAUD THEORY 
This section examines the cornerstone fraud theories that have shaped 
contemporary fraud-related literature, legislation, and public policy. An overview of 
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these theories helps to identify potential causes of fraudulent activities and assists in 
explaining how fraud occurs within the public sector.  
Cressey’s Fraud Triangle 
The work of Cressey (1950, 1953) has influenced fraud theory for many 
decades—in particular the Fraud Triangle theory, which has been described as a 
‘classic model’ that assists in understanding the nature of many, but not all, 
occupational offenders (Wells, 2014). Cressey (1950) hypothesised that three 
influencing factors are necessary for fraud to occur: perceived pressure, opportunity, 
and rationalisation. This triumvirate constitutes his Fraud Triangle, as set out below. 
 
 
Figure 2.1:  The Fraud Triangle 
Source: Wells (2014) 
 
Throughout his career, Cressey continued to refine his hypothesis. In its final 
version, Cressey posited: 
Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of 
themselves as having a financial problem which is non-shareable, are 
aware this problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the 
position of financial trust, and are able to apply to their own conduct 
in that situation verbalisations which enable them to adjust their 
conceptions of themselves as trusted persons with their conceptions of 
themselves as users of the entrusted funds or property. (Cressey, 1953, 
p. 30) 
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Cressey (1953) labelled individuals who meet the above criteria as ‘trust 
violators.’ In all three case studies examined for this research, each of the individuals 
convicted of fraud met Cressey’s descriptor of a ‘trust violator.’ Cressey’s (1953) 
Fraud Triangle assists in explaining why fraud occurs.  
The three elements of the Fraud Triangle are rationalisation, perceived 
pressure, and perceived opportunity. A summary of these three elements is provided 
below: 
• Rationalisation is defined by Ramos (2003) as the process of aligning a 
fraudulent act with one's personal code of ethics. Only through rationalisation 
is the perpetrator able to reduce the dissonance and proceed without 
compunction (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher, & Riley, 2012, p. 558).  
• Perceived pressure from non-sharable problems, combined with a strong 
sense of ego or pride that may prevent an individual seeking help, is a factor 
that assists in creating a motive for fraud (Dorminey et al., 2012, p. 558). 
Kassem and Higson (2012) observed that employment and external pressures 
can be derived from either financial or non-financial forces (p.193). The table 
below provides examples of pressures that may contribute as motivational 
factors to commit fraud (Kassem & Higson, 2012, p. 193).  
 
Table 2.1: Classification of pressure/motive 
Personal 
Pressure 
• Financial: Gambling addiction, sudden financial problem, 
paying for lifestyle. 
• Non-financial: Lack of personal discipline or greed. 
Corporate/ 
Employment 
• Financial: Continuous compensation, structure management, 
financial interests, and low salary. 
• Non-financial: Unfair treatment, fear of unemployment, 
frustration with work, or a challenge to beat the system. 
External 
Pressure 
• Financial: Threats to business financial stability, market 
expectations. 
• Non-financial: Ego, image or reputation, social pressure. 
Source: Kassem & Higson (2012) 
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• Perceived opportunity addresses the emergence of circumstances supportive of 
fraud. The fraudster will look for the perceived opportunity to commit and 
conceal their crime. Perceived opportunity occurs when the fraudster identifies 
how they can utilise their position of trust to solve financial problems, with little 
threat of being caught (Kassem & Higson, 2012). With regard to the Fraud 
Triangle, opportunity is argued as the only element the predator requires; 
pressure or rationalisation is not required (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher, & 
Riley, 2010, p. 21).  
Davis and Pesch (2013) argued that opportunity is a proxy for the overall 
strength of an organisation’s internal controls. Opportunity can arise from a variety 
of sources, such as poor internal controls, poor training, poor supervision, lack of 
prosecution of perpetrators, ineffective anti-fraud programs and procedures, or a 
weak ethical culture (Dorminey et al, 2010, p. 19). Kassem and Higson (2012) 
argued that rationalisation and pressure are factors that cannot be observed; 
accordingly, within the Fraud Triangle, opportunity is the element that organisations 
or third parties are best able to control, or at least, exert direct influence over to 
mitigate fraud. For these reasons, this study is most interested in the opportunity 
element of Cressey’s model. 
It can reasonably be assumed that where a crime has occurred, an opportunity 
existed for this crime to occur. This assumption may seem unnecessary to posit; 
however, authorities argue that the existence of an opportunity must be examined 
(Benson, Madensen, & Eck, 2008). This distinction is relevant because in order to 
mitigate fraud, organisations must first understand the potential risks that they may 
encounter. The opportunity, for example, of a street crime can be expected to differ 
from that of a crime committed within an occupational setting. Understanding the 
opportunities available to fraudsters is therefore essential; in particular with regards 
to understanding the offenses organisations want to prevent and the specific 
opportunities associated with them (Benson et al., 2008).  
This study focuses less on motivational factors (‘why’), instead emphasising 
the mechanisms that allow fraud to be facilitated (‘how’). In seeking to understand 
how a fraud is committed, this research presents a Conceptual Fraud Alignment 
Model for consideration. The Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model is designed to 
demonstrate how fraud minimisation can be achieved with an alignment between 
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legislative requirements and fraud related governance practices within public sector 
entities. The conceptual model predominately draws upon the element of opportunity 
contained within Cressey’s (1973) Fraud Triangle. However, analysis of alternative 
models uncovered additional constructs considered relevant to the topic of this study 
and these are presented next.  
Other fraud models 
A range of literature was examined in order to uncover mechanisms relating to 
‘how’ fraud occurs in an organisational setting to assist in identifying how fraudulent 
crimes are perpetrated. Three additional models were chosen, and include Sutherland 
(1940) and his theories of ‘white collar crime’; W. S. Albrecht, Albrecht, and 
Albrecht’s (2008) work relating to the ‘Fraud Scale’; and Wolfe and Hermanson’s 
(2004) ‘Fraud Diamond’. Each body of work extends Cressey’s (1950, 1953) original 
work by providing insights and explanations regarding how fraud is perpetrated. 
Each model further provides understanding as to how fraud can be perpetrated, 
thereby providing insights into fraud enablers from an organisational perspective.  
The Fraud Scale 
W. S. Albrecht et al.’s (2008) Fraud Scale is a refined version of Cressey’s 
(1973) Fraud Triangle. The scale includes the elements of opportunity and pressure, 
whilst substituting rationalisation for personal integrity. These three conditions –
opportunity, pressure, and personal integrity –  are analysed to assist in determining 
the fraud risk. The model was initially developed by Albrecht, Howe, and Romney, 
(1984) in an attempt to assist with the prediction of fraud through the provision of a 
better understanding of an individual and his/her likelihood to offend. In the version 
of the Fraud Scale in Figure 2.2, as the scales are balanced, the fraud risk is deemed 
neutral. In Figure 2.3 on the other hand, whilst pressure is determined to be low, 
greater opportunity and low personal integrity tip the scales, and as a result indicate 
conditions more conducive to fraud occurring.  
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Figure 2.2:  The Fraud Scale—balanced 
Source: Albrecht et al. (1984) 
 
 
Albrecht et al. (1984) posited that understanding or knowing an individual’s 
personal integrity would assist, in conjunction with the relative forces of pressure and 
opportunity, in determining the likelihood of fraud (Dorminey et al., 2010). Their 
view is based on the premise that it is easier to determine an individual’s integrity, as 
opposed to their rationalisation (Dorminey et al., 2010). Albrecht et al. (1984) argued 
that “by observing both a person’s decisions, as well as the decision making 
processes, his commitment to ethical decision making can be gauged” (Dorminey, et 
al., 2010, p. 20).  
 
 
Figure 2.3:  The Fraud Scale—tipped 
Source: Albrecht et al. (1984) 
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Fraud Diamond 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) addressed perceived limitations in Cressey’s (1973) 
Fraud Triangle through the inclusion of a fourth element, thereby creating the ‘Fraud 
Diamond’ model (see Figure 2.4). The additional element is an individual’s 
capability to commit the crime. The authors argued that, in addition to the influence 
of incentive, opportunity, and rationalisation, a person’s traits and their individual 
abilities also play a significant role in determining whether fraud may occur (Wolfe 
& Hermanson, 2004, p. 38). The other nuanced change was the recasting of 
‘perceived pressure’ as ‘incentive’. The fraud diamond contributes to fraud theory by 
highlighting the capabilities of individuals to commit crimes, separate from their 
environment or situations (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004, p.39).  
 
 
Figure 2.4:  The Fraud Diamond  
Source: Wolfe & Hermanson (2004) 
 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) expounded further on ‘capability’; if opportunity 
opens the door, and both rationalisation and incentives act to draw a person towards 
this open door, they posited that capability then needs to exist for the fraud to occur 
(p, 39). Capability links directly to the how aspect of this study; as such, when 
compared against the Fraud Triangle, the Fraud Diamond is regarded as more 
relevant. The added dimension of capability lends itself to greater analysis of not 
only why fraudsters commit fraud, but also contributes to an understanding of how 
the crime was perpetrated.  
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The models examined in this section assist in identifying how and why people 
commit fraud, but they do not identify the types of fraud that occur in the public 
sector, which is the focus of this study. Section 2.2 defines the types of fraud that 
currently exist; with Section 2.3 refining this focus to include an examination of 
public sector fraud.  
2.2 TYPES OF FRAUD 
Fraud, or the obtaining of benefit through deception, has existed since the 
beginning of commerce (Dorminey et al., 2012). Documented cases of unscrupulous 
individuals attempting to defraud unsuspecting victims for financial gain date back to 
ancient Greece (Johnstone, 1999). More recently, and within a domestic context, 
when the First Fleet set sail for Australia in 1787, among the hundreds of convicts in 
transit was a collection of individuals convicted of fraud (University of Wollongong, 
1999). One such individual was John Boyle,10 a seaman in the Royal Navy who 
adopted the identities of other seamen, some deceased, and submitted payslips in 
order to draw their wages (University of Wollongong, 1999, ser. 79). Whilst these 
anecdotes may have little relevance to contemporary commerce or fraud, they do 
highlight in general terms a long history of documented fraud. The technology 
surrounding contemporary fraud activities has changed dramatically; however, the 
mechanisms – false identities and accounts – have arguably remained largely 
consistent over time. 
This section commences with the Australian National Audit Office’s (ANAO) 
generic characterisation of fraud, followed by definitions of occupational crime, asset 
misappropriation, and invoice fraud. 
2.2.1 Australian National Audit Office categories of fraud 
ANAO has three broad categories of offences that constitute fraud. These are 
fraud perpetrated by an employee against an Australian Government agency or its 
programs; fraud perpetrated by an agency client or external individual against such 
an agency or its programs; and fraud perpetrated by a contractor or service provider 
against an agency or its programs (ANAO, 2004, p. 12). This research addresses the 
third listed ANAO category, fraud perpetrated by a contractor or service provider 
                                                
 
10 On 21 April 1784, Boyle was trialled at The Old Bailey10, London, found guilty of fraud and 
sentenced to death. His death sentence was later reduced to seven years transportation and he was 
shipped to New South Wales on board HMS Scarborough. 
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against an agency or its programs. This category was selected due to the high 
prevalence of cases against the Commonwealth falling into this category, with 57% 
of public sector frauds in Australia committed by employees (Lindley & Smith, 
2011, p. 7).  
Within the third ANAO category, many types of fraud can be perpetrated 
against a public entity. Key categories include: theft; accounting fraud (e.g., false 
invoices, misappropriation); misuse of Commonwealth credit cards; unlawful use of, 
or unlawful obtaining of, property, equipment, material or services; causing a loss, or 
avoiding and/or creating a liability; providing false or misleading information to the 
Commonwealth or failing to provide information when there is an obligation to do 
so; misuse of Commonwealth assets, equipment or facilities; cartel conduct; making, 
or using, false, forged, or falsified documents; and, wrongfully using Commonwealth 
information or intellectual property (ANAO, 2014, p. 8). This study focuses on asset 
misappropriation, specifically invoice fraud, as this category of crime is increasingly 
prevalent within Australia (see Figure 2.4).   
2.2.2 Categories of occupational crime 
The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines white collar crime as 
“those illegal acts which are characterised by deceit, concealment, or violation of 
trust and which are not dependent upon the application or threat of physical force or 
violence” (Barnett, 2002). Previously, when societies had distinct socio-economic 
classes, the term 'white collar' may have been a useful way to categorise criminals: as 
well educated individuals (white collar) or individuals from manual labour (blue 
collar) occupations (Palmer,11 1995, p. 1). Palmer (1995) argued that the 
contemporary use of this term, is therefore, an inaccurate way to categorise a type of 
crime, as criminals do not belong to a particular class of society. Palmer (1995) 
further contended that as fraud occurs within all levels of society, within all 
employment sectors, and by individuals perceived as both ‘respectable’ and ‘non 
respectable’, is it a misleading phrase. 
The variety and complexity of fraud is captured in Figure 2.5, which delineates 
the three main categories: corruption, asset misappropriation and fraudulent 
statements. This research focuses on asset misappropriation, specifically, invoice or 
                                                
 
11 Mick Palmer was the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police from 1994–2001. 
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‘billing schemes’. As articulated within Figure 2.5, asset misappropriation consists of 
two groups, cash and all inventory and other assets. Within the cash group resides 
invoice or ‘billing schemes’ as part of fraudulent dismemberments. 
As noted in the ANAO’s definition of fraud categories, the types of fraudulent 
activity are highly diverse, with numerous types of mechanisms used to perpetrate 
fraud. Obtained benefits are not always financial, and perpetrators, who may be 
operating alone or in collusion with others, are often difficult to profile. Despite the 
multiple ways that fraud can be carried out, each crime is intentionally deceptive and 
often highly rationalised (Hayes & Prenzler, 2003).  
 Wells (2014) identified the three major categories of occupational fraud as 
asset misappropriation, corruption, and financial statement fraud (p. 44) (see Figure 
2.5).    
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Figure 2.5:  Occupational fraud and abuse 
Source: Occupational Fraud and Abuse Model (Wells, 2014, p. 2). 
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Corruption pertains to exercising influence for personal benefit, financial 
statement fraud focuses on the misreporting of financial information, and asset 
misappropriation involves the theft or misuse of organisational assets (Wells, 2014). 
The next section discusses asset misappropriation/invoice fraud in detail and explains 
why this particular type of fraud was chosen for this study. 
2.2.3 Asset misappropriation 
Invoice fraud, a sub-section of asset misappropriation, is often referred to as 
billing fraud and is one of the most common types of financial fraud. Invoice or 
billing schemes do not require the perpetrators to expose themselves to the risks 
associated with physically stealing cash or merchandise from an individual or 
organisation (W. S. Albrecht et al., 2012). Fraudulent invoices can be generated 
within a secure home environment and are often submitted during periods of high 
invoice traffic to avoid initial detection. Farber (2005) observed that 60% of his 
sample population,12 which consisted of firms identified by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) as being involved with fraud, had utilised invoice 
schemes (p. 543).  
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) identified the same 
three categories of occupational fraud as Wells13 (2014), in its Report to the Nations, 
Global Report into Occupational Fraud and Abuse (ACFE, 2014).14 The ACFE 
report presented findings from the organisations’ global occupational fraud surveys. 
These surveys were completed most recently in 2010, 2012, and 2014. In each of 
these last three surveys, more than 85% of occupational fraud cases identified 
involved asset misappropriation, which therefore demonstrates that this type of fraud 
is a major issue for public and private sector organisations.  
2.2.4 Invoice fraud 
The three most common types of invoice fraud schemes, as categorised by 
Wells (2014) and W. S. Albrecht et al. (2012) are: 
1.  Setting up shell companies to submit invoices to the victim organisation;  
                                                
 
12 The sample (Farber, 2005) consisted of 87 publicly held firms, identified by the US SEC for 
violating SEC Rule 10b-5 (securities fraud) during the period 1982-2000. 
13 It is important to note that in addition to being an author, Dr. Joseph T. Wells is the President and 
CEO of ACFE. 
14 The 2014 Report to the Nations, Global Report into Occupational Fraud and Abuse is based on 
1483 cases of occupational fraud. 
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2. Altering or double paying a non-accomplice vendor’s statement; and,  
3. Making personal purchases with company funds. 
Shell companies, sometimes labelled ‘dummy companies’, are formally 
registered entities that are factitious in nature and established most commonly by 
employees for the primary purpose of committing fraud (W. S. Albrecht et al., 2012). 
Fraudsters may also establish an associated bank account with themselves as the sole 
signatory (Wells, 2014). Bierstaker, Brody, and Pacini (2006) argued that although 
shell companies are simple to establish, they are often difficult to detect, especially 
by electronic means, as the data sets are often not appropriate for screening. 
Bierstaker et al. (2006) stated that digital data analysis software may be used for 
audits of events, such as investment sales/purchases, cheque registers, and sales and 
price histories; however, data sets or data analysis around, for example, identification 
of duplicate addresses or bank accounts, contract manipulation, or inventory fraud 
are highly problematic (p. 526).  
Pay and return schemes, in contrast, add another complicating layer to 
detection. Pay and return schemes refer to double payments and intentional 
overpayments, including the altering or double payment of a non-accomplice 
vendor’s statement or the intentional mishandling of legitimate invoices by 
employees (Wells, 2014).  
Finally, the third category of making personal purchases with company funds 
results in victim organisations ordering and paying for items that they do not need, 
and is classified as a type of invoice fraud (Wells, 2014). In other words, the 
fraudster does not steal cash, but rather purchases items for personal (or family) 
consumption through false invoicing, fraudulent purchase authorisations, or by 
falsifying documents (Wells, 2014). 
Prevalence of these types of fraud involving the transference of government 
money to a corrupt person commonly results, according to ICAC NSW, from:  
• a poorly designed payment process; 
• a payment process being falsely modified by a system administrator; 
• staff being put under pressure to process quickly; 
• policies mandating impossible timeframes; 
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• incomplete paperwork being accepted; 
• delegations not being able to be verified; 
• excessive payments not being questioned; and 
• increases in payments to suppliers and/or order splitting going unnoticed 
(ICAC, 2014, p. 5). 
This section contained discussion of ANAOs broad summary of fraud 
categories, which were subsequently refined to define occupational crime, asset 
misappropriation, and invoice fraud. The next section reviews public sector fraud. 
2.3 PUBLIC SECTOR FRAUD 
A substantial body of literature has identified and examined fraud in the public 
sector. As Frimpong and Baker (2007) posited, government agencies should address 
the subject of fraud in a serious and sustained manner. This study posits that if fraud 
related governance practices align with fraud related legislation, public sector entities 
will achieve fraud minimisation. This short section examines common types of 
public sector fraud. 
2.3.1 Common types of fraud committed in the public sector 
Fraud in the public sector is a significant problem. According to PwC (2015), 
in the Fighting Fraud in the Public Sector III report, 41% of global public sector 
entities experience fraud; with 34% of these victim entities experiencing in excess of 
10 frauds within a two-year period. The study of public sector fraud is particularly 
relevant considering the current budget constraints associated with the delivery of 
essential services and that the Australian public sector is continually being asked to 
do more with less (Towell, 2016).  
In 2015, PwC published An Australian snapshot of economic crime in the 
public sector. The publication compared fraud rates within the public sector against 
other industries. The survey’s findings are represented in Figure 2.6 and show that 
the public sector ranked equal fourth with the hospitality and leisure sector (PWC, 
2015), demonstrating that the risk to public sector entities remains high.   
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Figure 2.6: Economic crime by industry 2014 
Source: PwC Global Economic Crime Survey - An Australian snapshot of economic crime in the 
public sector (2015, p.8) 
 
Private and public sector entities have many similarities and often work in 
unison, yet the focus of their respective management teams are fundamentally 
different. Entrepreneurs or shareholders own private sector entities, whilst public 
sector entities are owned collectively by members of political communities. Whereas 
market forces or economic systems drive private sector entities; political forces shape 
the public sector, because they are funded largely by taxation, as opposed to fees 
paid directly by customers (Boyne, 2002, p.98). Private sector managers seek to 
expend resources for maximum profits. Whilst in contrast, public sector managers 
focus on the use of available resources to provide the maximum benefit to 
constituents (Holmes, Strawser, & Welch, 2000, p.347). The differing focus of the 
two management teams in each industry results in differing control systems (Holmes 
et.al, 2000). 
Within the public sector, the type of crime perpetrated is often influenced by 
the position held by the fraudster (Seidman, 1990) and that individual’s ability to 
deceive, exploit, and manipulate others (Duffield & Grabosky, 2001). The 
perpetrators of fraud may be positioned at the very top or the very bottom of an 
organisation’s hierarchy (Zahra, 2005). Regardless of a fraudsters position in an 
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organisation, they are, by Cressey’s (1953) definition, ‘trust violators’ and use their 
internal knowledge to deceive the entity for their own benefit. 
Figure 2.7 shows occupational fraud by category; the data contained in this 
table is based on a survey of both public and private sector respondents. Figure 2.8 
shows asset misappropriation to be the dominant category of occupational fraud 
(ACFE, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 2.7:  Occupational fraud by category 
Source: ACFE (2014) 
 
 
Invoice fraud falls within the category of asset misappropriation and is the 
focus of this study, with all case study entities victims of this crime. See Figure 2.5 
for the complete list of asset misappropriation crimes. The findings reflected in 
Figure 2.6 are further supported by results obtained during the 2015 PwC Global 
Economic Crime Survey (see Figure 2.7), which highlights the prevalence of asset 
misappropriation as the top reported crime in both 2011and 2014. Figure 2.7 shows 
the percentage of respondents from the 2015 PwC Global Economic Crime Survey 
that experienced particular types of economic crime. The next section in this chapter 
reviews public sector fraud related legislation. 
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Figure 2.8: PwC - Types of economic crime reported 
Source: PwC Global Economic Crime Survey (2014) 
 
2.4 PUBLIC SECTOR FRAUD RELATED LEGISLATION 
Fraud related legislation is a critical part of this study, with the Conceptual 
Fraud Alignment Model in Chapter 3 identifying it as the foundation element 
required for public sector entities in order to achieve fraud minimisation.  
This section provides background information on fraud related legislation 
within the Australian context. Fraud-related legislation and offences in Australia are 
reviewed to determine how fraud is dealt with under Commonwealth legislation. In 
doing so, the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA 
Act) (Cth, 2013) and Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) are 
examined. The review of these two publications provides an understanding of the 
mandatory fraud control mechanisms public entities are required to implement in 
order to be deemed ‘compliant’. Additionally, AS 8001 Fraud and Corruption 
Control (AS 8001) (Standards Australia, 2008), is reviewed as a complimentary 
(non-mandated) source of information.  
2.4.1 Background 
Historically, fraud has often been viewed as a ‘victimless’ crime, or a crime 
that creates minimal impact (Duffield & Grabosky, 2001; Moore & Mills, 1990). As 
many researchers have documented; however, fraud detrimentally impacts many 
stakeholders: shareholders, taxpayers, other employees, the communities in which 
organisations work, and critically, society at large (Zahra, 2005, p.818). Fraud results 
in a breach of trust (Price & Norris, 2009), negatively impacting not only the victim 
organisation, but also surrounding entities (Button, Lewis, & Tapley, 2012). On a 
macro level, Zahra (2005) argued that one of the most corrosive consequences of 
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fraud is the public’s loss of faith or trust in its leading institutions, or as Zahra terms 
it, its “destruction of social capital” (Zahra, 2005, p.819). 
Concerns resulting from public sector fraud have led to a raft of enacted 
legislation by state and federal government agencies. A range of authors have 
explored the nature of legislative frameworks best designed to address and deter 
fraud. According to Bini (2015), the basic purpose of any government rule is to 
change people’s behaviour, and in doing so, effect a desired change. The challenge 
for governments is to introduce legislation that does not provide an undue burden for 
organisations, and which is relatively easy to implement – to create a unified strategy 
that maintains sufficient autonomy that will allow employees to develop initiative 
and responsiveness (Norman, 2001). ‘Juridification’ is a term used by Haines and 
Sutton (2003) to describe the situation where individuals and organisations subjected 
to regulations become overwhelmed by the detailed rules, standards, and instructions. 
If individuals or organisations are overprescribed with regulations, the likelihood of 
them being able to comply is undermined (Haines & Sutton, 2003). Hence, 
establishing an alignment between legislation and fraud governance practices is 
critical and underpins this study.  
Literature surrounding high profile scandals underscores that government 
responses to these events may contribute to a broader understanding of effective 
fraud deterrence frameworks. Bittle and Snider (2011) argued that high-profile fraud 
cases often compel governments to introduce legislation to offset corporate abuses 
and to protect public interest. Examples of this include the collapse of WorldCom 
and Enron in the United States, where these cases generated substantial legislative 
reform. They became a turning point for professional accounting regulators and 
financial reporting standards, both in terms of the scale of the incident and in the 
scope of legislative reforms, such as the United States’ Sarbanes–Oxley Act 2002 (H. 
Rockness & Rockness, 2006). Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the Bribery Act 
(2010) was introduced, in part, following a highly controversial bribery scandal 
involving BAE Systems (Yeoh, 2012).  
In Australia, numerous amendments to the Corporations Act (2001) occurred 
following the government’s Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit 
Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9). Carey, Monroe, and Shailer 
(2014) argued that CLERP 9 was introduced following fraud scandals, particularly 
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involving financial reporting between 2000 and 2003. Other high-profile cases where 
internal governance controls have failed and spurred significant legislative response 
include HIH Insurance Pty Ltd, One.Tel Limited, and ING Australia in the private 
sector, in addition to Queensland Health, Centrelink,15 Department of Defence,16 and 
the NSW Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) in the public sector. 
2.4.1.1 Legislation and offences 
The criminal law system in Australia is a matrix of federal and state legislation. 
Nine separate jurisdictions (Cth, ACT, NT, NSW, VIC, SA, WA, Qld, and Tas) 
either have their own, or share common legislation relating to fraud (Bronitt, 2013; 
Graycar, 2000). Where fraud legislation under the Commonwealth’s Criminal Code 
Act 1995 (Cth, 2005) and Queensland’s Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) overlap, 
Constitutional allocation of powers dictates the relative order of precedence for 
prosecution (Bronitt, 2013). State offences are generally prosecuted in state courts, 
while Commonwealth offences where both state and federal crimes are involved 
may, for efficiency reasons, be prosecuted in state and territory courts (Broome, 
1999). In situations where law enforcement extends beyond state borders, or where 
federally regulated crimes are involved, the Commonwealth retains prosecution 
rights (Sarre, 2002). 
Legislation around public sector fraud is found in the Commonwealth’s 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth, 2005) and in state equivalents. Under the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth, 2005), fraud against the Commonwealth involving “Obtaining 
property or a financial advantage by deception” constitutes a criminal offence. (Part 
7.3, Division 134).  Key fraud-related offences include:17  
• dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity 
by deception (s. 134.2); 
                                                
 
15 The Daily Telegraph (NSW). 2015. Welfare frauds stealing $5 billion of taxpayers money. 
Retrieved November 27, 2015. http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/welfare-frauds-stealing-
5-billion-of-taxpayers-money/story-fni0cx12-1227623207866 
16 Canberra Times. 2015. Defence is watching the odometer after $585,000 fuel card fraud. Retrieved 
November 27, 2015. http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/public-service/defence-is-watching-
the-odometer-after-585000-fuel-card-fraud-20150717-giemij?rand=1438306274829 
17 ComLaw. 2015. Commonwealth Fraud Control guidelines. Retrieved December 3, 2015. 
https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2011L00511.  
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• doing anything with the intention of dishonestly obtaining a gain from a 
Commonwealth entity, or causing a loss to a Commonwealth entity (ss. 
135.1(1) and (3)); 
• conspiring with another person with the intention of dishonestly obtaining 
a gain from a Commonwealth entity, or causing a loss to a Commonwealth 
entity (ss. 135.4(1) and (3));  
• dishonestly influencing a Commonwealth public official in the exercise of 
their duties (s. 135.1(7));  
• obtaining a financial advantage, which the recipient knows or believes 
they are not eligible to receive (s. 135.2(1)). 
 
Government agencies with direct responsibilities to support state or federal 
charges include the Attorney-General’s Department for the provision of high policy 
advice to the government, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) for investigations 
relating to serious or complex crime against Commonwealth laws, the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions for prosecuting offences against 
Commonwealth law and for conducting related criminal assets recovery, and the 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) for annual financial audits of 
Commonwealth agencies (ANAO, 2011, p.19). 
2.4.2 The PGPA Act (2013) 
Sitting beside the Criminal Codes, Australian public entities are also subject to 
legislation under the PGPA Act (Cth, 2013).18 With parliamentary directed emphasis 
on planning, performance, and reporting, the PGPA Act (Cth, 2013) is the primary 
resource management legislation for the Commonwealth19 (Department of Finance, 
2015).  
Legislative instruments20 currently in effect (under the PGPA Act) include: 
• PGPA Rule 2014 (Cth, 2014); 
                                                
 
18 The PGPA Act (Cth, 2013) replaced the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) 
(FMA Act) and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cth) (CAC Act) on 1 July 
2014. 
19 Australian Government, Department of Finance. (2015). Retrieved December 12, 2015, from 
http://www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/pgpa-legislation/. 
20 Australian Government, Department of Finance. (2015, para 3). Retrieved September 9, 2015, from 
http://www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/pgpa-legislation/. 
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• Commonwealth Procurement Rules; 
• Commonwealth Grants Rules and Guidelines; 
• PGPA Financial Reporting Rule 2015; 
• PGPA Investment Authorisation 2014; 
• Finance Minister’s Delegations; 
• other binding requirements, including determinations, policies, 
government policy orders, and directions. 
The PGPA Act (Cth, 2013) is complemented by:   
• Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); 
• Public Service Act 1999 (Cth); 
• Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).  
Additional Australian Government legislated requirements dealing with fraud, 
including the Crimes Act 1914 and Evidence Act 1995 are detailed within Appendix 
B.   
In summary, the Commonwealth Resource Management Framework (Cth, 
2015 supports devolved responsibilities, accountability, and transparency through 
devolved rules for public entities. Figure 2.9 shows the relationship between the 
legislative foundations, the supporting legislative instruments and the resource 
management cycle (Cth, 2015, p.7).  
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Figure 2.9: Conceptual view of the Commonwealth Resource Management 
Framework 
Source: Australian Government, Department of Finance (2015). 
 
2.4.3 The Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a)  
The Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) outlines the 
principles of fraud control and the minimum standards agencies are required to 
achieve to reduce fraud risks. The framework was developed specifically to assist 
public entities with their internal fraud prevention and detection mechanisms, and 
provides a pivotal reference for this this study. 
Briefly, the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) consists of 
three components: 
• Fraud Rule–Section 10 of the PGPA Rule 2014 (Cth, 2014); 
• Fraud Policy–the Commonwealth Fraud Control Policy; 
• Fraud Guidance–Resource Management Guide No. 201: Preventing, 
detecting and dealing with fraud (Cth, 2014b). 
An understanding of the binding nature of the Commonwealth Fraud Control 
Framework’s (Cth, 2014a) Fraud Rule (Cth, 2014) and Fraud Policy publications are 
essential for public sector organisations; these components are further described in 
Chapter 3 of this study. Each component of the framework has varying binding 
effects. Table 2.2 summarises the agency status for the three components of the 
Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a).  
 
Table 2.2:  Requirements for entities - Agency status 
 
Source: Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a, p.iv). 
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Fraud Guidance (Cth, 2014b) leverages off the PGPA Act (Cth, 2013) and the 
PGPA Rules (2014) to “provide best practice guidance for fraud control 
arrangements for all Commonwealth entities” (Cth, 2014a, p. 3). Fraud Guidance is 
drafted to support the government’s “targeted and risk based approach towards the 
prevention and detection of fraud perpetrated against the Commonwealth” (Cth, 
2014b, p. 6). This expectation is based on the premise that, whilst not binding, Fraud 
Guidance is deemed (by the government) to be best practice (Cth, 2014b). Similarly, 
whilst AS 8001 (Standards Australia, 2008) is also not mandatory for public entities, 
its use is recommended by the government as a supporting resource. The following 
section provides a short summary of the AS 8001. 
2.4.4 Australian Standard 8001 (Standards Australia, 2008) 
The Australian Standard—Fraud and Corruption Control (AS 8001), forms part 
of the Governance series of publications within the Australian Standards (Standards 
Australia, 2008). AS 8001 is nested alongside AS 8000 (Good Governance 
Principles), AS 8002 (Organisational Codes of Conduct), AS 8003 (Corporate Social 
Responsibility), and AS 8004 (Whistleblower Protection Programs For Entities) 
(Standards Australia, 2008).  
AS 8001 covers three main categories (Standards Australia, 2008, p.11): fraud 
involving the misappropriation of assets, fraud involving the misappropriation of 
financial reporting (either internal or external to the reporting entity), and corruption 
involving abuse of position for personal gain. 
Standards Australia (2008) suggests that AS 8001 applies to, and is 
implemented in its entirety by; publicly listed corporations, large privately owned 
corporations, and all government departments and agencies (p.11). In order for any 
entity to be deemed AS 8001 compliant, they must meet minimum AS 8001 
standards. AS 8001 states “Any entity claiming to be fully compliant with the 
Standard will, as a minimum, have implemented all of the minimum acceptable 
compliance level elements” (Standards Australia, 2008, p. 12).  
The structure of AS 8001 (Standards Australia, 2008) is based on four 
components: planning and resourcing, prevention, detection, and response. Figure 
2.10 presents the structure of AS 8001 (Standards Australia, 2008, p. 18). The AS 
8001 minimum fraud and corruption control standards (Standards Australia, 2008, 
pp. 19–51) are listed in Appendix A.  
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AS 8001 (Standards Australia, 2008) is not binding, but the Commonwealth 
Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) does recommend that entities use it as the 
recognised standard; additionally, it states that fraud methodologies adopted by 
public entities should be consistent with the AS 8001 (Cth, 2014, C-10).  
 
Figure 2.10:  AS 8001—Fraud and corruption control structure 
Source: AS 8001 (Standards Australia, 2008, p. 18). 
 
2.4.5 Obtaining compliance 
Organisations are required to follow multiple criteria in order to be deemed 
compliant. These criteria may include laws or regulations, contracts, or internal 
policy and procedures (Leung, Corman, Cooper, & Richardson, 2015, p.180). 
Auditors will articulate an organisation’s compliance through the provision of a 
‘compliance engagement’. The Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AASB) of 
Australia outlines the requirements of a compliance engagement within the Standard 
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on Assurance Engagements (ASAE 3100)–Compliance Engagements. ASAE 3100 
defines the objective of a compliance engagement as “…enabling the assurance 
practitioner to express a conclusion on whether an entity has complied in all material 
respects, with requirements as measured by the suitable criteria” (AASB, 2008, pp. 
9-10). For public sector entities within Australia, compliance is achieved through 
adherence to legislation, as stated within the Commonwealth Fraud Control 
Framework (Cth, 2014a). Legislation to address public sector fraud is designed to 
promote governance practices to ensure compliance. This legislation is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3 and within Appendix D. The following extract articulates public 
entity responsibilities for compliance in Australia: 
These Guidelines are a legislative instrument registered in accordance 
with the requirements of the Legislative Instruments Act (LIA) 2003, 
and individuals and agencies have a legal obligation to comply with 
the requirements set out within the Guidelines. Obligations that are 
required to be complied with, in all circumstances, are denoted by the 
use of the term ‘must’ in the Guidelines.  The use of the word ‘should’ 
denotes matters, which are recommended as sound practice. 
(Australian Government, 2011, p. 2). 
As demonstrated within this section, legislation is a central tenant to the 
attainment of fraud minimisation. For this reason, this study focuses on the alignment 
of fraud related legislation and fraud governance practices. The legislation and 
governance sections within this chapter are important, as the information presented 
was used to help form this study’s Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model in Chapter 3. 
The following section describes the most common governance measures used by 
organisations to minimise fraudulent acts, including invoice fraud. 
2.5 PUBLIC SECTOR FRAUD RELATED GOVERANCE 
This section describes governance literature, identifying research that 
demonstrates how governance structures can help to prevent and detect fraud. The 
Australian Stock Exchange’s Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (2014) define governance as “the framework of rules, 
relationships, systems and processes within and by which authority is exercised and 
controlled within corporations. It encompasses the mechanisms by which companies, 
and those in control, are held to account” (p. 3). The term ‘minimised’ reflects the 
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fact that fraud prevention is almost impossible in practice and that the objective is to 
ensure it occurs rarely, and that its influences are minimised (McGibney & Hearne, 
2003, p. 2).  
In general terms, despite Australia having sophisticated systems available for 
managing compliance, many Australian organisations still require a significant 
amount of work to fully integrate and manage their compliance issues (Stein, 2006, 
p. 330). Instead of being an integrated component of strategy, Stein (2006) argued 
that compliance too often remains a process of ticking boxes, as opposed to actual 
practices. This study seeks to determine whether this is the case, and whether actual 
work practices are effectively addressing the fraud problem. Further evidence of a 
lack of compliance was provided by KPMG (2012), who surveyed 22 leading 
Australian companies in 2011 and identified that many organisations had 
‘compliance myopia’, which prevented them from looking past the compliance to the 
detriment of strategic benefits (Stein, 2012, p. 330).  
This study seeks to analyse public entities in relation to their compliance, with 
enacted legislation designed to minimise fraud. Figure 2.11 shows the relationship 
between conformance and performance (actual practices).  
 
 
Figure 2.11:  The Performance Conformance Nexus 
Source: ANAO (2002) 
 
The aim of this study is to determine whether performance and conformance 
are aligned in attempts to minimise fraud, as robust fraud prevention (minimisation) 
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and detection mechanisms are the central component of internal controls. These 
components are supported by legislation and refined by fraud governance 
procedures. Fraud prevention and detection mechanisms were defined in simplistic 
terms by Bolton and Hand (2002), who distinguished the two concepts by 
characterising ‘prevention’ as measures to stop fraud from occurring and ‘detection’ 
as a means of identifying fraud once it has been perpetrated (p. 235). Whilst fraud 
prevention and detection measures are two separate functions, the two elements work 
in unison and complement one another as a collective effort.  
2.5.1 Hard and soft controls 
In this study, two terms are used to broadly categorise fraud control 
mechanisms: hard and soft controls. Table 2.3 lists types of controls within each of 
these two groups. Hard controls are designed to change employee behaviour or 
actions; they are easily observed and relatively easy for internal auditors to test. Key 
elements of hard controls include planning, tasks, responsibilities, and authorisation 
(Combee et al., 2015, p. 5). Soft controls refer to the culture and behaviour of both 
management and employees; soft controls relate to the workplace attitude on 
achieving organisational objectives (Combee et al., 2015, p. 5). Soft controls are 
more difficult to test due to their largely intangible nature. Abdelrahim (2014) 
explained the difficulty in ascertaining the degree of effectiveness of a soft control. It 
is simple to determine whether an entity has a formal code of conduct, yet 
determining how effectively it is implemented is much more difficult (Abdelrahim, 
2014, p.5). Soft controls are intangible controls, and examples may include morale, 
integrity, ethical climate, empowerment, openness and shared values (Abdelrahim, 
2014; Chtioui & Thiéry-Dubuisson, 2011; Combee et al., 2015), or competence and 
professionalism of employees (DiNapoli, 2010). Hard controls are tangible, and may 
include approvals, authorisations, verifications, reconciliations, review of 
performance (Abdelrahim, 2014) or planning and task allocation (Combee et al., 
2015).   
Soft controls should be viewed as the foundation of effective hard controls 
(Abdelrahim, 2014). Hard and soft controls should complement one another in order 
to mitigate the fraud risk in the most appropriate manner (Chtioui & Thiéry-
Dubuisson, 2011). Falkenberg and Herremans (1995) argued that the most effective 
internal controls exist when formal and informal or hard and soft systems are 
congruent (see Table 2.3). The two systems should be developed in a balanced 
 38 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
manner according to the characteristics of the entity in order to form a single set of 
efficient controls (Chtioui & Thiéry-Dubuisson, 2011). The balance between these 
controls is referred to as control harmonisation, and is deemed an essential 
prerequisite for establishing a stable and efficient organisation (Falkenberg and 
Herremans, 1995). When an entity focuses on hard controls to achieve compliance, 
there is an illusion of control. However, as Chtioui & Thiéry-Dubuisson (2011) 
posited, hard controls alone do nothing to curb incidents of fraud.  
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Table 2.3:  Hard and soft controls 
Hard Controls (tangible) Soft Controls (intangible) 
Organisational structure Integrity 
Delegations Morale 
Legislation Ethical climate 
Policies Empowerment 
Segregation of duties Competencies 
Reconciliations Shared values 
System access Culture 
Budgets Leadership 
Signatures Education 
Source: McDonald (2015) 
 
Hard controls tend to supervise and monitor employee behaviour through 
systems using explicit measures, whilst soft controls are enabled by managers 
through shared values, moral standards, beliefs, and unwritten traditions (Chtioui & 
Thiéry-Dubuisson, 2011). Many workplaces focus on hard controls, leading to more 
regulation being introduced and a requirement for appropriate soft controls for 
implementation (Chtioui & Thiéry-Dubuisson, 2011). These controls are discussed in 
more detail in the following sections. 
2.5.2 Governance principles 
The section commences by discussing the importance of ‘tone from the top’ 
and by addressing the broader topic of culture; in particular, a positive anti-fraud 
culture. Risk assessment, education and training, and employee and third party 
screening are also discussed within this section, as they are each valuable functions 
designed to minimise fraud within the workplace. Finally, whistle blower protection 
is reviewed, highlighting the importance of employees as a valuable tool to detect 
fraudulent activities. 
2.5.2.1 Culture – Tone from the top 
The cultural tone of an organisation is established based on the behaviour of 
managers or accountable authorities (Bryan, 2012). This type of culture is often 
referred to as ‘tone at the top’ (Davis & Pesch, 2013; Lail, MacGregor, Stuebs, & 
Thomasson, 2013). Based on Table 2.3, tone at the top is a soft control measure 
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because its influence is often largely intangible. This study aims to determine 
whether tone at the top (or lack of it) contributed to fraud occurring.   
Tone at the top is defined by Lail et al. (2013) as an organisation’s general 
ethical climate, as established by its senior management and board of directors. In a 
similar manner, Davis & Pesch (2013) used the term to describe how a management 
team or executive conveys a consistent message regarding ethical values and 
appropriate behaviour. The Board and CEO must demonstrate integrity, honesty, and 
ethical behaviour in their handling of decisions and sensitive issues, and operational 
managers continue the tone through internal control initiatives as part of daily 
operations (DiNapoli, 2010, p.3). It is argued that in an organisation where there is a 
strong anti-fraud culture, the tone from the top promotes transparent financial 
reporting and complete disclosure; conversely, a weak tone will inculcate or 
advocate misleading and non-transparent actions that are detrimental, and may lead 
to fraudulent behaviour (Lail et al., 2013).  
Tone from the top is an essential component of governance and an important 
element in fraud prevention (Cth, 2014a, p. 14). Strong leaders that maintain ethical 
values and support ethical behaviour provide the foundation for establishing an anti-
fraud culture (Graycar, 2000); this is particularly important with many soft controls, 
for example, whistle blowing will be less effective as a fraud minimisation strategy if 
there is a perceived risk of organisational retaliation (by individuals or groups) 
towards the party that blew the whistle (Bhal & Dadhich, 2011). Setting the tone at 
the top allows for objectives to be promoted that focus on achieving high 
performance with accountability (ANAO, 2014, p. 10). The PGPA Act (Cth, 2013) 
highlights the need for managers or accountable authorities to be advocates for fraud 
prevention and states that: 
The accountable authority of a Commonwealth entity must govern the 
entity in a way that promotes the proper use and management of 
public resources for which the authority is responsible, promotes the 
achievement of the purposes of the entity and promotes the financial 
sustainability of the entity.  (Australian Government, 2013, p. 18) 
A strong anti-fraud culture is based on two-way communication between 
leaders and staff; if there is a reluctance to hear bad news, then it is likely that staff 
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will hold off on communicating problems until it is too late or until the problem has 
become worse (PwC, 2008, p.43). 
Strong leadership also relates to culture. A culture of compliance will take time 
to develop and the journey to obtain the highest levels of ethical standards may be 
long (Biegelman & Bartlow, 2012, p. 49). The Australian Public Service (APS) code 
of conduct outlines all professional conduct related requirements for all APS 
employees. This short code, approximately one page long, is a succinct list of clearly 
explained expectations that relate directly to a public entities culture. The first two 
listed requirements state that an APS employee must behave both honestly and with 
integrity in the course of APS employment, and also act with care and diligence in 
the course of APS employment (APS, 2014, p.10).  
When describing the link between the importance of leadership and the 
implementation of effective fraud governance, ANAO (2014) regards strong 
leadership as an essential element. Therefore, it is argued that fraud prevention 
begins with upper management (Graycar, 2000). Without leadership from upper 
management, the ability to maintain high standards of conduct is difficult (ANAO, 
2014, p. 10). Leadership is directly linked to the effectiveness of an organisation’s 
governance framework and controls; poor leadership inhibits the ability to 
operationalise governance controls (ANAO, 2014, p. 10). In this study, case 
organisations are analysed to determine whether tone from the top contributed to 
fraud occurring. The next section examines risk assessments as a fraud minimisation 
control measure.  
2.5.2.2 Risk assessment 
The design of appropriate internal controls begins with a risk assessment 
process (DiNapoli, 2010). W. S. Albrecht et al. (2012) defined risk assessment  as the 
identification and analysis of relevant risks to the achievement of objectives, forming 
the basis of how the risks should be managed (p. 67). Leung et al. (2015) stated that 
strong risk assessment should consider the entities business risk and their financial 
consequences, the inherent risks of misstatements in financial statement assertions, 
and the risk of fraud and its financial consequences (p. 379). In general terms, Main 
(2004) argued that the aim of risk assessment is to reduce risk to an acceptable level, 
and that the process is not complete until an acceptable level is achieved (p. 37). This 
general definition indicates that the process should be ongoing, with the assessment 
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continually updated and reviewed. The next section examines the importance of 
education and training to increase employee fraud awareness as a fraud minimisation 
control measure. 
2.5.2.3 Education and training 
In order to achieve a true compliance culture, organisations must understand 
that fraud prevention and detection training is essential, as is the dissemination of 
fraud awareness throughout the organisation (Stein, 2012, p. 330). Training should 
be delivered at the time of hiring, and periodically thereafter; it is recommended that 
the training include processes for acceptance of gifts and entertaining, conflicts of 
interest, suspicion reporting/protected disclosures, criminal and/or civil redress 
against offending persons, breaching the policy guidelines, and investigation 
standards (PwC, 2007, p. 16). Ongoing fraud awareness training empowers an 
organisation by creating more employees who can identify risks, which increases the 
ability for the entity to deter and detect fraudulent activity (Strand, Judd, & 
Lancaster, 2002). 
Organisational managers who are directly involved with fraud control should 
be suitably prepared. Additional supporting or useful traits would include knowledge 
of law and fraud-related legislation and a good knowledge of human behaviours (W. 
S. Albrecht et al., 2012, p. 16). Organisational managers must ensure that employees 
understand the guidelines and processes; when fraudulent acts are investigated, a 
lack of clear guidelines is a very common excuse used by offenders (PwC, 2008, 
p.15). This study aims to provide insights into whether education and training was 
used as fraud minimisation strategy in the organisations examined within the case 
studies. The next section examines employee and third party screening as a fraud 
minimisation control measure. 
2.5.2.4 Employee and third party screening 
Research has found that the majority of fraud (71.4%) is perpetrated by 
employees (PwC, 2008). When an economic downturn occurs and there is a 
decreasing number of high-paying jobs, curriculum vitae (CV) fraud and misstated 
information on employee job applications are common practice. As a result of the 
increased competition, effective screening is a necessity (Engleman & Kleiner, 1998, 
p. 164). At a minimum, it is argued that employee screening and criminal checks 
must occur as part of the due diligence process when considering hiring a new 
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employee. Ideally, employee screening should be extended to third party providers. 
Organisations should adopt a much broader approach to screening than the traditional 
methods of letters, references, and interviews. Engleman and Kleiner (1998) stated 
that whilst the personal interview is the most commonly used selection method, it is 
often the weakest—although communication and social skills may be observed, 
honesty and trustworthiness cannot be detected (p. 165). “It is a fact that the cost of 
proper screening is far outweighed by the cost of one bad recruit” (PwC, 2008, p16). 
A variety of methods beyond the standard criminal check should be used to 
select and hire the right candidate. Additional screening methods should be 
incorporated as part of a total screening package and could include resume 
verification, media searches, credit checks, reference checks, criminal history, and 
driving record checks (Brody, 2010, p. 220). The next section examines 
whistleblower protections as a fraud minimisation control measure. 
2.5.2.5 Whistleblower protection 
Employees are a valuable source of information (ACFE, 2014), with 
whistleblowing recognised as a proven method for combating the threat of fraud. A 
whistleblower is defined by the Australian Securities Investment Commission (2015) 
as an individual, most often an employee, contractor, or member of an organisation, 
who reports misconduct, or dishonest or illegal activity that has occurred within that 
same organisation.  
Whistleblowing hotlines are a response mechanism used by employees and 
others to report questionable behaviour (W. S. Albrecht et.al, 2012, p.663). The 
establishment of an anti-fraud environment relies on a variety of deterrence factors, 
including tone from the top, whistleblower hotlines, and whistleblower protections 
(Dorminey et.al, 2012). Bhal & Dadhich (2011) stressed the importance of the 
relationship between tone from the top and effective whistleblower systems; they 
posited that ethical leadership is essential, especially when there is a high risk of 
whistleblower retaliation. Whistleblowers in Australia receive protection from the 
Corporations Act 2001; however, Van Akkeren & Tarr (2015) posited that these 
‘protections’ are not comprehensive, especially when comparisons are made between 
public and private sector entities. For example, due to the Australian criminal law 
system operating throughout nine separate jurisdictions, Australian whistleblowing 
laws are not uniform. Each jurisdiction maintains varying provisions regarding who 
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is eligible for protected disclosures, the scope of protection, how disclosures need to 
be made, and overall procedures (Parliament of Australia, 2009). Within the public 
sector, the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (PIDA) (Australian Government, 
2013) provides protection for public entity employees; it supports disclosure of 
corporate wrongdoing and ensures investigations are conducted properly. PIDA was 
the result of a major reform process for the Australian public sector’s whistleblower 
framework (Parliament of Australia, 2009, para 14.37). During the 2014 Senate 
enquiry into the Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, expert witnesses suggested that PIDA should be used as a template for 
the private sector, as it represented best practice (Parliament of Australia, 2009). In 
contrast, internal whistleblower programs are currently not mandated within the 
private sector (Van Akkeren & Tarr, 2015). Additionally, the ‘burden of proof’ rests 
with the whistleblower, who must identify themselves when the report is made, have 
a direct association with the organisation, submit the report to a designated person, 
and demonstrate both reasonable grounds and that it was made in ‘good faith’ (ASIC, 
2015).  
The effectiveness of a whistleblower can be determined by the extent to which 
the reported action, misconduct, wrongful practice, or omission is terminated within 
a reasonable timeframe (Near & Miceli, 1995). Whilst ASIC requires individuals to 
identify themselves, research indicates that reported cases of misconduct are higher 
within organisations where there is the opportunity for individuals to report 
anonymously (Lee & Fargher, 2013, p. 287). This anonymous reporting often occurs 
through whistleblower hotlines. Whistleblower hotlines are a source of ‘tips’ (ACFE, 
2014) and are defined as an “accurate, convenient and secure method for employees 
to report fraud concerns or any irregularities to an independent party without fear of 
retaliation” (Pergola & Sprung, 2005, p. 43). Hotlines are a very cost effective means 
for detecting occupational fraud and abuse (Bierstaker et al., 2006, p. 523). Formal 
whistleblowing mechanisms, such as hotlines, can provide an effective means for 
driving a change of culture (Church, Gallus, Desrosiers, & Wacawski, 2007, p. 162). 
The degree of support for whistleblowers within organisations can be measured by 
whether or not the organisation explicitly articulates its whistleblowing policy (Lee 
& Fargher, 2013, p. 287). It should be noted that the Australian Standard (AS) 8004 
Corporate Governance–Whistleblower Protection Programs for Entities highlights 
that it is not mandatory for organisations to have whistleblower hotlines or 
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whistleblower protection mechanisms in place; however, it strongly recommends that 
they do (Standards Australia, 2008). The next section examines the identified gaps in 
literature. 
2.6 GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
This chapter presented extant literature relevant to the topic of this thesis. 
Literature directly focussing on the alignment or relationship between Australian 
legislation and fraud governance practices within private or public sector 
organisations is relatively sparse; whilst a significant amount of academic work has 
explored the importance of legislation and fraud control, such studies have treated 
the literature in isolation, ignoring any interface. This silo analysis has resulted in the 
literature gap this study seeks to address. This study reviews legislation and fraud 
governance practices as a collective; examining their relationship to one another and 
the efforts designed to achieve fraud minimisation. The next section presents this 
study’s research questions for consideration. 
2.7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The following research questions were developed for this study based on a 
review of the literature and identified gaps: 
• RQ1: What are the public sector legislative requirements for fraud 
minimisation?  
• RQ2: What specific governance measures address legislative requirements 
for fraud minimisation?  
• RQ3: To what extent should fraud governance practices be aligned with 
legislative requirements to achieve fraud minimisation? 
These three research questions are designed to address the identified gaps in 
the literature by: first, identifying the legislative requirements for fraud minimisation 
in the public sector; second, identifying the governance measures used by public 
entities to comply with legislative requirements; and, third, based on the findings, 
providing insights into fraud governance practices and whether an alignment 
between both hard and soft controls will help to achieve fraud minimisation. 
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2.8 SUMMARY 
This thesis seeks to examine the alignment between fraud related legislation 
and fraud governance practices within the public sector. The literature review 
consisted of five main components: fraud theory, types of fraud, public sector fraud, 
public sector fraud related legislation, and public sector fraud related governance. 
The literature review was designed to provide the background information required 
to understand the context of the research problem. This chapter informs this study’s 
Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model presented in Chapter 3, to assist in the analysis 
of the research findings in Chapter 5 and also informs refinements to the Conceptual 
Fraud Alignment Model in Chapter 6.  
The next chapter presents this study’s Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model for 
consideration.  
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Model 
“Managers must balance and control tensions between freedom and 
constraint, between empowerment and accountability, between top-down 
direction and bottom-up creativity, between experimentation and 
efficiency” (Simons, 1995, p. 5). 
 
This chapter introduces a conceptual model designed to demonstrate how fraud 
minimisation21 can be achieved through the alignment of fraud legislation and fraud 
governance practices in the public sector. The conceptual model was generated from 
a variety of sources, including fraud theories, governance literature, and evidence-
based best practices.  
This chapter proposes and explains a fraud alignment model. As identified in 
Section 2.6 (Gaps in the Literature), it was difficult to source studies examining the 
alignment between fraud-related legislation and fraud governance practices. No 
models or graphical representations were identified that articulate the approach 
required for achieving fraud minimisation, or for obtaining appropriate alignment. 
Therefore, this study has developed a model based on empirical studies, legislation, 
and regulation that will assist in identifying the requirements needed to achieve fraud 
minimisation through the attainment of an alignment between legislation and actual 
work practices. The conceptual model was informed by the relevant literature, and 
includes: (inter alia) W. S. Albrecht et al. (2012); Bierstaker et al., (2006); Bronitt, 
(2013); Cressey, (1950, 1953); Dorminey et al. (2010); Fleming, (2010); Graycar, 
(2000); and Wells (2014); and by the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 
(Cth, 2014a). It should be viewed as a medium to assist in bridging the identified 
literature gaps.  
Figure 3.1 displays the proposed public sector fraud alignment model. The 
analogy of a Roman temple is utilised to explain this conceptual model. Fraud-
related legislation forms the foundation of the temple structure; this legislation is 
extracted directly from the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a). 
                                                
 
21 Fraud minimisation is defined as a set of integrated activities to prevent, detect, investigate, and 
respond to fraud (Australian Government, 2011).  
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These are prescribed responsibilities, including rules and regulations that ‘must’ be 
followed and guidelines that ‘should’ be followed because they are deemed (by 
government) to be best practice (Cth, 2014a). The pillars (prevention, detection, and 
response) represent the mechanisms required to create appropriate fraud governance 
practices (risk assessment, fraud awareness training, qualifications, fraud control 
plans, employee screening, and investigations); they provide the temple with 
structure. The pillar names within the fraud alignment model were selected because 
they capture the three primary responsibilities listed within the Commonwealth 
Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) and directed towards accountable 
authorities;22 that is to ‘prevent, detect, and deal’23 with fraud relating to the entity. 
The pillars support the ceiling (fraud governance practices) and allow it to be set in 
relative alignment so that the roof (fraud minimisation) can be established 
successfully. The two-way arrows that run parallel along-side the pillars depict the 
relationship (compliance) between fraud legislation and fraud-related governance 
practices.  
The model visually illustrates how fraud-related legislation and fraud 
governance practices should be aligned within public sector organisations to achieve 
fraud minimisation. In developing the model, one of the objectives was to create a 
more simplistic approach that would enable management to easily understand the 
challenges associated with achieving fraud minimisation. The next section covers 
legislation, and in particular, the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 
2014a). 
                                                
 
22 Accountable authority is defined as “the person or group of persons who has responsibility for, and 
control over, a Commonwealth entity’s operations as set out under section 12 of the PGPA Act” (Cth 
No. 21, 2014b, p. 4). 
23 The term ‘deal’ was replaced with ‘response’ because this verb is deemed by the author to have 
more proactive connotations. 
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Figure 3.1: Fraud Alignment Model 
Source: Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) 
 
3.1  LEGISLATION: THE COMMONWEALTH FRAUD CONTROL 
FRAMEWORK (CTH, 2014A)  
Company executives have an obligation to manage their financial crime 
exposure. However, the reality is that the majority of fraud in organisations goes 
unreported, and despite fraudulent acts being deemed ‘low’ in the number of 
occurrences, are not actually under control (Chalom & Groenewold, 2011). In 
Australia, Commonwealth entities must adhere to the Commonwealth Fraud Control 
Framework (Cth, 2014a). Section 21 of the PGPA Act (Cth, 2013) states “the 
accountable authority of a non-corporate Commonwealth entity must govern the 
entity in a way that is not inconsistent with the policies of the Australian 
Government” (C’th, 2014, p.B-2). As discussed in Section 2.4.3, The 
Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) is broken into three 
components: 
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• Fraud Rule–Section 10 of the PGPA Rule 2014 (Cth, 2014); 
• Fraud Policy–the Commonwealth Fraud Control Policy; 
• Fraud Guidance–Resource Management Guide No. 201: Preventing, 
detecting and dealing with fraud (Cth, 2014b). 
There are 22 individual fraud-related legislative requirements within the 
Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a), and each relates specifically 
to public sector organisations within Australia.24 The complete list of mandated 
legislative requirements is provided in Appendix D.  
For non-corporate entities, the first two components of the Commonwealth 
Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a), Fraud Rule (Cth, 2014) and Fraud Policy, 
are binding or mandatory requirements. The third component, Fraud Guidance (Cth, 
2014b), is considered best practice; the recommended guidance within this third 
publication articulates what entities should do in order to comply with the Fraud Rule 
(Cth, 2014) and Fraud Policy. This chapter (conceptual model) focuses primarily on 
the mandatory requirements for Commonwealth entities contained within both the 
Fraud Rule (Cth, 2014) and the Fraud Policy. Fraud Guidance (Cth, 2014b) and AS 
8001 (Standards Australia, 2008) are also referenced as supporting publications. 
In addition to fraud controls, governance must include all aspects of a 
company’s operations, such as the roles of management and directors, the 
composition and qualifications of the board, ethics, conflicts of interest, codes of 
conduct, succession planning, and shareholder rights (Biegelman & Bartlow, 2012, p. 
48). Legislation, as the foundation element of the Conceptual Fraud Alignment 
Model, relates specifically to Research Question 1: What are the public sector 
legislative requirements for fraud minimisation? 
                                                
 
24 The legislative requirements contained within the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 
2014a, p.212) are not numbered; a numbering system was adopted in this study for easy reference and 
convenience. 
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Figure 3.2: Sub-elements of ‘legislation’ within the Fraud Alignment Model 
 
3.1.1 Fraud Rule–Section 10 of the PGPA Rule 2014 (Cth, 2014).  
The Fraud Rule (Cth, 2014) is a relatively short publication, which outlines 
some of the mandated fraud control requirements for Commonwealth entities. The 
Fraud Rule is designed to ensure that minimum standards are established for the 
management of fraud risks and incidents. In accordance with the Fraud Rule–Section 
10 of the PGPA Rule 2014, accountable authorities within corporate and non-
corporate Commonwealth entities must take all reasonable measures to prevent, 
detect, and deal with fraud relating to the entity (Cth, 2014a, p. A-1). Legislative 
requirements 1-6 are captured under the Fraud Rule (Cth, 2014) (see Appendix D).  
3.1.2 Fraud Policy–The Commonwealth Fraud Control Policy.  
This policy is designed to assist accountable authorities to establish and 
maintain fraud control systems in accordance with the Fraud Rule (Cth, 2014). The 
policy outlines specific responsibilities, including investigations and reporting 
requirements (Cth, 2014a, p. B-2). The objectives of this policy are to protect public 
resources and to protect the integrity and reputation of Commonwealth entities. The 
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Commonwealth Fraud Control Policy states what Commonwealth entities must do. 
Legislative requirements 7-22 are detailed within the Fraud Policy (see Appendix D). 
3.2  MANDATED LEGISLATION ALLOCATION WITHIN 
CONCEPTUAL FRAUD ALIGNMENT MODEL 
Section 3.2 lists what Commonwealth entities must do in order to be deemed 
compliant with Australian Government policy. This section presents implementation 
options to support those mandated requirements. The options are drawn from 
academic literature, AS 8001 (Standards Australia, 2008) and the Fraud Guidance–
Resource Management Guide No. 201: Preventing, detecting and dealing with fraud 
(Cth, 2014b). As previously discussed, AS 8001 (Standards Australia, 2008) is not a 
legally binding publication; however, the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 
(Cth 2014, p. C-10) does recommend entities use this Australian Standard when 
developing risk assessments and fraud control plans. For this reason, AS 8001 
(Standards Australia, 2008) is incorporated into this section of the study.  
Table 3.1 allocates the 22 mandated legislative requirements25 into 
recommended implementation categories. These implementation categories are then 
allocated to one of the pillars within the conceptual framework (see Table 3.1). The 
allocated implementation categories within each pillar are, in essence, sub-elements 
of that particular pillar; that is, they are the essential components required to create a 
strong and sturdy compliance support structure. For example, within the prevention 
pillar the mandated legislative requirements are 1 and 3b; these relate to the 
requirement for public sector entities to have appropriate risk assessment. The 
complete list of legislation derived from the Commonwealth Fraud Control 
Framework (Cth, 2014a) is attached in Appendix D (Page 146). In relation to the 
prevention pillar, the relevant legislation states: 
• Mandated requirement 1: Conduct fraud risk assessments regularly and 
when there is a substantial change in the structure, functions or activities 
of the entity (Cth, 2014). 
• Mandated requirement 3b: Have an appropriate mechanism for 
preventing fraud, including by ensuring that the risk of fraud is taken into 
account in planning and conducting the activities of the entity (Cth, 2014). 
                                                
 
25 See Enclosure D: Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a, p. 146) legislation.  
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Table 3.1: Mandated legislation allocation within conceptual fraud alignment model 
Implementation categories Mandated Requirement Pillar 
  
Prevention Detection Response 
        
Risk Assessment 1, 3b X 
  Fraud Control Plan 2, 4, 13,14, 22 
 
X 
 Fraud Awareness Training  
and Qualifications 3a, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17a, 18 X 
  
Investigations 
6, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18,  
19, 20, 21 
  
X 
Screening 11 
 
X 
  
Source: Adapted from Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) 
 
3.2.1 Prevention 
Mandated Requirement: 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17a and 18. 
Risk Assessments 
Risk assessments are completed to provide management with an understanding 
of internal and external fraud risks; the frequency of risk assessments is usually 
determined based on the degree of identified risk, with assessments conducted more 
frequently for high risk entities (Cth, 2014b, p. 12). The types of high risks an entity 
may experience will depend a variety of factors, including size, turnover, business 
diversity, geographical spread and reliance on technology, and the industry in which 
it operates (Standards Australia, 2008, p. 11). The Commonwealth Fraud Control 
Framework (Cth, 2014a) states public entities must conduct fraud risk assessments 
regularly, and when there is a substantial change in the structure, functions, or 
activities of the entity. ‘Substantial change’ is defined within Fraud Guidance (Cth, 
2014b, p.12) as “any major new policies or when there is a significant change in a 
current policy or in the way a policy will be implemented”. 
Fraud Awareness Training 
Accountable authorities need to understand what constitutes fraud, which is 
achieved through fraud awareness training. Fraud awareness training is an essential 
component of an entity’s fraud prevention strategy (Herold, 2005). This is supported 
by Stein (2012), who argued that in order to achieve a true compliance culture, fraud 
awareness training is essential. Fraud awareness training provides employees with an 
understanding of exactly what fraud prevention and fraud detection entails (Stein, 
2012). The type and frequency of training is captured within an entity’s fraud control 
plan and will be a part of the overall fraud strategy. It is recommended that training 
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be delivered at the time of hiring and periodically thereafter; it should include 
acceptance of gifts and entertaining, conflicts of interest, suspicion reporting/ 
protected disclosures, criminal and/or civil redress against offending persons, 
breaching the policy guidelines, and investigation standards (PwC, 2008).  
A fraud strategy statement is a component of an entity’s fraud strategy. Similar 
to a code of conduct, it is a way for organisations to clearly articulate what is 
acceptable within their organisation. It is recommended that entities adopt a bottom-
up approach to the development of a fraud statement. This allows all workers the 
opportunity to exert influence over the creation of the document and have their 
voices heard (Hill & Rapp, 2014). Awareness training and fraud strategy statements 
are two simple ways to ensure all employees understand what fraud is and what their 
individual and collective responsibilities are. 
Fraud Guidance states that “fraud prevention involves not only putting into 
place effective accounting and operational controls, but also fostering an ethical 
culture that encourages officials and contractors at all levels to play their part in 
protecting public resources” (Cth, 2014b, p.14). An ethical culture, as described 
within Fraud Guidance is created in part during fraud awareness training (Cth, 
2014b). Due to the largely intangible nature of culture, it is not legislated; however, it 
needs to be considered. Tone from the top (Davis & Pesch, 2013; Lail et al., 2013) is 
an essential component of organisational culture.  
Qualifications 
As identified by W. S. Albrecht et al. (2012), there are numerous recommended 
traits (not qualifications) required by organisational managers who are directly 
involved with fraud. The Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) 
specifically states that individuals who have fraud-related responsibilities and 
individuals involved with fraud-related investigations must be appropriately 
qualified. Employment positions that include responsibilities that relate to fraud 
control should have individuals who hold (as a minimum) Certificate IV in 
Government (Fraud Control) or equivalent for officials and a Diploma of 
Government (Fraud Control) or equivalent. All investigation qualifications should be 
compliant with Australian Government Investigation Standards (AGIS) 
requirements.  
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Figure 3.3: Sub-elements of ‘prevention’ within the Fraud Alignment Model 
 
3.2.2 Detection 
Mandated Requirement: #2, #4, #13, #14, #22 and #11. 
Fraud control plans 
Fraud control plans are essential; they could easily reside in any of the three 
alignment pillars; however, they have been allocated to detection because this 
essential internal document includes delegations of authority to individuals within 
the entity. Fraud Guidance states that a fraud control plan “should, whenever 
appropriate, emphasise prevention measures, including effective policy and program 
design to minimise the opportunity for fraud” (Cth, 2014b, p. 13). Fraud control 
plans are defined within AS 8001 as “a document summarising an entity’s anti-fraud 
and anti-corruption strategies” (Standards Australia, 2008, p.15). Fraud control plans 
are designed to establish procedures and avoid poor internal controls. 
Poor internal controls are a significant cause of fraudulent activity. In its 
survey of fraud, bribery, and corruption in Australia and New Zealand, KPMG 
(2012) reported that poor or deficient internal controls accounted for 47 per cent of 
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fraud cases reported.26 The Queensland Audit Office (2014) report, Fraud 
Management in Local Government, identified a lack of appropriate supervision as the 
most common internal control breakdown contributing to fraud between 2009 and 
2014. Lack of appropriate supervision assists in the creation or growth of extant 
opportunities for capable employees to defraud an entity.  
In order to ensure that fraud controls plans are relevant, useful, cost effective, 
proportionate, and relevant, they should be updated as soon as is practicable 
following the conduct of a risk assessment (Cth, 2014b). Fraud control plans should 
be integrated into an entities business plan and should be easily understood and 
widely communicated, both internally and externally. They should be communicated 
in the entity’s annual report; within entity T&Cs for business dealings and third 
parties, with request for tender documentation; and on the entity’s website (Standards 
Australia, 2008). 
Employees are a valuable source of information. Whistleblowing is recognised 
as a proven method for combating the threat of fraud in organisations (ACFE, 2015; 
Lee & Fargher, 2013; Near & Miceli, 1995; Van Akkeren & Tarr, 2015). 
Commonwealth entities must implement governance to support the protection of 
whistleblowers. This policy must be well communicated and understood by all 
personnel (Standards Australia, 2008). Australian Standard 8004-2003 Corporate 
governance: Whistle blower protection programs for entities provides 
comprehensive information designed to support this type of governance (Standards 
Australia, 2008). 
Employee Screening 
The majority of fraud is perpetrated by employees (PWC, 2008). In relation to 
outsourcing, legislation (#11) states that accountable authorities and third party 
service providers both have responsibilities relating to the management of fraud risks 
and to meeting obligations as listed in the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 
(Cth, 2014a). CV fraud and misstated or deceptive information on job applications is 
common (Brody, 2010; Engleman & Kleiner, 1998). Effective employee screening is 
an essential function for all public entities (Brody, 2010; Engleman & Kleiner, 
1998).  
                                                
 
26 Based on 281 respondents from Australian and New Zealand based organisations. 
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Figure 3.4: Sub-elements of ‘detection’ within the Fraud Alignment Model 
 
3.2.3 Response 
Mandated Requirement: 6, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 and 21. 
Investigations 
A significant component of the Commonwealth legislative requirements centre 
on investigations. Compliance with legislation relating to investigations involves 
more than simply operating within the law and seeking to identify the source of 
financial losses. Investigation compliance covers a broad range of issues. A correctly 
conducted investigation is able to assist an entity to reduce losses, identify the 
fraudster, gather evidence for prosecution, and recapture stolen funds; additionally, 
good investigations can also shed a light on weaknesses in the entity’s internal 
controls (Wells, 2014). It should be noted that the legislative requirements do not 
only apply after a crime has been committed. Investigation of fraud can occur once 
there are symptoms or indicators (red flags) that a fraud may be occurring (W. S. 
Albrecht et al, 2012, p. 210). 
Investigations should be conducted in line with Australian Government 
Investigation Standards (AGIS) (Cth, 2011a) requirements, by suitably qualified and 
experienced persons – there is also a need for appropriate managerial oversight (Cth, 
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2014b, p. 19). AGIS establishes the minimum standards for Commonwealth entities 
that apply at all stages of the investigation process (Cth, 2011a, p. 1). If an 
investigation is not conducted by a suitably qualified person, then the case could be 
compromised through an inability to collect available evidence, incorrectly collecting 
evidence that subsequently makes it inadmissible, or by unsuspectingly alerting the 
suspect prior to all available evidence being collected (Cth, 2014b, p. 19). 
For Commonwealth entities seeking to establish and maintain compliance, 
AGIS (Cth, 2011a) is the key publication. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Sub-elements of ‘response’ within the Fraud Alignment Model 
 
3.3  SUMMARY 
The Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model was generated using a variety of 
sources, including fraud theories, governance literature, and evidence-based best 
practices. The model is designed to demonstrate how fraud minimisation can be 
achieved through the alignment of fraud related legislation and fraud related 
governance practices.  
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The legislation component of the model reflects the mandated requirements for 
Commonwealth entities in Australia; this is currently based on adherence to the 
Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a). Legislation forms the 
foundation of the model, and Chapter 5 – Analysis tests each case study entity 
against these requirements to determine their compliance at the time the frauds were 
perpetrated.   
Fraud minimisation requires effective fraud related governance practices, 
specifically those listed within the model’s pillars - prevention, detection, and 
response. In the second phase of the analysis, the case study entities are reviewed 
against the elements within the model’s pillars to determine their actual work 
practices and as such, their ability to achieve an appropriate degree of fraud 
minimisation. It is acknowledged that the pillars do not contain every governance 
mechanism reviewed within Chapter 2. The model is reviewed and refined based on 
this study’s findings within Chapter 6. 
The model aids in investigating the three research questions. For example, the 
legislation component relates directly to Research Question 1: What are the public 
sector legislative requirements for fraud minimisation? Whilst the three pillars assist 
in answering Research Question 2: What specific governance measures address 
legislative requirements for fraud minimisation in the public sector? Finally, the 
legislation, pillars and governance practices are designed to collectively assist in 
answering Research Question 3: To what extent should fraud governance practices 
be aligned with legislative requirements to achieve fraud minimisation? The research 
questions are answered in the final chapter (Chapter 6) of this thesis. 
Figure 3.6 demonstrates all of the elements of the model – the desired alignment 
is achieved when the fraud related legislation and fraud related governance practices 
are in a relative position to one another through the pillars. The next chapter 
describes and justifies the methodological approach taken for this research. 
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Figure 3.6: Pillars of the Fraud Alignment Model 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
The methodology adopted in this study is qualitative content analysis, based on 
data collected from publicly available secondary sources. Three case studies 
involving fraud within the Australian public sector were selected. The first case study 
selected involved fraud within Queensland Health; the second dealt with fraud within 
NSW Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) and RailCorp; the third involved several 
NSW based universities. Details of each case are provided within Section 5.2. A 
tripartite examination of these case studies was designed to explore the relationship 
between fraud-related legislation and fraud governance practices. Specifically, the 
study seeks to better understand how Australian public sector entities can achieve 
fraud minimisation. 
This chapter describes and justifies the methodological approach taken in this 
research. Section 4.1 (Research Design) discusses the path taken during the conduct 
of the qualitative content analysis. This is followed by a discussion of the sample 
strategy, which defines the criteria used to select the three cases for this research. 
Data collection protocols and industry analysis are explained, with the research 
justification, ethical consideration, and research limitations presented for 
consideration. 
4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
According to Kumar (2013), research design is a road map that allows the 
researcher to research questions validly and objectively (p. 122). This study 
commenced with a description of the research problem (Section 1.2) and 
consequently, the research design chosen to answer the research problem is a 
qualitative content analysis approach. 
This study is a multi-case study, which allows for an analysis of the alignment 
between fraud related legislation and fraud governance practices within the 
Australian public sector, through the conduct of a qualitative content analysis. 
According to Krippendorff (2004), qualitative content analysis is a suitable and 
recommended methodology for use when examining regulatory compliance. 
According to Baxter and Jack (2008), multi-case study designs provide visibility of 
the similarities and differences of research areas, whilst a holistic case study with 
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embedded units only allows the researcher to understand one unique/extreme/critical 
case (p. 550). As this study seeks to understand multiple facets associated with the 
attainment of fraud minimisation, this approach was deemed most suitable. 
 
Figure 4.1: Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model 
 
The qualitative content analysis was completed in two phases. In the first 
phase, each of the public entities, as victims of fraud, were reviewed in relation to 
their legislative compliance at the time the crimes were committed. This 
determination was made based on the case study reports and additional open source 
information (see Section 4.3 for a detailed description). The aim in Phase 1 was to 
determine whether an entity was compliant or non-compliant with the mandated 
legislation at the time their respective frauds were perpetrated. With regards to the 
Queensland Health case, an additional layer of assessment was completed in Phase 1, 
with the department also retrospectively assessed against the mandated legislative 
requirements from the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) 
(Fraud Rule (Cth, 2014) and Fraud Policy). 
In the second phase of the analysis, case study entities were reviewed to 
determine their actual work practices, and as such, their ability to achieve an 
appropriate degree of fraud minimisation. Exploring an entity’s fraud minimisation 
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practices and procedures was completed through the prism of this study’s conceptual 
Fraud Alignment Model. To achieve this, the study reviewed each entity’s 
documented practices against the individual components listed within the model’s 
‘pillars’ (see Figure 4.1).  For example, in order to determine the degree of 
prevention within an entity, this study looked at risk assessment, and fraud 
awareness training and qualifications. Likewise, with the detection; fraud control 
plans and employee screening were reviewed, with investigation processes and 
procedures reviewed within the final pillar of response. In the final component of 
Phase 2, a comparative analysis was completed to triangulate the findings.  
Phase 1 and Phase 2 of this study’s qualitative content analysis are 
demonstrated in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 respectively. Findings from Phase 1 and 
Phase 2 are presented in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 4.2: Research design - Phase 1 
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Figure 4.3: Research design - Phase 2 
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The following section describes the sample strategy adopted for this study, 
including data collection procedures, research justification, trustworthiness and 
transferability, and limitations. 
4.2 SAMPLE STRATEGY 
“At the outset of a sampling process, the target population must be 
carefully defined so that the proper sources from which the data is to 
be collected can be identified.” (Zikmund, 2010, p.390). 
 
Malhotra (2004) provided three options for researchers to reduce the risk of 
sampling frame error (p. 364). These options include redefining the sample 
population, screening respondents in the data collection phase, and finally, adjusting 
the collected data through use of a weighted scheme. Malhotra’s (2004) second 
option of risk reduction was selected for this study, with a sample screening process 
or selection criteria utilised. Initially, the sample population was very generic, with 
fraud related cases selected from within the Australian public sector. This generic 
population was refined into a study population with the following prerequisites or 
population parameters established for inclusion in the study: 
• The case involved asset misappropriation; specifically invoice fraud within 
the Australian public sector. 
• The case had been referred for independent investigation, with the reports 
highlighting the investigation outcomes being publicly available. 
• The case was contemporary (ideally less than five years old). 
As discussed, a comparative analysis between the selected cases was 
undertaken in the final section of Phase 2. When comparisons are drawn, it is 
essential that the cases are selected carefully so that researchers can predict similar 
results across cases, or predict contrasting results based on a theory (Yin, 2003). 
Careful selection as advocated by Yin (2003), was achieved in this study by applying 
the aforementioned case study selection criteria. 
The decision to include independent, publicly available reports as part of the 
case selection criteria was made in an attempt to achieve research efficiency. Each of 
the three reports draw on the investigative expertise of either the Queensland CMC 
or ICAC (NSW), state and federal police services, as well as industry and academic 
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subject matter experts. This study benefits from the significant resources and 
expertise utilised during the generation of each independent case study report. The 
three cases studies each provide a unique perspective on invoice fraud. As discussed, 
the cases were selected based on a set of criteria (see Section 4.2) designed to ensure 
triangulation could occur as part of the study’s reliability considerations.  
The study aims to gain a greater understanding of the elements required to 
achieve fraud minimisation within public sector entities. Therefore, using the content 
analysis of the three cases and comparing them against the conceptual Fraud 
Alignment Model presented in Chapter 3 will provide deep insights into the risk 
factors associated with asset misappropriation in the public sector. The following 
section describes how data were collected throughout this study. 
4.3 DATA COLLECTION 
This section outlines the data collection for the study during the qualitative 
content analysis phase. Most qualitative researchers collect data from three main 
categories: unstructured or semi-interviews, observations, and secondary sources 
(Kumar, 2014, p. 192). This study utilised ‘secondary sources’, Kumar (2014) 
defined these as a “source of information collected by someone else or which already 
existed; it involves the researcher being required to extract specific information 
relevant to their study” (p.196). The types of secondary sources used in this study 
were government and quasi-government publications/reports.27 
4.3.1 Data collection protocols 
Research data were primarily obtained from the following three publicly 
available government or quasi-government publications/reports: 
• Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC), Queensland. (2013). Fraud, 
financial management and accountability in the Queensland public sector. 
An examination of how $16.9 million fraud was committed in Queensland 
Health. 
• Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), NSW. (2006). 
Report on investigation into defrauding the NSW Roads and Traffic 
                                                
 
27 Government or quasi-government publications/reports are based on data that has been collected on a 
regular basis and in a variety of areas for use by members of the public and interest groups (Kumar, 
2014, p.196) 
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Authority (RTA) and RailCorp in relation to provision of traffic 
management services. 
• Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), NSW. (2015). 
Investigation into the conduct of a university manager and others in 
relation to false invoicing. 
Annual financial reports were reviewed when case study reports did not 
provide clarification on compliance with mandated legislation, or specific work 
practices as listed within the model’s ‘pillars’. Annual financial reports were deemed 
a suitable alternate source of data collection because they are written in accordance 
with Directors’ obligations, as outlined within Chapter 2M of the Corporations Act 
2001, and because they are independently audited publications (Psaros, 2009). 
Directors must sign a declaration that states they believe their annual financial report 
complies with accounting standards, that it provides a true and fair view, and 
demonstrates that it is their belief the company is solvent (Psaros, 2009, p. 107). The 
inclusion of Annual Financial Reports is represented in the bottom section of Figure 
4.2. These publicly available reports were utilised for the RTA and RailCorps, and 
universities cases to ensure a rigorous analysis was conducted. 
4.3.2 Industry liaison 
For the Queensland Health case, an additional source was available for 
clarification on matters associated with the actions and policies of the organisation. 
Mr Bob McDonald is a former Chief Compliance Officer at Queensland Health. Mr 
McDonald was appointed by the Queensland Government immediately after the 
Barlow fraud to oversee a review of the department’s governance policy and 
procedures. He was also responsible for oversight of new departmental fraud 
prevention mechanisms. Mr McDonald was approached during the study to provide 
clarification on critical areas not discussed within the CMC report or publicly 
available within departmental documentation. All personal communications with Mr 
McDonald utilised within this study have been appropriately cited. 
4.3.3 Content analysis 
Kumar (2014) described content analysis as a method that allows for the 
identification of themes from within the descriptive information available. In this 
study, the descriptive information was presented within the CMC and ICAC 
investigative reports. Walter (2013) expanded on Kumar’s (2014) definition by 
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stating that content analysis should be viewed as a formal review of texts providing a 
method of analysis. Within this study, based on Walter’s (2013) definition, the texts 
used are the aforementioned government or quasi-government publications/reports 
(Section 4.3.1). 
According to Walter (2013) content analysis is conducted in seven steps (pp. 
259-267). The following section outlines these seven steps, with comments provided 
to articulate how the processes were adopted for this study. 
4.3.3.1 Content analysis steps undertaken during this study 
Seven steps or phases (Walter, 2013) are necessary for the analysis of content. 
Each step is explained, followed by a discussion on how each step was applied to this 
study. 
• Step 1: Decide on your topic and develop your question. This study 
attempts to develop an understanding of how Australian public sector 
entities can achieve fraud minimisation by examining the relationship 
between fraud related legislation and fraud related governance practices. 
The research questions developed were:  
o RQ1: What are the public sector legislative requirements for fraud 
minimisation?  
o RQ2: What specific governance measures address legislative 
requirements for fraud minimisation in the public sector?  
o RQ3: To what extent should fraud governance practices be aligned 
with legislative requirements to achieve fraud minimisation?  
• Step 2: Choose texts for analysis. See Section 4.3.1.  
• Step 3: Define units for analysis. Krippendorff (2013), argued that there 
should be three types of units utilised within content analysis: sampling 
units, recording and coding units, and context units.  
Walter’s (2013, p. 261) description of Krippendorff’s (2013) three types of 
units are reviewed within this section, along with a summary of how each 
of the unit types were used in this research:   
o Sampling units are the texts from which the samples are drawn. In this 
study, the sample units are government or quasi-government 
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publications/reports. As identified within Section 4.3.1, this included a 
CMC (Queensland) report, and two ICAC (NSW) reports. 
o Recording and coding units are sub-elements contained within the 
broader sample. The prominent coding units used within this study 
were the findings and recommendation sections of each of the 
government or quasi-government publications/reports.  
o Context units are the elements of the text that allow for an 
understanding of the recording and coding units. Within this study, 
these were specific sentences, directly related to the Conceptual Fraud 
Alignment Model’s ‘pillars’. The context units allowed for a 
determination to be made about the presence of specific fraud related 
work practices.  
In the context of this study, the review of Krippendorff’s (2013) various 
types of units allowed for an audit of three publicly available documents to 
be conducted, in order to determine the degree of fraud minimisation 
practices of the subject entities.  
• Step 4: Sample texts.  See Section 4.3.1 Sample Strategy. 
Step 5: Develop a codebook for analysis. The codebook utilised for this 
study included coding units providing one of two possible outcomes for 
each phase. In Phase 1, the analysis determined whether the entity was 
compliant or non-compliant with the mandated legislation. In Phase 2, the 
presence or absence of specific fraud related work practices (as outlined in 
the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model) was determined.  
• Step 6: Analysing data. See Chapter 5 – Analysis. 
• Step 7: Writing up. See Chapter 5 – Analysis. 
By using this approach, each case was consistently and systematically 
analysed, with findings categorised against this study’s conceptual Fraud Alignment 
Model. The next section presents the justification for the research design used in this 
study. 
4.4 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
The selected design method, based on qualitative content analysis, was deemed 
appropriate, as it met the necessary criteria as defined by Walter (2013), in that the 
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study concerned exploring the understanding, meaning, and interpretation that people 
or groups attribute to their social world. According to Walter (2013) and 
Krippendorff (2013), this method is used by social researchers to examine 
relationships; hence, this method is applicable for this study, as it seeks to understand 
the alignment between fraud related legislation and fraud related governance 
practices. It was difficult to source studies that specifically addressed invoice fraud in 
the public sector, yet from public interest perspectives, it is an important topic. 
Insights gained from this study can provide the government and broader community 
with valuable lessons and insights, and consequently, a closer examination of the 
actions/inaction on fraud minimisation provides a useful contribution. The research 
design used in this study has enabled deep analysis of factors that led to invoice fraud 
in three public sector organisations, regardless of legislation and governance 
practices put in place to minimise such events. The next section presents how 
reliability and validity were achieved in this study.  
4.5 TRUSTWORTHINESS AND TRANSFERABLITY OF THE RESEARCH 
DESIGN 
Qualitative research, ensuing from a variety of disciplines, paradigms, 
and epistemologies, embraces multiple standards of quality, known 
variously as validity, credibility, rigor, or trustworthiness (Morrow, 
2005, p.250). 
Trustworthiness is described as the extent to which the findings are an 
authentic reflection of the personal or lived experiences of the phenomenon under 
investigation (Barbour, 1998; Curtin & Fossey, 2007, p.88). To achieve 
trustworthiness, this study focussed on reliability and validity (Jackson, 2003), in 
addition to credibility, dependability, transferability, and confirmability (Lincoln & 
Guba 1985). This study’s application of the aforementioned elements of 
trustworthiness is described within this section.  
The use of the concepts of reliability and validity are borrowed from, and often 
associated with, judging the rigour of quantitative research (Curtin & Fossey, 2007, 
p.88; Marshall & Rosman, 2011). Whilst reliability and validity are derived from 
quantitative research, they have application with qualitative research (Jackson, 
2003), albeit in a diminished capacity due to ongoing debate about its relevance 
outside of the quantitative spectrum (Kumar, 2014). In qualitative research using 
case studies and content analysis, reliability is concerned with whether alternative 
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research would reveal similar information (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe 2002). 
Testing the reliability of the coding process is a common requirement for research, 
particularly for content analysis, as it requires the generation of data from texts or 
observations (Krippendorff, 2011, p. 93). This approach is applicable to this study, as 
government or quasi-government publications/reports were utilised as units of 
analysis. Krippendorff (2011) argued that in order for coding of texts to be deemed 
reliable, there needs to be multiple independently working and interchangeable 
coding among a set of units of analysis. Within this study, this was achieved through 
the use of both the government or quasi-government publications and entity Annual 
Financial Reports. In addition, the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model (Chapter 3) 
provided a consistent approach across all three cases. This ensured the text in each 
report was analysed in the same manner and within the same context. Validity refers 
to the extent to which the researcher gains access to case knowledge and experience, 
and is able to infer a meaning from the language; in this study this was acquired from 
the published reports (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2003). A high level of validity 
was possible in relation to this study’s qualitative content analysis because the 
research design and methodology were created to ensure that all three case studies 
were analysed carefully and consistently. The case studies met the same selection 
criteria for inclusion in this study, and were each assessed against identical 
components of the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) posited that research trustworthiness is based on an 
evaluation criterion, which involves credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability.   Lincoln and Guba (1985) summarised their evaluation criteria as: 
• Credibility: confidence in the 'truth' of the findings. 
• Transferability: showing that the findings have applicability in other 
contexts. 
• Dependability: showing that the findings are consistent and could be 
repeated. 
• Confirmability: a degree of neutrality or the extent to which the findings of 
a study are shaped by the respondents and not researcher bias, motivation, 
or interest. 
Triangulation is one method used to ensure credibility (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). Triangulation of this study’s sources was completed as part of the 
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comparative analysis processes within the second phase of the research design. 
Triangulation is a form of cross checking (Patton, 1990) used by researchers in an 
attempt to maximise the range of data, which might contribute to a more complete 
understanding of a phenomenon (Knafl & Breitmayer, 1991).   
Demonstrating the applicability, and as a result, the transferability of this 
study’s findings was achieved by ensuring a thick description was provided. A thick 
description is defined as a way of achieving external validation through the provision 
of a detailed rationale for the chosen method; it is a thorough and multidimensional 
description (Walter, 2013). A thick description explains and highlights to the reader 
the importance of specific behaviours and events completed to ensure quality (Curtin 
& Fossey, 2007; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Lincoln and Guba (1985) posited that 
when a phenomenon is accurately presented, readers will be able to individually 
evaluate the extent to which the findings are transferable to other times, settings, 
situations, and people. This study clearly outlined the research problem within 
Section 1.2, with every effort made to ensure that there was no ambiguity about what 
the study aimed to achieve through the adopted methodological approach (as outlined 
in this chapter).  
Dependability was achieved in two ways; firstly, through research supervisors 
conducting periodic external audits (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) of the study’s 
findings. Secondly, by providing the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model to be 
adapted to changing environments and contexts. This was achieved by stating that 
the foundation component of the model was legislation, as opposed to as specific 
piece of legislation, for example, the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 
(Cth, 2014a). By not specifically stating the legislation, and instead referring to the 
mandated legislation, the model can be easily adapted should renewed or additional 
legislation be introduced. This flexibility provides the study with dependability; this 
method is deemed appropriate for qualitative research where the social world is 
always changing (Marshall & Rosman, 2011, p.253). 
According to Marshall and Rosman (2011), confirmability is similar to 
reliability in that it relates to the degree to which results can be confirmed to be 
collaborated by others. Free from bias, within this study, confirmability was achieved 
through the use of publicly available government or quasi-government publications 
and entity Annual Financial Reports. In addition, the study adopted a consistent 
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methodological approach across all three selected cases to ensure the text in each 
report was analysed in the same manner and within the same context. 
4.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
There were several limitations encountered during this study. In reviewing the 
findings of this study, the following limitations should be taken into consideration. 
Limitations are categorised as both general and study specific limitations. 
4.6.1 General limitations 
The following list outlines some of the common limitations associated with 
qualitative content analysis, as described by Walter (2013, p.258): 
• when using a wide range of texts, content analysis can be laborious and 
time consuming; 
• the interpretation of data can be subjective; and 
• analysis does not always involve consideration or exploration of the social 
context within the text. 
Furthermore, the availability of required data is a common limitation 
associated with the use of content analysis. Researchers often assume that 
information will be readily available; however, it is often more limited than 
anticipated (Kumar, 2014, p.196). According to Marshall & Gretchen (2011), many 
limitations associated with content analysis can be mitigated, provided care is taken 
to display the logical interpretation used when conducting the analysis. This 
recommended approach was adopted at all stages during this study to overcome the 
limitation.  
4.6.2 Specific limitations of this study 
The primary limitation identified within this study relates to the relative age of 
the three selected cases and the principle legislation used during the analysis section 
of the study. In each of the three selected cases, the fraudsters were detected prior to 
the 2014 publication of the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) 
(Queensland Health fraudster was charged in 2011, RTA and RailCorp fraudsters 
were charged in 2006, and the universities IT fraudsters were charged in 2013).  
Future research in this area could seek to identify cases that have occurred post 
publication of the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a). It should 
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be acknowledged that there will always be a time lag between the detection and 
subsequent charging of a fraudster, their conviction, and where relevant, the release 
of an independent report into the circumstances. For example, in the Queensland 
Health case, Barlow was charged on 10 December 2011, with the CMC (Qld) report 
not released for almost two years, in September 2013. Likewise, with the RTA and 
RailCorp fraudsters, the period from fraud detection28 in August 2005 to the release 
of the ICAC report in December 2006 was approximately 18 months. In the case of 
the university frauds, the IT fraudsters were charged in 2013 and the ICAC report 
was not released until June 2015. 
The time available for completion of this Research Masters was assessed as a 
limitation, which precluded the option of interviews within the research design. If 
this topic was studied as part of a PhD instead of a Masters, the additional time and 
resources available could have been used to include interviews with the convicted 
fraudsters as part of the research design. Interviews would provide a more in depth 
view of ‘how’ the crimes were committed from the perspective of the fraudster. 
Gaining access to prison inmates can be difficult, especially in the case of high 
profile crimes. Formal requests were made to interview Barlow; however, no 
responses were received.29 
4.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Data collection for this study was obtained from publicly available reports; the 
QUT Business School’s Research Ethics and Integrity Advisor confirmed that ethical 
clearance was not required for this research.  
In the case of the Queensland Health fraud case, it should be noted that the 
misconduct of Barlow was primarily contained within the Department’s Finance 
Section. Barlow’s fraud, and indeed the findings of this report should not be viewed 
as representative of all Queensland Health actions during the period the frauds were 
perpetrated. 
                                                
 
28 The first formal report to ICAC was made in August 2005 and identified possible fraud and 
corruption (ICAC, 2006, p.9) 
29 Two letters requesting interviews with Barlow were sent to Wolston Correctional Centre, 
Queensland, in March and April 2015. 
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4.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter described and justified why a qualitative content analysis research 
design was selected as the most appropriate method to answer the research questions, 
and as such, contribute to deep insights into the research problem. The design 
followed the recommended stages of Walter (2013). These stages were discussed in 
this chapter and the adopted processes presented. Additionally, this chapter included 
a summary of trustworthiness and transferability of research design, in addition to the 
overall research limitations. Chapter 5 presents the analysis of this study’s data. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
Ultimately, though, I cannot ignore the amount of money that is involved 
here. I cannot ignore the fact that those were public moneys. I cannot ignore 
the fact that you occupied a position of significant trust and I cannot ignore 
the fact that the money was spent on little more, it seems, than the enjoyment 
of an extravagant lifestyle. The punishment must be one, which reflects those 
matters. It must punish you, but it must also serve as a deterrent to others 
who might be minded to commit similar offences. Judge Kerry O'Brien, 19 
March 2013 (Barlow’s sentencing appeal).   
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis and findings of the Queensland Health, RTA 
and RailCorp, and NSW universities fraud cases. The findings will be used to better 
determine how Australian public sector entities can achieve fraud minimisation, by 
examining the relationship between fraud related legislation and fraud related 
governance practices.  
This chapter’s structure reflects the research design. The background and 
environmental context of each individual case study is first presented, with 
similarities and differences highlighted for consideration. Following this, each entity 
within the three case studies is examined to determine their compliance with relevant 
fraud related legislation (as per Phase 1 of the research design). Finally, this study’s 
Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model (see Figure 5.1) is used as a mechanism to 
determine the effectiveness of fraud governance practices within each of the three 
case study entities (as per Phase 2 of the research design). A summary of findings is 
provided at the end of each section, along with a comparative analysis at the end of 
the chapter. The findings presented are then used to update and refine this study’s 
Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model within Chapter 6. 
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Figure 5.1: Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model 
 
The analysis throughout this chapter includes references to hard and soft 
controls. As discussed within Section 2.4.1, hard controls tend to supervise and 
monitor employee behaviour through systems using explicit measures, whilst soft 
controls are enabled by the managers through shared values, moral standards, beliefs, 
and unwritten traditions (Chtioui & Thiéry-Dubuisson, 2011; Ouchi, 1980).  
The findings presented in this chapter seek to answer the study’s three research 
questions, that is: 
• RQ1: What are the public sector legislative requirements for fraud 
minimisation?  
• RQ2: What specific governance measures address legislative 
requirements for fraud minimisation in the public sector?  
• RQ3: To what extent should fraud governance practices be aligned 
with legislative requirements to achieve fraud minimisation? 
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5.2 Background 
Each of the three selected case studies used in this research comply 
with the stipulated selection criteria, as outlined within Section 4.2, in that: 
• The case involved asset misappropriation; specifically invoice fraud within 
the Australian public sector. 
• The case was referred for independent investigation, and the reports 
highlighting the investigation outcomes were publicly available. 
• The case was contemporary (ideally less than five years old). 
All three fraud cases are categorised, in accordance with the ANAO as “frauds 
perpetrated by an employee against an Australian Government agency or its 
programs”. (ANAO, 2004, p.12) 
Although the three cases are categorised as the same type of fraud, there are 
some differences, which it is anticipated will allow for a broader application of 
findings. The key differences between the case studies relate to the relationship 
between the fraudster and the victim organisation. In the Queensland Health case, the 
fraudster was a trusted employee, in a position of authority, who operated alone. He 
submitted false invoices and used his influence to manipulate other employees into 
getting the invoices processed. In the RTA and RailCorp case, there were two 
fraudsters, a contractor and a trusted employee who colluded to submit and approve 
false invoices. Finally, in the NSW universities fraud, the fraudster was an employer 
who performed the majority of his work duties in isolation (without supervision). He 
was able to create and authorise false invoice payments into his personal bank 
account and into shell companies. The following sub-sections provide a detailed 
background summary for each case study. 
5.2.1 Case Study 1: Queensland Health  
In late 2011, a major fraud against Queensland Health was uncovered. Shortly 
after the crime was exposed and the fraudster convicted, the circumstances 
surrounding this fraud were forensically examined by the Crime and Misconduct 
Commission Queensland (CMC). In September 2013, in accordance with section 
69(1)(b) of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001, Dr Ken Levy, Acting CMC 
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Chairperson, submitted the Commission’s report to the Queensland Government, 
titled Fraud, financial management and accountability in the Queensland public 
sector—an examination of how $16.9 million fraud was committed in Queensland 
Health (CMC, 2013). This report forms the basis of this case study and provides a 
detailed insight into this criminal case. A chronological summary of the key events 
has been created based on the report and is attached in Appendix E.  
In total, the fraudster (Joel Morehu- Barlow) syphoned $16.9 million from 
Queensland Health over a period of almost four and a half years, in what may be the 
largest known single fraud ever committed against the Queensland public sector 
(CMC, 2013, p.1). To provide some fiscal perspective, the cost of the Queensland 
Health fraud can be compared to the department’s operating budget. The Barlow 
fraud occurred over a period of years, with the first fraudulent transaction for 
$2,200.61 occurring on 4 October 2007 and the final invoice for $11 million 
submitted on 16 November 2011. The collective budget for Queensland Health 
during this period was approximately $36,674,000,000,30 with $16.9 million dollars 
of defrauded funds representing 0.0446 per cent. Should the final $11 million dollar 
transaction, which resulted in the arrest of the perpetrator, be removed, the equation 
is reduced to 0.0161 per cent. Barlow processed 65 invoices (CMC, 2013, p.1), 
whilst the department is estimated to have processed in excess of 6 million invoices 
during the same period (McDonald, 2015). This comparison is not designed to 
understate the seriousness of the crime; however, when the relatively small amount 
stolen is combined with the high number of invoices processed to support a 
$36,674,000,000 budget, it is apparent that the department operated in a complicated 
environment.  
Barlow understood Queensland Health’s internal policies and procedures 
sufficiently to be able to exploit them for his own benefit (CMC, 2013). Barlow 
understood that within the Finance Section there were low levels of compliance with 
existing policy and procedures by other staff, and there were failures relating to 
financial management and accountability, as well as supervision and management. 
Change management was poor and levels of fraud awareness were low. These 
                                                
 
30 Queensland State Budget Reports list the following budget allocations to Health: 50% of FY 2007-
08 $3.725 billion, FY 2008-09 $8.352 billion, FY 2009-10 $9.037 billion, FY 20010-11 $10.0 billion, 
50% of FY 2011-12 $5.5 billion. 
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problems were allowed to compound, as Queensland Health failed to properly 
investigate information provided in audits and complaints (CMC, 2013, p28). Barlow 
established two shell companies for use with the false invoices; the first was called 
The Muse Pty Ltd, and the second company was called Healthy Initiatives and 
Choices Pty Ltd. A summary of Barlow’s expenditure is attached in Appendix D. 
Notwithstanding Barlow’s poor work ethic, suspicious workplace behaviour 
and extravagant personal lifestyle, his crimes continued undetected for almost four 
and a half years (CMC, 2013). Furthermore, not only did Barlow avoid detection by 
the department; he was also promoted and placed into positions of greater authority 
during the period the fraud was occurring. Ironically, when the fraud was finally 
uncovered, Barlow was the Manager, Governance, within the Finance Section 
(CMC, 2013).  
In the Queensland District Court, Judge Kerry O’Brien heard the case against 
Barlow. Barlow was convicted on 19 March 2013 and given an effective31 sentence 
of 14 years imprisonment. The conviction summary for Barlow is attached in 
Appendix E. Barlow will be eligible for parole on 12 December 2016, once he has 
served five years imprisonment (R v Morehu-Barlow [2014] QCA 4 (7 February 
2014). 
5.2.2 Case Study 2: RTA and RailCorp Fraud 
ICAC (NSW) (2006): Investigation into defrauding the Roads and Traffic 
Authority (RTA) and RailCorp in relation to provision of traffic management services 
(Operation Quilla). 
Following a 10-day public inquiry that commenced on 11th September 2006, 
involving evidence from 23 people (ICAC, 2006); ICAC (NSW) found Damien Job 
and his friend Terence Stepto guilty of fraudulent conduct on 21 December 2006. Mr 
Job was an RTA operations manager who also had responsibility for the awarding of 
Clearway Tidal contracts. Mr Stepto was an RTA contractor and owner of two small 
businesses used in the frauds. Mr Job and Mr Stepto colluded to defraud the victim 
companies through the provision of billing or invoice fraud. Mr Stepto’s businesses 
                                                
 
31 It was declared that the 464 days that Joel Morehu-Barlow had served in presentence custody 
between 12 December 2011 and 19 March 2013 was time already served under the sentences. Source: 
AUSTLII. 2015. R v Morehu-Barlow [2014] QCA 4 (7 February 2014). Retrieved November 27, 
2015 http://www.austlii.edu.au 
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were called Advanced Traffic Solutions and Advanced Traffic Consultants; these 
entities received in excess of $257,000 for works claimed, but never conducted, 
during 19 rail shutdowns that occurred during the period January 2004 to February 
2006.  
The ICAC (NSW) (2006a) report outlines the systemic weaknesses that 
assisted in the facilitation of the frauds against the RTA and RailCorp. Mr Stepto 
issued false and misleading invoices to both the RTA and RailCorp; Mr Job, 
knowing they were fraudulent, authorised the payment of the invoices. Some 
invoices were submitted for work that never occurred; other invoices were for jobs 
that were grossly inflated. In addition to Clearway Tidal contracts, Mr Job and Mr 
Stepto also submitted inaccurate and exaggerated invoices for the replacement of 
stock and repair of candy bar vending machines. Invoices for candy bars were 
submitted over a two-year period and resulted in the RTA paying over $92,000 for 
stock that did not exist (ICAC, 2006a, p.1). 
5.2.3 Case Study 3: Universities IT Fraud Case 
ICAC (NSW) Report (2015): Investigation into the conduct of a university 
manager and others in relation to false invoicing.  
In 2015, ICAC (NSW) released their report into the conduct of asset 
misappropriation; specifically invoice fraud, at three NSW universities. The 
universities involved were the University of Newcastle, the University of Sydney and 
Macquarie University. Mr Brett Roberts and two associates were found guilty by 
ICAC (NSW) on 18 February 2015 for engaging in corrupt conduct (ICAC, 2015, p. 
5-6). The ICAC (NSW) (2015) report details how Mr Roberts was employed as an IT 
Manager at the University of Newcastle from 2005 to 2007, at the University of 
Sydney in 2010 and 2011, and then at Macquarie University from 2012 to 2013. 
During these periods, Mr Roberts authorised and certified false invoice payments, 
which enabled him to personally gain a financial benefit in excess of $86,000.  
Mr Roberts created false invoices for the universities and payment was 
subsequently made into two separate entities (shell companies) and a personal bank 
account belonging to him. The first entity was called Management and Professional 
Services Pty Ltd (MAPS). MAPS was a sole operated IT consultancy owned by a 
friend of Mr Roberts. MAPS received a combined total of $60,200 from the 
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University of Newcastle and University of Sydney through false invoicing. The 
second entity, iPath Pty Ltd, was also an IT consultancy that received $10,450 from 
Macquarie University through false invoicing, with monies then paid to MAPS. At 
no stage did MAPS or iPath complete work for any of the victim organisations.  
5.2.4 Background summary 
The three case studies all involved asset misappropriation, specifically billing 
or invoice fraud. The key difference between the three cases relates to the 
relationship between the fraudster and the victim organisation. The identified 
differences in each case should allow for a broader application of research findings. 
The next section investigates the legislative compliance of each case study entity. 
5.3 PHASE 1 - LEGISLATIVE COMPLIANCE 
The current legislative requirements for Australian public sector entities are 
derived from the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a). As 
discussed within Chapter 4 – Methodology, the first phase of this study’s analysis 
focussed on legislative compliance. It should be noted that all three case study frauds 
took place prior to the introduction of the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 
(Cth, 2014a). This does not discredit this phase of the study in any capacity, as there 
is sufficient data available to assess each entity against the mandated legislation at 
the time the crimes were committed. That each case pre-dates the introduction of the 
current legislation is mentioned as a research limitation within Section 4.6.2.  
Legislation forms the foundations of the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model 
(see Section 3.2). Each of the three ‘pillars’ of the model rely on legislative 
compliance to provide the impetus of an entity’s fraud related governance practices, 
and as such, to create fraud minimisation. The analysis of the three entities legislative 
compliance in this section is based on the selected secondary sources (see Section 
4.3), including CMC and ICAC reports, in addition to various Annual Financial 
Reports. 
5.3.1 Case Study 1: Legislative compliance - Queensland Health  
At the time of the Barlow Case, Queensland Health was compliant with the 
departmental regulatory framework. Evidence of this compliance is detailed in the 
CMC (2013) report and within both the Queensland Audit Office (QAO) Financial 
Audit 2007/08—Report to Government No. 4 and 2007–08 Report on State Finances 
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of 30 June 2008. Neither of the QAO reports identified any adverse risks relating to 
fraud and stated that the departments32 were compliant. Additionally, the CMC report 
stated that an assessment of fraud policies and procedures within Queensland Health, 
including those relating to grants, showed that they were broadly adequate to ensure 
a reasonable level of probity (CMC, 2013, p. 28). Queensland Health had established 
processes for the reporting of suspected fraud, and in 2009, the department was 
endorsed by the CMC to internally investigate Category 1 complaints (CMC, 2013, 
p.16).  
Based on the information available within the CMC report, an assessment of 
retrospective compliance of Queensland Health in relation to the legislation 
contained with the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) was 
completed. As a result of some information not being available within the CMC 
report, clarification was requested from Mr Bob McDonald (former Chief 
Compliance Officer at Queensland Health, see Section 4.3.2). Information from the 
CMC (2013) report and subsequent advice received from Mr McDonald determined 
that Queensland Health was also retrospectively compliant with the mandated 
legislation contained within the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 
2014a).  
5.3.2 Case Study 2: Legislative compliance - RTA and RailCorp Fraud 
The RTA and RailCorp case study did not provide adequate information to 
determine whether each of these entities were compliant with the relevant fraud 
related legislation at the time of the crimes. As such, public records (financial 
statements and annual reports) were researched (secondary sources) to determine the 
compliance status of the entities. Based on public records, RTA and RailCorp were 
both deemed to be compliant; this is demonstrated by the following:  
• The 2005 RTA Annual Report stated that “Governance and risk 
management systems are effective” (RTA, 2005, p. 54).  
• The NSW Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation (TIDC) 
Annual Report (2006) stated that during the reporting period, a successful 
fraud risk assessment was completed by a third party auditor. The fraud 
                                                
 
32 The QAO reports do not identify specific departments; general terms are used to provide 
departmental anonymity.  
  
Chapter 5: Analysis 85 
risk assessment concluded that TIDC has “effective controls to prevent and 
detect irregularities including fraud” (2006, p.34).  
• Rail Corporation NSW (RailCorp) Annual Report 2004-05 (Tata 
Consultancy Services, 2005) did not identify any risks or weaknesses 
relating to fraud prevention or internal controls. 
5.3.3 Case Study 3: Legislative Compliance - Universities IT Fraud Case 
In a similar manner to the RTA and RailCorp case study, the ICAC (2015) 
report associated with this case did not provide adequate information to determine 
whether each of the universities were compliant with the relevant fraud related 
legislation at the time of the crimes. As such, in a similar manner to the RTA and 
RailCorp case, public records (financial statements and annual reports) were 
researched (secondary sources) to determine the compliance status of each 
university.  
In reviewing financial statements and annual reports from each of the three 
universities,33 it was assessed that each of the three entities were compliant with the 
relevant fraud related legislation during the periods that the fraud occurred.34 
5.3.4 Legislative Compliance Summary 
All three case study entities were deemed compliant with the mandated 
legislation at the time the frauds were perpetrated against them. This is a significant 
and critical finding, as it immediately points to a misalignment between legislative 
compliance and the actual fraud related governance practices within each victim 
entity.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
33 The University of Newcastle’s 2007 Annual Report (2008, p.5); The University of Sydney’s 2010 
(2011, p.126) and 2011 (2012, p.72) Annual Reports; Macquarie University’s 2012 (2013, p. 57) and 
2013 (2014, p.55) Annual Reports. 
34 The University of Newcastle’s financial statements and Annual Reports pre dating 2007 were not 
available.  
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Table 5.1: Case study entity legislative compliance summary 
Case Study Entity Compliant with mandated fraud related legislation 
Queensland Health YES 
RTA and RailCorp YES 
Universities IT Fraud YES 
 
This stark contradiction can be tempered by noting the following quote from 
Alan Greenspan. 
Corruption, embezzlement and fraud exist everywhere and can never be 
eliminated; what successful economies do is keep fraud to a minimum 
(Greenspan, 2007).  
This study acknowledges the issue presented by Greenspan (2007) and looks to 
contribute by identifying the elements required to achieve fraud minimisation in 
public sector entities. The focus of the next section is an analysis of the fraud 
minimisation practices of each entity, based on the Conceptual Fraud Alignment 
Model.  
5.4 PHASE 2 – ASSESSMENT OF FRAUD MINIMISATION PRACTICES 
BASED ON ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAUD ALIGNMENT 
MODEL 
This section analyses the fraud minimisation practices within each case study 
entity, based on a review of the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model (see Figure 5.1).  
The findings are grouped within each of the model’s pillars; prevention, detection, 
and response. The results are presented case by case. A comparative analysis is 
completed, with a brief summary provided at the end of the chapter to highlight 
significant findings. The findings are then further considered within Chapter 6. 
5.4.1 Case Study 1: Assessment of Queensland Health fraud minimisation 
practices based on the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model. 
An analysis of the CMC (2013) report into the Queensland Health fraud was 
conducted, with comparisons made between the actual fraud minimisation practices 
of the department and the recommended practices listed within (pillars) the 
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Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model under the headings of ‘prevention’, ‘detection’ 
and ‘response’.  
Prevention  
Phase 1 of the analysis demonstrated that there was strong supporting evidence 
of Queensland Health’s compliance with fraud related legislation. Despite this, the 
CMC (2013) report noted that risk identification across Queensland Health was 
inadequate. The CMC (2013) report does not indicate whether Queensland Health, or 
more specifically the Finance Section, had completed a fraud risk assessment at the 
time of Barlow’s case. However, it has been confirmed (Mr Bob McDonald, personal 
communication, February 11, 2016) that Queensland Health did manage a central 
risk management function, which provided training, advice, and software for the risk 
registers. Fraud risk assessment was not treated as a specific separate process and 
was intended to be part of the overall risk assessment process (Mr Bob McDonald, 
personal communication, February 11, 2016). 
Entities should regularly monitor and review any changes to the risk 
environment (Standards Australia, 2008, p.37), with risk assessments and subsequent 
fraud control plans to follow as soon as possible (Cth, 2014a, p. C-12). The CMC 
(2013) report does not indicate whether fraud risk assessments and fraud control 
plans were completed and/or reviewed directly after the department completed the 
implementation of their structural changes in January 2010. The CMC (2013) report 
states that immediately after the 2010 structural changes, the fraudster Barlow 
actively pursued retention of the cost codes associated with the grant funds by 
fostering the impression that delegation remained with him. The narrative of the 
CMC (2013) report details how Barlow manipulated his colleagues; it repeatedly 
makes reference to his work colleagues poor fraud awareness and an inability to 
review and update fraud minimisation procedures; these factors collectively allowed 
the crimes to continue unchanged. 
Fraud awareness training was completed within Queensland Health, although 
the CMC (2013) report assessed that this fraud awareness was low among staff 
across all levels of the department. Administrative training had been cut back across 
the department, especially in the area of specific and detailed training on the 
Financial Management Practice manual.  Limited on-line fraud awareness training 
was available; however, it was not at the same frequency/quality as traditional 
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training (Mr Bob McDonald, personal communication, February 11, 2016). This 
assessed lack of fraud awareness is a critical weakness; organisations must motivate 
their personnel to learn how to identify and report fraud to support fraud prevention 
efforts (Herold, 2005, p.1). Fraud awareness will not exist if personnel do not 
understand the impacts and consequences (Herold, 2005, p.1).  
The lack of fraud awareness training within Queensland Health was further 
demonstrated by the inability of other Queensland Health workers to consider the 
possibility of Barlow’s misconduct.  
Although his conduct, and questions about it, appear to have been a frequent 
topic of discussion among senior managers, this was never translated into 
more probing questions being raised about his trustworthiness and his fitness 
to manage public funds (CMC, 2013, p.30). 
 The Ethical Standards Unit (ESU) never received an internal complaint about 
Barlow’s work ethic. Barlow’s behaviour should have raised ‘red flags’. His 
suspicious actions included repeated submissions of ‘urgent’ payment requests 
without adequate documentation; continuing failure to produce appropriate 
documentation, despite serious questions being raised by the audit of his credit card, 
and by a complaint relating to the misuse of his credit card in 2011; jealous retention 
of functions or files related to a previously held position; and generally poor 
workplace conduct and performance, including erratic attendance, missed deadlines, 
and poor-quality work (CMC, p.30). 
Shortly after the Barlow fraud was uncovered, the Queensland Audit Office 
(QAO) completed an audit of Queensland Health and two other government 
departments. The report was very critical of departmental culture, stating that there 
was little evidence that agency culture reinforced the message that fraud management 
was a core responsibility of every employee (CMC, 2013). Based on the CMC 
(2013) report, this leadership or ‘tone from the top’ was missing within the 
management levels of the Finance Section within Queensland Health. 
During the CMC investigation, Queensland Health acknowledged that they did 
not have a policy that stated individuals in management positions needed to have 
formal qualifications. Barlow falsified his qualifications within his CV and lied about 
his background (see Section 2.5.2.4). 
  
Chapter 5: Analysis 89 
Detection 
The CMC (2013) report identifies that Barlow’s fraud was made easier by the 
inability of staff to follow fraud minimisation procedures. This included: 
• “…staff failed either to follow policies and procedures in relation to 
approving expenditure or, even more importantly, to understand the 
principles they represented”.  
• “…staff did not see the importance of thorough cross-checking and the 
requirement for two signatures on forms as a fraud control mechanism”.  
• “…when given non-compliant documents for payment, there is no 
evidence that the staff whose responsibility it was to check them followed 
agency policies and procedures for verification of supporting 
documentation or appropriate financial delegation” (CMC, 2013, p.28). 
A whole of department Fraud Control Plan did not exist due to the size of the 
department (Mr Bob McDonald, personal communication, February 11, 2016). The 
CMC (2013) report does not specifically mention the existence of a Fraud Control 
Plan for Queensland Health. The Queensland Health Annual Report 2008-09 stated 
that during the reporting year, the department’s Fraud Control Strategy was 
reviewed, with a new Fraud Control Policy was developed with the aim of ensuring 
fraud risks were identified, controlled, and monitored (QHealth, 2009, p. 22).  
The CMC (2013) report frequently refers to poor internal controls within the 
Finance Section of the department. The follow quote from the CMC report 
demonstrates this weakness:  
“Although the investigation found that Barlow acted alone in committing the 
fraud, it also found that a number of Queensland Health officers failed to 
comply with existing policy and procedures and, in so doing, defeated a 
number of internal controls which may have otherwise prevented Barlow’s 
offending or led to it being identified much earlier.” (CMC Media Release, 
25 September 2013).  
The failure of employees to comply with measures specifically designed to 
support fraud minimisation demonstrates a lack of fraud awareness and poor internal 
fraud prevention culture. On many occasions, Queensland Health did not adhere to 
basic compliance checks in accordance with the Fraud Control Policy. Paperwork for 
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the first shell company (The Muse Pty Ltd) that Barlow established was incorrectly 
compiled. The application form did not contain a vendor address and there was also 
no supporting ABN search attached. Similarly, when Barlow established his second 
shell company, Healthy Initiatives and Choices (HIC) as a Queensland Health 
vendor, no validation of the application was conducted. No ABN or trading name 
authentication or independent validation was completed. If an independent check had 
occurred, it would have identified that HIC was a trading name registered to Barlow 
as an individual operator and owner, and that the registered address was his home 
address.  
Despite Queensland Health having established Human Resource recruitment 
processes and employee screening, Barlow escaped any appropriate levels of 
screening. The CMC (2013) report catalogues numerous red flags and behavioural 
issues about Barlow, including the department’s inability to uncover Barlow’s 
previous fraud related crimes or to verify his falsified CV. Employee screening and 
police checks would have identified a variety of issues relating to Barlow’s 
truthfulness. In particular, that he was a convicted criminal35 in New Zealand, and 
that he changed his name in 2001 by deed poll from Joseph Hikairo Barlow to 
Hohepa Hikairo Morehu-Barlow. Shortly after, in 2003, Barlow departed New 
Zealand for Australia. At the time of Barlow’s departure, he was recorded as being 
wanted in New Zealand for questioning in relation to two additional fraud-related 
crimes. In 2005, Barlow applied for a position within Queensland Health; his CV 
stated that he held a variety of tertiary qualifications and that he had been awarded 
multiple academic awards; however, the CV was fabricated. The false qualifications 
and awards included a Bachelor of Laws and Bachelor of Commerce, and ‘Best 
Maori Commerce student in all New Zealand universities for the period 1996–1998’. 
Response 
On numerous occasions, Queensland Health failed to appropriately investigate 
serious complaints against Barlow. There were established investigation processes at 
Queensland Health and the department did maintain a whistle blower hotline at the 
time of the Barlow case (Mr Bob McDonald, personal communication, February 11, 
2016). Initially, all complaints were directed to the CMC; if the CMC deemed the 
                                                
 
35 In 1999, Mr Joel Morehu-Barlow was convicted of ‘theft as a servant’ and ‘using a document for 
pecuniary advantage’ in New Zealand (CMC, 2013, p.3). 
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complaint to be within the department’s endorsed authority for internal investigation, 
then the complaint was returned back to the department accompanied with a request 
for notification of any outcomes. The CMC (2013) report is critical of how 
complaints were handled within the Finance Section. Even the most basic of 
administrative investigations were problematic in Queensland Health. For example, 
in 2007, a complaint was received that Barlow has misused an official vehicle by 
using it outside of official work commitments. This routine investigation took 40 
months to resolve, with the allegations finally substantiated in early 2011. Other 
investigations relating to Barlow included: 
• On 5th August 2010, the CMC received an anonymous email implicating 
Barlow in serious fraud against the department. The CMC referred the 
investigation to the Ethical Standards Unit (ESU) in Queensland Health as 
it was not deemed a CMC ‘Category 1’ complaint. The ESU had an 
attached Queensland police officer called a Police Liaison Officer (PLO). 
The PLO did complete an Australian criminal check on Barlow; however, 
no check was ever conducted on Barlow’s New Zealand criminal record. 
Barlow’s vehicle misuse had not been entered into the internal complaints 
database. The ESU reached out to Barlow’s manager to ascertain whether 
he had the capacity for fraud – the manager replied that he could find no 
indications that would suggest fraudulent activity. Barlow’s poor work 
ethics, poor attendance, poor treatment of others, job competency, and his 
claim to be royalty were never passed onto the ESU as potential ‘red 
flags’. Based on the email from the Barlow’s manager, the ESU closed the 
investigation. 
• In late 2010, an internal audit team commenced an investigation into credit 
card misuse. Barlow was identified as an employee with suspicious 
transactions. Queensland Health referred the findings to CMC. The CMC 
advised Queensland Health to deal with the matter and report back to 
them. The internal investigation reported to the ESU in June 2011 that 
Barlow had breached policy by splitting transactions – a recommendation 
was made that his management deal with the issue. No action was ever 
taken against Barlow. 
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• In June 2011, QAO audited 25 grant transactions within the department. 
One of the transactions selected was a payment made by Barlow to HIC. 
Irregularities were identified with a decision made to audit grant funding 
in December 2011 – by this time the full extent of Barlow’s frauds were 
uncovered. 
• Individuals within Barlow’s immediate workspace complained about 
Barlow’s behaviour; however, none of the complaints led to the 
identification of his fraud. No complaints ever reached the ESU.  
Summary  
Queensland Health was a victim of fraud, despite being a well-resourced, 
modern, public service provider. There was no internal collusion; the CMC report 
confirmed that Barlow acted alone (CMC, 2013, p.5); however, the report stresses 
the negative affect of poor employee fraud awareness, poor anti-fraud culture, and an 
inability for management to set an appropriate workplace tone relating to fraud (tone 
from the top).  
The analysis found that Barlow’s ability to corrupt hard controls was much 
more limited when compared to his exploitation of soft controls. The corruption of 
soft controls within the Finance Section was allowed to take place as a direct result 
of poor ‘tone from the top’ (Mr Bob McDonald, personal communication, February 
11, 2016). This leadership void within the Finance Section of Queensland Health 
allowed for the existence of a weak anti-fraud culture, which in turn had significant 
negative implications on the ability of the section to adhere to fraud control policies.  
The following quote provides a reflective summary of the Barlow case: 
It would appear that Barlow was determined to defraud any organisation he 
worked in, as evidenced by his criminal conviction and suspected actions in 
New Zealand.  He brought a manufactured persona to the Department from 
day one of employment.  His charisma with certain managers and staff 
allowed him to get away with things that otherwise should not have been 
allowed.  He was able to get away with small items of unethical behaviour 
and escalate to the level he did. Barlow was not able to corrupt the specific 
system for the payment of grants and that the staff members in that area were 
beyond reproach in the soft control failures. Due to management decisions 
he was able to get permanent employment and promotional opportunities, 
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which put him in the position of being able to have junior staff, ignore the 
required controls and to have senior management not take responsibility for 
his actions (Mr Bob McDonald, personal communication, February 11, 
2016).    
5.4.2 Case Study 2: Assessment of RTA and RailCorp fraud minimisation 
practices based on the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model. 
Analysis of the ICAC (NSW) (2006) report into the RTA and RailCorp frauds 
was conducted, with comparisons made between the actual fraud minimisation 
practices of the entities and the recommended practices listed within (pillars) the 
Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model.  
Prevention  
The ICAC (NSW) (2006) report does not confirm whether either the RTA or 
RailCorp had completed fraud risk assessments. Research using secondary sources 
was unable to ascertain whether this internal document was ever produced or if the 
policy was implemented. There is no mention of fraud awareness training within the 
ICAC (NSW) (2006) report, however, the report does identify that within the RTA 
and RailCorp there was a lack of compliance to policy and procedures by staff. The 
report recommended that the RTA implement a ‘Probity Plan/Checklist – Guide for 
the Procurement of Goods and Services’ and that staff must be appropriately trained 
in these new policies and procedures. The ICAC (NSW) (2006) report states that 
there was both a lack of understanding by many staff and blatant disregard by others, 
for policy and procedures relating to compliance for tenders and contracts. These 
employee behaviours suggest poor fraud awareness, a poor anti-fraud culture, and 
poor tone from the top. RTA and RailCorp personnel had a lack of understanding of 
the correct processes for verifying, certifying, and approving invoices – the report 
recommended training in these procedures. This recommendation demonstrates a 
lack of understanding of fraud awareness training by employees at the time the 
frauds occurred. 
The report identified that poor culture was a key component that “contributed 
to, or failed to prevent and deter, the corrupt conduct” (ICAC, 2006, p.46). 
Management at both the RTA and RailCorp neglected to monitor the performance of 
their subordinates against duty statements. Additionally, managers did not maintain 
accurate records of their oversight/supervision of their staff, as per established 
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procedures.  The ICAC (NSW) (2006) report identified that poor record keeping and 
a lack of suitable employee performance management increased the risk of fraud 
within the organisations; in addition, the absence of these two functions inhibited the 
ability of both auditors and investigators to do their jobs properly. The ICAC (NSW) 
(2006) report recommended that all staff should acknowledge in writing that they 
understand and will comply with the Code of Conduct. The RTA and RailCorp had 
established Human Resource recruitment processes - there is no mention within the 
ICAC (NSW) (2006) report of appropriate employee screening occurring, or even 
basic qualifications checks of employees. 
Detection 
There is no mention of Fraud Control Plans or employee screening within the 
ICAC (NSW) (2006) report. The following points highlight weaknesses in 
governance practices that would usually be included as part of an organisation’s 
Fraud Control Plan:  
• Staff lacked education and training in relation to the seriousness of policies 
and procedures breeches;  
• The report recommended that staff must be made aware that sanctions 
would apply if individuals were found to have deliberately breached 
organisational policies and procedures;  
• The report details how there was a ‘single software solution’ for electronic 
transactions, this prevented the generation of ‘exemption’ reports usually 
associated with duel software solutions, which electronically cross check 
information;  
• Data was not captured electronically to confirm who certified and who 
verified invoices – this prevented the detection of individuals who 
performed unauthorised dual functions;  
• There was no due diligence on the tenderer’s business, their name or 
specifics about the company identity; and,  
• No ATO, ABN, ASIC, or NSW Office of Fair Trading checks were 
completed.  
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Response 
Concerns about possible fraudulent conduct within the RTA were made 
directly to ICAC (NSW) by the RTA, pursuant to Section 11 of the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption Act 1988.  The investigations were commenced as a 
result of the reports to ICAC (NSW). The ICAC (NSW) (2006) report does not 
reference any internal investigations completed by the RTA or RailCorp in relation 
to these frauds. The report notes that whist employees from both victim entities are 
responsible for implementing policies and procedures, it is the managers that must 
foster the appropriate culture form successful implementation (ICAC NSW, 2006). 
The ICAC investigation reported on the behaviour of managers and the example they 
set, noting the associated influence on the performance and attitudes of employees 
(ICAC NSW, 2006). 
Summary 
The ICAC (NSW) (2006) report provides minimal background information, 
and as a result, there are information gaps, which inhibit analysis. Within the RTA 
and RailCorp there was a lack of compliance to policy and procedures by staff, a lack 
of fraud awareness, and a poor anti-fraud culture. Based on the report’s 
recommendations, this case identifies an abuse of soft controls and a general lack of 
fraud awareness by the employees directly involved (ICAC NSW, 2006). Whilst not 
suggesting that managers were directly complicit in any of the frauds perpetrated, 
their poor leadership and the poor example they set to their subordinates did not 
advocate a positive anti-fraud culture. 
5.4.3 Case Study 3: Assessment of universities (IT fraud) fraud minimisation 
practices based on the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model. 
Analysis of the ICAC (NSW) (2015) report into university IT frauds was 
conducted, with comparisons made between the actual fraud minimisation practices 
of the entities and the recommended practices listed within (pillars) the Conceptual 
Fraud Alignment Model.  
Prevention 
There is no mention of risk assessments within the ICAC (NSW) (2015) report. 
However, the report does indicate that after these frauds occurred, measures were 
taken to reduce risk. It can be assumed that if a risk assessment was completed, it did 
not include invoice payments as a potential point of risk. Automated workplace 
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systems were implemented after the frauds; these automated systems are designed to 
“provide important advantages, including the ability to track purchases, the 
automatic segregation of duties and in-built delegations, which reduce both the 
likelihood of errors and coordination costs” (ICAC NSW, 2015, p.26). 
There is no mention of Fraud Awareness Training within the ICAC (NSW) 
(2015) report; however, each ICAC (NSW) recommendation provides a suggested 
mitigation to each identified weakness, most of which indicate the shortcomings (of 
varying degrees) of employee fraud awareness. 
Detection 
There is no mention of Fraud Control Plans within the ICAC (NSW) (2015) 
report. The report does highlight a number of fraud related governance practices that 
were not completed – the procedures would reside within the detection pillar. The 
University of Sydney did not adequately manage the details of its vendors. The 
university used paper-based authorisations, and members responsible for checking 
details were negligent in their duties. For example, the invoices that Mr Roberts 
submitted included his personal bank details – a more thorough system would likely 
have identified the duplication of banking details and may have unmasked the fraud. 
As a result, Recommendation 1 from the report stated that “the University of Sydney 
implements measures to safeguard the integrity of vendor banking details when new 
vendors are created and invoices are processed for payment” (ICAC NSW, 2015, 
p.27). 
All three universities paid at least some invoices without appropriate 
validations occurring. The ICAC (NSW) (2015) report does highlight that three 
fraudulent invoices made out to Macquarie University were refused payment due to 
an absence of supporting documentation. The attentiveness of the staff at Macquarie 
University confirms that there were extant fraud control plans in place – other 
positive actions are not noted in relation to the other two universities. 
Each university had established Human Resource recruitment processes that 
dealt with employee screening. Despite this, Mr Roberts falsified his CV and 
qualifications to all three universities; this deception included false qualifications, 
professional associations, and previous employment positions. The report states that 
it is unlikely that Mr Robert’s would have been employed if he had not lied about his 
employment history and qualifications (ICAC, 2015, p. 30). As a result, 
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Recommendation 3 from the reports states: “The University of Newcastle, The 
University of Sydney, and Macquarie University ensure that employment screening 
checks are performed on preferred applicants in line with the Australian Standard on 
Employment Screening (AS 4811-2006)” (ICAC, 2015, p.30).  
Response 
There is no mention within the ICAC (NSW) (2015) report about entity 
investigations and whether or not they contributed to any of the frauds. As such, this 
pillar cannot be analysed for this case study. 
Summary 
The ICAC (NSW) (2015) report provides minimal background information and 
as a result, there are information gaps that inhibit analysis. Payments without 
appropriate validations demonstrate poor fraud awareness training and a poor anti-
fraud culture. It should be noted that staff at Macquarie University did successfully 
prevent three fraudulent transactions being processed by following correct protocol. 
5.5 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Each of the three selected case studies involved asset misappropriation; 
specifically invoice fraud against an Australian public sector entity. In the first phase 
of the analysis, each of the public entities was examined to determine whether they 
were compliant with the relevant fraud related legislation at the time the crimes were 
committed. In the Queensland Health case, an additional layer of assessment was 
completed in this phase, with the department also assessed retrospectively against the 
mandated legislative requirements from the Commonwealth Fraud Control 
Framework (Cth, 2014a) (Fraud Rule (Cth, 2014) and Fraud Policy). In the second 
phase of analysis, the ability of the case study entities to minimise fraud was tested 
against the individual components within the Conceptual Fraud Alignment model’s 
‘pillars’. Table 5.2 provides a summary of identified weaknesses in relation to the 
elements within the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model. 
All entities were deemed compliant with the mandated fraud legislation; yet 
they all became victims of fraud. Each of the entities operated in a similar 
environment, where a high number of invoices were processed daily as a mechanism 
to disperse funds. Corruption of soft controls surrounding these payment methods 
was the common theme for all cases and resulted in the occurrence of invoice fraud. 
 98 Chapter 5: Analysis 
Evidence suggests that whilst the majority of hard controls listed within the 
Conceptual Fraud Alignment model were adhered to, it was ultimately the soft 
controls, or the human element that were corrupted.  
The cultural tone of an organisation is established based on the behaviour of 
managers or accountable authorities (Bryan, 2012). This type of culture is often 
referred to as ‘tone at the top’ (Davis & Pesch, 2013; Lail et al., 2013). Senior 
management are responsible for ensuring an appropriate fraud prevention culture 
exists and must act as role models in the defence against fraud (Andrews, 1989; 
Waters & Bird, 1987). All case study entities became victims of fraud, in part 
because a poor anti-fraud culture has a detrimental effect of fraud minimisation 
through the degradation of soft controls. This occurs because soft controls are 
enabled by managers (Andrews, 1989; Waters & Bird, 1987), through shared values, 
moral standards, beliefs, and unwritten traditions (Chtioui & Thiéry-Dubuisson, 
2011). The Queensland Health case demonstrates the detrimental effect poor anti-
fraud controls can have on an entity. There were three critical findings from the 
study’s analysis, that is:  
• Critical Finding 1: All of the case study entities (Queensland Health, 
RailCorp, RTA, the University of Newcastle, the University of Sydney and 
Macquarie University) were assessed and deemed to be compliant with the 
relevant fraud related legislation at the time the respective frauds took 
place.  
• Critical Finding 2: All of the case study entities demonstrated poor tone 
from the top, or more generally, poor organisational anti-fraud culture. 
• Critical Finding 3: In each case, the fraudsters’ criminal activity was 
made easier as a result of poor employee fraud awareness, which created 
an inability by many employees to adhere to basic fraud control 
procedures.  
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Table 5.2: Identified weaknesses in entity fraud minimisation practices 
Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model Elements 
Case 1: 
Queensland 
Health 
Fraud 
Case 2: RTA 
and 
RailCorp 
Fraud 
Case 3: 
Universities 
Fraud 
  !!     
Prevention - Risk Assessment 
 
UNKNOWN UNKNOWN 
Prevention - Fraud Awareness Training 
   
Prevention - Qualifications 
   
Detection - Fraud Control Plan 
   
Detection - Employment Screening 
   
Response - Investigations 
 
UNKNOWN UNKNOWN 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
This chapter provides an overview of findings in the context of addressing the 
research questions outlined at the beginning of this thesis: 
• RQ1: What are the public sector legislative requirements for fraud 
minimisation?  
• RQ2: What specific governance measures address legislative requirements 
for fraud minimisation?  
• RQ3: To what extent should fraud governance practices be aligned with 
legislative requirements to achieve fraud minimisation? 
In this context, recommendations supporting better use of hard and soft 
controls to help align governance frameworks with daily reporting and oversight 
practices are set out, along with further refinement of the Conceptual Fraud 
Alignment Model introduced in prior chapters. The relationship between ‘tone from 
the top’ and an entity’s anti-fraud culture is also discussed, along with the 
importance of formal regular fraud control procedures, reviews, and updates.   
6.1 OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
Phase 1 of the analysis (see Section 5.3) examined whether the public sector 
department in each case study was compliant with its prescribed anti-fraud regulatory 
framework at the time the crimes were committed. In the second phase of analysis, 
the fraud minimisation practices of each case study entity were assessed using this 
study’s Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model as a mechanism to determine the 
alignment between fraud-related legislation and fraud governance practices. Three 
critical findings were identified (Section 5.5): 
• Critical Finding 1: All of the case study entities (Queensland Health, 
RailCorp and the RTA, the University of Newcastle, the University of 
Sydney and Macquarie University) were assessed and deemed to be 
compliant with the relevant fraud related legislation at the time the 
respective frauds took place.  
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• Critical Finding 2: All of the case study entities demonstrated poor tone 
from the top, or more generally, a poor organisational anti-fraud culture. 
• Critical Finding 3: In each case, poor employee fraud awareness and 
training made the fraudster’s criminal activity easier to perpetrate and 
conceal.  
The three critical findings each contributed to a misalignment between fraud 
related legislation and fraud governance practices, which in turn reduced the ability 
of each entity to exercise appropriate fraud minimisation practices. The following 
section considers the findings in relation to the literature from Chapter 2. 
6.2 CONSIDERATIONS 
This section considers the critical findings (Section 5.5) and demonstrates 
where they align with or differ from the literature (Chapter 2) relating to fraud 
minimisation in the public sector. The considerations are used to shape the 
refinement of the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model. 
Critical Finding 1. An interesting and important finding in all three case study 
entities was that each was deemed to be compliant with the relevant fraud related 
legislation, yet they all became victims of invoice fraud. This finding highlights that 
compliance alone is not sufficient to minimise fraud, which aligns with Falkenberg 
and Herremans (1995), who argued that the most effective internal controls exist 
when formal and informal or hard and soft systems are congruent. The research 
findings from this study suggest that each entity placed too much emphasis on hard 
controls at the detriment of soft controls, which according to Chtioui & Thiéry-
Dubuisson (2011) is quite common. Findings from this study concur with the 
literature that focusing on ‘compliance’ alone leads to a misalignment between fraud 
related legislation and fraud governance practices.  
The Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014) and AS 8001 Fraud 
and Corruption Control (Standards Australia, 2008) advocate following the processes 
of prevention, detection, and response in order to achieve fraud minimisation. 
However, each of the three case study entities placed too much emphasis on 
compliance with legislative requirements (ticking the boxes) rather than ensuring that 
hard and soft governance practices were in place. When this happens, broader 
strategic benefits and control mechanisms within an entity suffer; this finding 
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concurs with Stein, (2012), who added that obtaining legislative compliance should 
not be the only fraud minimisation objective for public entities. Additionally, Chtioui 
& Thiéry-Dubuisson (2011) asserted an over emphasis on legislation or hard controls 
would be at the detriment of soft controls, which findings from this study confirm.  
Although legislative compliance is a positive outcome that all three entities 
achieved after the conduct of independent audits, it should be viewed as one of the 
first of many steps in the process of establishing fraud minimisation. Hard and soft 
controls need to be developed in a balanced manner according to the characteristics 
of the entity in order to form a single set of efficient controls (Chtioui & Thiéry-
Dubuisson, 2011). Falkenberg and Herremans (1995) referred to this balance as 
control harmonisation, and it is deemed an essential prerequisite for establishing a 
stable and efficient organisation. Organisations that only focus on hard controls to 
achieve compliance create an illusion of control (Chtioui & Thiéry-Dubuisson, 
2011). These illusions do nothing to curb the incidents of fraud (Chtioui & Thiéry-
Dubuisson, 2011); with findings from this study supporting this view.  
Critical Finding 2. There is much literature arguing that poor tone from the 
top directly results in a poor organisational anti-fraud culture (Davis & Pesch, 2013; 
Lail et al., 2013). This study concurs with the literature, as it was identified that case 
entities had insufficient leadership when it came to ‘tone-from-the-top’, which 
contributed to invoice fraud occurring. As discussed in Section 5.5, a poor anti-fraud 
culture has a detrimental effect on fraud minimisation because it degrades established 
soft controls. Soft controls should be enabled by the managers through shared values, 
moral standards, beliefs, and unwritten traditions (Chtioui & Thiéry-Dubuisson, 
2011). Moreover, it is posited that senior management, through their lack of 
leadership, did not act as role models to their subordinates in the defence against 
fraud (Andrews, 1989; Waters & Bird, 1987). The Queensland Health fraud case 
clearly demonstrates the absence of an anti-fraud culture, as demonstrated by the 
CMC report (2013) being critical of the leadership and culture created by 
management within the Department’s Finance Section.  
An anti-fraud culture can only be developed when the tone from the top 
promotes transparent financial reporting and complete disclosure; the alternative is a 
work environment that inculcates or advocates misleading and non-transparent 
actions that are detrimental to the entity and may lead to fraudulent behaviour (Lail, 
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et al., 2013). Managers from the case entities adopted an approach that relied on the 
use of hard controls in isolation, which Tipgos (2002) argued is not suitable for 
effective fraud minimisation. Managers should only rely on hard controls when the 
entity operates within a stable risk environment (Falkenberg & Herremans, 1995). 
None of the case study entities operated within ‘stable’ environments, because each 
had multiple payment systems where high quantity and high frequency payments 
existed. Hard controls need to be implemented in conjunction with soft controls 
(Tipgos, 2002) as a complimentary or balanced approach to fraud minimisation.  
Critical Finding 3. The third critical finding relates to fraud awareness 
training and reviews. Organisations must adapt and learn. As one weakness is 
identified, or when fraud is detected, an internal review should follow, with updated 
fraud awareness training provided for employees (Falkenberg and Herremans, 1995, 
Strand et al., 2002). Findings from this study confirm this as an important 
consideration in fraud minimisation. The need to adapt and review procedures is 
mandated in the legislation (Cth, 2014a) and listed as best practice within AS 8001 
Fraud and Corruption Control (Standards Australia, 2008). Risk assessment reviews 
should occur at regular intervals, including after any significant structural changes 
have occurred within an entity (Cth, 2014). Failure to review procedures after the 
structural changes within Queensland Health allowed the fraudster Barlow to 
actively pursue retention of the cost codes associated with the grant funds by 
fostering the impression that delegation remained with him. It is interesting to note 
that all secondary sources of information analysed in this study formally 
recommended their respective case study entities review extant fraud control 
procedures, including fraud awareness training and reviews. 
All entities demonstrated a degree of complacency towards ongoing fraud 
awareness training and continual development of an anti-fraud culture to meet the 
dynamic threat fraud poses. As Strand et al. (2002) posited, ongoing fraud awareness 
training empowers an organisation, creating more employees who can identify risks, 
which increases the ability to deter and detect fraudulent activity, and the findings of 
this study concur with this view. Poor employee fraud awareness is directly 
attributed to a lack of appropriate training (Cth, 2014b, p.14), and results in an 
inability by many employees to adhere to basic fraud control procedures.  
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Conclusion: Fraud minimisation can only be achieved if there is an alignment 
between fraud related legislation and fraud governance practices including hard and 
soft control measures. This is achieved by adhering to appropriate prevention, 
detection, and response measures (Cth, 2014; AS 8001, Standards Australia, 2008), 
and rather than a ‘ticking the boxes’ approach to compliance, this study has 
demonstrated the importance of public sector organisations ensuring their anti-fraud 
governance practices address specific fraud issues. This is particularly important 
when it comes to asset misappropriation, such as invoice fraud, as the case entities 
demonstrate. Based on these findings, an updated Conceptual Fraud Alignment 
Model (Figure 6.1) presents culture and awareness as enduring elements designed to 
support the implementation of the ‘pillars’, and in turn, ensures alignment is 
achieved. 
6.2.1 Refined Fraud Alignment Model – Review (Awareness & Culture) 
The Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model was reviewed following the analysis 
phase of this study. The model is largely the same as presented within Chapter 3, 
however, the refined version includes ‘awareness’, which relates to fraud awareness 
training and reviews; and, ‘culture’, which encompasses tone from the top and an 
anti-fraud culture within the organisation.  
As discussed, a lack of soft controls occurred in all three case studies, and can 
in part, be attributed to poor fraud awareness and poor tone from the top (culture). 
An effective anti-fraud and compliance culture cannot be achieved without fraud 
awareness training and review measures; it creates an environment where everyone 
in the entity understands compliance objectives and the importance of individual 
roles in that process (Stein, 2012). An environment where employees understand and 
value compliance creates an additional line of defence against fraudsters, making 
disguising fraud more difficult (Dorminey et.al, 2012, p.12); this study concurs with 
this view. In addition, as Lail et al. (2015) argued, tone from the top is essential, as it 
promotes transparency and disclosure, which this study also confirms. Senior 
management and organisational leaders must act as role models in the defence 
against fraud; they are the most influential force for the correct delivery of soft 
controls (Andrews, 1989; Waters & Bird, 1987); all three case entities analysed in 
this thesis demonstrate the importance of this.  
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The revised conceptual model should be viewed as an iterative process of 
awareness, evaluation, and review, with a focus on the culture of the organisation in 
minimising fraudulent activities.  
 
Figure 6.1: Refined Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model 
 
In viewing fraud and the associated fraud risks as a complex adaptive system,36 
the refined model recognises that fraudsters will continue to adapt to their 
environment in order to survive. Fraud minimisation must be viewed as a non-linear 
function, random in nature, difficult to predict, and as such, awkward to counter. 
Ongoing fraud awareness training and maintenance of a positive anti-fraud culture 
ensures the Conceptual Fraud Alignment model can operate in a constant state of 
momentum. As lessons are learnt, employees should be educated about the changing 
risks. Similarly, if there is a trend towards non-compliance of soft controls, 
                                                
 
36 Complex adaptive systems are defined as an entity consisting of many diverse and autonomous 
components or parts that are interrelated, interdependent, linked through many dense interconnections, 
and behave as a unified whole in learning from experience and in adjusting, not just reacting, to 
changes to the environment. Source: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/complex-adaptive-
system-CAS.html 
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leadership should combat this directly to ensure the culture remains conducive to 
fraud minimisation. The iterative nature of the updated model is an important aspect, 
as it assists in creating a positive anti-fraud work environment - an environment 
where employees know and understand invoice fraud related risks, and receive 
appropriate training to mitigate them. 
6.3   CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE THREE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The three research questions were presented in Chapter 3 and the findings for 
each are now presented.  
6.3.1 Research Question 1:  
What are the public sector legislative requirements for fraud minimisation?  
In Australia, all public entities must comply with the mandated legislative 
requirements as outlined within the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 
2014a). Understanding the legislative requirements for fraud minimisation is 
important; however, findings from this study have highlighted that compliance 
cannot be the sole priority, as it leads to compliance myopia, which in turn has a 
detrimental influence on all aspects of an entity (Stein, 2012, p. 330).  
At a glance, finding the answer to this research question seemed a relatively 
straightforward objective when viewed in isolation. However, the study has 
demonstrated that identifying public sector legislative requirements is simply the first 
of many essential steps required to achieve fraud minimisation. An examination of 
the three case study entities showed that they were compliant with the relevant fraud-
related legislation, yet they all became victims of invoice fraud over extended 
periods. This contradiction highlights the need for public sector entities to achieve a 
balance approach between compliance and fraud governance (hard and soft) 
practices in an attempt to achieve fraud minimisation. Legislative compliance alone 
is not sufficient to achieve fraud minimisation. 
6.3.2 Research Question 2:  
What specific governance measures address legislative requirements for fraud 
minimisation?  
The study identified that fraud-related governance practices must consist of a 
balance between hard and soft controls. The controls were broken into three distinct 
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elements; prevention, detection, and response. These elements formed the pillars 
within the Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model.  
This study has identified that soft controls enable the implementation of hard 
controls and that management are ultimately responsible for ensuring an appropriate 
anti-fraud culture, in addition to fraud awareness and review. Each of the case study 
entities had established fraud control plans; however, these hard controls were 
innocuous in workplace environments that had poor soft controls.  
The management teams in each of the case study entities did not know or 
understand that soft controls are the foundation of effective hard controls, a finding 
that concurs with Abdelrahim (2014). As Chtioui & Thiéry-Dubuisson (2011) 
suggest, the two elements complement one another in order to mitigate fraud risk in 
their workplaces; and findings from this study concur. Finally, it is argued that 
effective internal controls exist if hard and soft systems are congruent (Falkenberg 
and Herremans, 1995) and findings from this study have identified this as being an 
important factor for effective fraud minimisation.  
To summarise, the need for a positive anti-fraud culture based on an 
appropriate tone from the top, in addition to regular fraud awareness training, and 
regular reviews of fraud minimisation practices are more important than defining 
governance measures in addressing legislative requirements (see Section 6.1.1).  
6.3.3 Research Question 3:  
To what extent should fraud governance practices be aligned with legislative 
requirements to achieve fraud minimisation?  
This study has demonstrated that for fraud minimisation to occur, there must be 
an alignment between fraud-related legislation and fraud-related governance 
practices. If there is a misalignment, public sector entities will be at risk of becoming 
victims of fraud.  
Within Chapter 5 – Analysis, this study identified the internal weaknesses for 
each case study entity, including poor employee CV and qualification screening, low 
levels of fraud awareness, an inability of some employees to follow procedures, out-
dated risk assessments, and slow investigation processes. These weaknesses inhibited 
the ability of the entities to implement appropriate governance measures and created 
an opportunity for the fraudsters to exploit them, a finding that aligns with Cressey 
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(1953); Duffield & Grabosky (2001); Albrecht (2008); and Dorminey et al. (2010). 
Opportunities for invoice fraud will be significantly reduced if fraud governance 
practices are aligned with the legislative requirements in the public sector. 
6.4   CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH 
This study provides contributions to both academic researchers and 
practitioners in both private and public practices. 
6.4.1 Contribution to Theory 
Despite the identified limitations of this study (Chapter 4, Section 4.6), the 
study has made a valuable contribution into the research area of fraud minimisation 
in the public sector. A conceptual model based on the extant literature was developed 
and tested. The model was refined following a review of this study’s critical findings. 
The refined Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model may be used to assist future 
researchers to identify the origin of fraud within an entity. In particular, the study 
identifies the importance of a more holistic approach to fraud minimisation, rather 
than simply ensuring legislative compliance in public sector entities. 
6.4.2 Contribution to Practice 
The Revised Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model was refined into a tool 
available for use by entities aiming to achieve fraud minimisation. The simplicity of 
the model will aid public entities in avoiding what Stein (2006) described as 
compliance myopia. This is achieved by making the attainment of fraud 
minimisation easier to understand, less intimidating, and less of an organisational 
burden. The findings highlight that legislative compliance alone is not sufficient to 
inhibit fraud. Fraud minimisation can only be achieved if there is an alignment 
between fraud related legislation and fraud governance practices through the 
adherence of appropriate prevention, detection, and response measures. The need for 
an anti-fraud culture demonstrated from the top of the organisation, in addition to 
fraud awareness training and fraud risk reviews were emphasised in particular as 
being critical to fraud minimisation. 
6.5  FUTURE RESEARCH 
Considering the high cost of fraud (AIC, 2003) and the increasing rates of 
invoice fraud within both the public and private sectors across Australia (ABS, 2012, 
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2016), future studies into the area of fraud-related legislation and fraud governance 
practices would be welcomed. Based on the critical findings within this study, more 
research into the relationship between soft controls and fraud minimisation would be 
beneficial in both private and public sector organisations. Future research could also 
include analysis of the private sector, either in isolation to this study, or as part of a 
comparative review. As discussed in Section 4.6, if this topic was studied as part of a 
PhD instead of a Masters, the additional time and resources available could be used 
to include interviews or surveys of convicted fraudsters as part of the research design 
to gain deeper insights into the factors that enabled fraud to occur. Future research 
could also identify other types of fraud, bribery, and corruption in private and public 
sector organisations by using the model to identify the anti-fraud practices (or lack 
thereof) that resulted in fraud occurring.  
Fraud will never be eradicated; however, successful organisations should be 
vigilant and strive to achieve fraud minimisation; for this reason, ongoing research 
into all fields of fraud should be encouraged. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This study has provided insights into how Australian public sector entities can 
achieve fraud minimisation by examining the relationship between fraud-related 
legislation and fraud-related governance practices. The study’s findings have 
provided answers to the research questions and assist in providing an answer to the 
research problem; that is, how can Australian public sector entities achieve fraud 
minimisation? 
The Conceptual Fraud Alignment Model, which was initially presented for 
consideration in Chapter 3, was reviewed after the analysis phase of this study. The 
refined version now includes ‘awareness’, which relates to fraud awareness training 
and review; and ‘culture’, which encompasses tone from the top and the anti-fraud 
culture within the organisation. The refinements create a tool suitable for public (and 
potentially, private) sector entities seeking to improve their fraud minimisation 
practices.  
The findings highlight that legislative compliance alone is not sufficient to 
inhibit fraud, and that hard and soft controls need to work in unison to achieve fraud 
minimisation through the adherence of appropriate prevention, detection and 
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response measures. The study identified that public sector entities must move away 
from too much emphasis on legislative compliance and ‘ticking the boxes’, and 
instead move towards an integrated and balanced approach to the accomplishment of 
appropriate fraud minimisation in public sector workplaces. 
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Appendix A : Queensland Government Criminal Code Act 1899, s. 408C 
 
The Queensland Government Criminal Code Act 1899, s. 408C states that a person commits 
fraud if he or she dishonestly commits certain acts, including: 
 
a) applies to his or her own use or the use of any person- 
i. property belonging to another; 
ii. property belonging to the person, or which is in the person's 
possession, either solely or jointly with another person, subject to a 
trust, direction or condition or on account of any person; or 
b) obtains property from any person; or 
c) induces any person to deliver property to any person; or 
d) gains benefit or advantage, pecuniary or otherwise, to any person; or 
e) causes a detriment, pecuniary or otherwise, to any person; or 
f) induces any person to do any act which the person is lawfully entitled to 
abstain from doing; or 
g) induces any person from abstaining from doing any act which that person 
is lawfully entitled to do; or 
h) makes off, knowing that payment on the spot is required or expected for 
any property lawfully supplied or returned or for any service lawfully 
provided, without having paid and with intent to avoid payment. 
  
 122 Appendices 
Appendix B: Additional Australian Government legislated requirements for public 
entities dealing with fraud 
Additional Australian Government legislated requirements dealing with fraud, 
include:  
• Crimes Act 1914;  
• Evidence Act (1995);  
• Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983; 
• Auditor General Act 1997; 
• Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; 
• Freedom of Information Act 1982; 
• Electronic Transaction Act 1999; 
• Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979; 
• Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013; 
• Telecommunications (Interception) and listening Device Amendment Act 
1997. 
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Appendix C: Mandatory requirements to obtain AS 8001 certification 
 
• Entities should develop and implement a Fraud and Corruption Control Plan 
documenting the entity’s approach to controlling fraud and corruption 
exposure at strategic, tactical, and operational levels.  
• An entity’s Fraud and Corruption Control Plan should be reviewed and 
amended at intervals appropriate to the entity, but at a minimum, once every 
two years. Entities operating in rapidly changing business conditions 
(including and in particular, in conditions of significant technological change) 
should review and update the Fraud and Corruption Control Plan more 
frequently. 
• Entities should ensure that an appropriate level of resources is applied to 
controlling fraud and corruption risk. 
• While primary responsibility for the identification of fraud and corruption 
within an entity rests with management, entities should recognise that internal 
audit activity can be, in the context of addressing all business risks, an 
effective part of the overall control environment to identify the indicators of 
fraud and corruption.   
• An entity should aim to ensure that it has a healthy and sustainable ethical 
culture through the implementation of an integrity framework which should 
include a process of benchmarking and continuous monitoring underpinned 
by a program of example setting by senior management.   
• Entities should ensure that senior management has an observably high level 
of commitment to controlling the risks of fraud and corruption both against 
the entity and by the entity. 
• Entities should ensure that line managers are aware of their accountabilities 
for the prevention and detection of fraud and corruption. The management of 
fraud and corruption should be incorporated into the performance 
measurement system and each line manager’s performance should be 
measured against benchmarks appropriate for the industry or sector in which 
the entity operates. 
• Entities should ensure that all business processes, particularly those assessed 
as having a higher predisposition to the risks of fraud and corruption, are 
subject to a rigorous system of internal controls that are well documented, 
updated regularly and understood by all personnel.   
• Entities should adopt a policy and processes for the systematic identification, 
analysis and evaluation (‘risk assessment’) of fraud and corruption risk and 
should periodically conduct a comprehensive assessment of the risks of fraud 
and corruption within their business operations.   
• Every staff member (management and non-management) should have general 
awareness of fraud and corruption and how he or she should respond if this 
type of activity is detected or suspected.  
• The employment screening process is dealt with in Employment Screening 
AS 4811—2006 and it involves verifying, with the consent of the individual, 
the identity, integrity, and credentials of an entrusted person.  
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• Verification of suppliers and customers entities should take steps to ensure 
the bona fides of new suppliers and customers and periodically confirm the 
bona fides of continuing suppliers and customers.  
• Entities should separately consider measures aimed at controlling the risks of 
corruption. 
• All entities should implement systems aimed at detecting fraud and 
corruption as soon as possible after it has occurred in the event that the 
entity’s preventative systems fail.   
• Entities whose financial statements are audited should be familiar with the 
role and responsibilities of the auditor in detecting fraud.  
• Entities should ensure that adequate means for reporting suspicious or known 
illegal or unethical conduct are available to all personnel.  
• Entities should implement a policy for the active protection of whistle 
blowers and should ensure that the policy is well communicated and 
understood by all personnel.  
• Entities should develop and implement a program for the capturing, 
reporting, analysis, and escalation of all detected fraud and corruption 
incidents.  
• An entity should ensure that its own Human Resources Manual (or other 
relevant guidelines) includes particulars on how disciplinary proceedings 
should be conducted.  
• Entities should ensure that they have a policy on whether and how allegations 
of fraud and corrupt conduct should be reported to the police, other 
appropriate law enforcement agency, or other government body (for example, 
as identified in legislation)  
Source: AS 8001 (2008, p. 19–51). 
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Appendix D: Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework (Cth, 2014a) legislation 
 
#1. Conduct fraud risk assessments regularly and when there is a substantial change in 
the structure, functions or activities of the entity. 
 
#2. Develop and implementing a fraud control plan that deals with identified risks as 
soon as practicable after conducting a risk assessment. 
 
#3. Have an appropriate mechanism for preventing fraud, including by ensuring that:  
a. officials in the entity are made aware of what constitutes fraud. 
 
b. the risk of fraud is taken into account in planning and conducting the 
activities of the entity. 
 
#4. Have an appropriate mechanism for detecting incidents of fraud or suspected fraud, 
including a process for officials of the entity and other persons to report suspected fraud 
confidentially. 
 
#5. Have an appropriate mechanism for investigating or otherwise dealing with incidents 
of fraud or suspected fraud.  
 
#6. Having an appropriate mechanism for recording and reporting incidents of fraud or 
suspected fraud. 
 
Fraud Policy—Prevention and training  
#7. Entities must document their instructions and supporting procedures that assist 
officials to deal with fraud. 
 
#8. All officials and contractors must take into account the need to prevent and detect 
fraud as part of their normal responsibilities. 
 
#9. Entities must ensure that officials who are primarily engaged in investigating fraud 
as a minimum meet the required fraud control competency requirements set out in the 
Australian Government Investigations Standards (AGIS) within 12 months of being engaged 
in investigating fraud. 
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#10. Entities must ensure officials primarily engaged in fraud control activities possess or 
attain relevant qualifications or training to effectively carry out their duties within 12 months 
of being engaged in fraud control activities.  Relevant qualifications include a Certificate IV 
in Government (Fraud Control) or equivalent for officials primarily engaged in fraud risk 
assessment, and a Diploma of Government (Fraud Control) or equivalent for officials 
primarily engaged in the coordination and management of fraud control activities. 
 
Fraud Policy—Outsourcing 
#11. Outsourcing does not remove the responsibility of the accountable authority to 
manage fraud risk.  However, when an entity provides third-party services for another entity, 
the entity delivering the service retains responsibility for meeting the first entity’s 
obligations under this Policy and the fraud rule. 
 
Fraud Policy—Investigations 
#12. Entities must take into consideration the requirements of the AGIS when developing 
systems and processes for the detection and investigation of fraud. 
 
#13. Entities must maintain appropriately documented procedures setting out criteria for 
making decisions at critical stages in the management of a suspected fraud incident.  
 
#14. Entities must appropriately document decisions to use civil, administrative or 
disciplinary procedures or to take no further action in relation to a suspected fraud incident. 
 
#15. An entity is responsible for investigating instances of fraud or suspected fraud 
against it, including investigating disciplinary matters, unless the matter is referred to and 
accepted by the AFP or another law enforcement agency. 
 
#16. Where a law enforcement agency declines a referral, entities must resolve the matter 
in accordance with internal and external requirements such as the AGIS and relevant entity 
specific criteria. 
 
#17. The AFP has the primary law enforcement responsibility for investigating serious or 
complex fraud against the Commonwealth.  Entities must refer all instances of potential 
serious or complex fraud offences to the AFP in accordance with the AGIS and AFP referral 
process, except in the following circumstances: 
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a. entities that have the capacity and the appropriate skills and resources 
needed to investigate potential criminal matters and meet the requirements of the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions in preparing briefs of evidence and 
the AGIS for gathering evidence, or where legislation sets out specific alternative 
arrangements. 
 
#18. Investigations must be carried out by appropriately qualified personnel.  If external 
investigators are engaged, they must as a minimum have the required investigations 
competency requirements set out in the AGIS. 
 
#19. Entities must have in place investigation processes and procedures that are consistent 
with the AGIS.   Entities must also comply with the Prosecution Policy of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
#20. Entities must take all reasonable measures to recover financial losses caused by 
illegal activity through proceeds of crime and civil recovery processes or administrative 
remedies. 
 
#21. Where an investigation discloses potential criminal activity involving another 
entity’s activities or programs, the investigating entity must report the matter to that entity in 
accordance with the Privacy Act 1988 and the Australian Privacy Principles. 
 
Fraud Policy—Reporting 
#22. Entities must have procedures in place to manage information gathered about fraud 
against the entity. 
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Appendix E: Barlow’s expenditure of fraudulently obtained funds 
 
Moray Street Property Purchase $6,165,915.40 
Cash Withdrawals $592,946.43 
Travel and Accommodation $1,129,396.92 
Louis Vuitton purchases $636.740.14 
Motor Vehicles $319,272.41 
Libertine Parfumerie Costs $212,823.09 
Artwork $199,937.29 
Space Furniture $189,893.80 
Clothing $143,461.38 
Bang & Olfuson $103,975.00 
David Jones $85,013.45 
Flowers (The Flower Trap) $74,338.20 
Brisbane Jetskis $43,900.00 
Restaurants & Food $54,540.71 
Rent $73,265.00 
Watches of Switzerland $30,605.00 
Mount Blanc & The Pen Shop $16,707.16 
Fusion Cycles $14,574.95 
Unvouched Transfers and Withdrawals $646,013.43 
Transfers to Barlow ANZ Debit Card $410,290.00 
Balance of Expenditure $1,298,395.82 
Total Expenditure37   $12,442,005.58 
Source: AUSTLII. 2015. R v Morehu-Barlow [2014] QCA 4 (7 February 2014). 
 
  
                                                
 
37 In addition to this expenditure, Joel Morehu Barlow had $4,475,274.59 in bank accounts, making 
the total amount defrauded $16,917,280.17. (AustILL, 2014). 
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Appendix F: Conviction summary of Joel Morehu-Barlow 
Date of Offence Offence/ Maximum Penalty Sentence 
Ct 1: btwn 6 October 
2007 – 8 August 2008. 
Aggravated fraud (s 408C(1)(c), (2)(b) & 
(d) (max – 10 years). 
2 years 
imprisonment 
Ct 2: on or about 26 
September 2008. 
Falsifying a record (s 430(e)) (max – 10 
years). 
2 years 
imprisonment 
Ct 3: btwn 28 
September 2008 – 18 
December 2011. 
Aggravated fraud (s 408C(1)(b), (2)(b) & 
(d)) (max – 12 years).[1] 
12 years 
imprisonment 
(cumulative) 
Ct: 4 btwn 22 July 2010 
– 8 December 2011. Uttering (s 488(1)(b)) (max – 3 years). 
2 years 
imprisonment 
Ct 5: on or about 14 
November 2011. 
Falsifying a record (s 430(e)) (max – 10 
years) 
2 years 
imprisonment 
Ct 6: 9 December 2011. Possess dangerous drug (s 9(d) Drugs Misuse Act 1986) (max – 15 years). 6 months 
Ct 7: 9 December 2011. Possess relevant substance (s 9A Drugs Misuse Act 1986) (max – 15 years). 6 months 
Summary offence: 9 
December 2011. 
Possess utensils (s 10(2) Drugs Misuse 
Act 1986) (max – 2 years). 
Not further 
punished 
 
Source: AUSTLII. 2015. R v Morehu-Barlow [2014] QCA 4 (7 February 2014). 
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• !
Appendix G: Queensland Health Invoice Fraud – Key Events 
Summary of Events 
 
 
13 February 1975  - ( Serial 1 ) - Joseph Hikairo Barlow born in New Zealand. 
 
 4 August 1999 - ( Serial 2 ) - Barlow convicted and sentenced for ‘theft as a servant’ and ‘using a document for pecuniary 
advantage’. The offences occurred while Barlow was employed in the New Zealand Internal Revenue Department. 
 
 10 May 2001  - ( Serial 3 ) -Barlow changed his name by deed poll to Hohepa Hikairo Morehu-Barlow.  
 31 March 2003 - ( Serial 4 ) - Barlow to departs New Zealand for Australia. 
 
 July 2003 - ( Serial 5 ) - Barlow was recorded as being wanted in New Zealand for questioning in relation to a fraud while employed as a private contractor on a project funded by a New Zealand government department, and in relation to another 
fraud committed after his employment with a private business was terminated due to theft.  
 
 2005 - ( Serial 6 ) - CV provided to Queensland Health (QHealth) from Barlow stated he had received a number of tertiary qualifications. These included the Diploma in Business Studies, Certificate and Management, Certificate in IT, Bachelor of Laws 
and Bachelor of Commerce Administration. There is no evidence Barlow received any of these qualifications. 
 
 
 
2005 - ( Serial 7 ) - Barlow employed by QHealth as an AO3 contractor 
 
September - 2005 - ( Serial 8 ) - Barlow accepts a temporary position as an A04 Assistant Finance Officer. 
 
 2005 - ( Serial 9 ) - A former colleague said that when Barlow started working for QHealth in 2004, his lifestyle was beyond 
that of a QHealth wage. 
 
 2005 - ( Serial 10 ) - Barlow tells QHealth employees that he was Tahitian royalty and made it known he has e a trust fund but 
needs to have a job to access it. 
 
 4 October 2007 - ( Serial 11 ) - Barlow authorises first fraudulent payment to ‘The Muse’ for $2,200.61 
 
 Late 2007 - ( Serial 12 ) - Staff began voicing concerns about Barlow’s poor attendance and work performance. 
 
 August 2010 - ( Serial 13 ) - Initial allegations raised against Joel Barlow by Queensland Health work colleagues. The 
allegations were the Barlow was to defrauding QHealth. 
 
 30 August 2010 - ( Serial 14 ) - CMC advised that the allegations of fraud by Barlow were “Not Substantiated”. 
 
 January 2011 - ( Serial 15 ) - The 2007 complaint about Barlow (vehicle misuse) is substantiated. Barlow was found to have 
misused an official vehicle over a weekend period without authority; he travelled 213km, incurred a speeding fine and 
falsified a logbook to cover up the misuse. An Executive Director reprimanded Barlow. 
 
 
8 December 2011 - ( Serial 17 ) - Queensland Health identified a fraudulent transaction of $11 million of public funds paid to 
Healthy Initiatives and Choices (HIC). 
 
 
16 November 2011 - ( Serial 16 ) - Barlow sent the SSP Officer an “urgent’ GPV for payment from MGIA to HIC of $11 million.   
 
 
8 December 2011  - ( Serial 18 ) - Queensland Health report the identified fraudulent transaction to QPS. 
 
 9 December 2011 - ( Serial 19) - QPS seek assistance from CMC to identify, seize and restrain all property owned or disposed of 
by Joel Barlow since he began employment with Queensland Health. 
 
 
9 December 2011 -  ( Serial 20 ) - CMC commence actions to restrain Barlow’s 
 
10 December 2011 - ( Serial 21 ) - Barlow arrested and charged with fraud related offences. 
 
 12 December – ( Serial 22 ) -  Barlow pleads guilty.  
 
12 December 2011 - ( Serial 23 ) - Director-general of QHealth directs a review of material relating to previous allegations against 
Barlow (August 2010). 
 
 19 March 2013 - ( Serial 24 ) - Barlow sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.  (confirm source) 
 
 13 June 2013 ( Serial 25 ) - Supreme Court in Brisbane authorizes restrained assets be returned to the State. 
 
 Date Range: 13 February 1975 – 13 June 2013 
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Fraudulent Transactions Key Events  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 October 2007 - ( Serial 34 ) - Barlow authorises first 
fraudulent payment to ‘The Muse’ for $2,200.61 
29 October 2007 - ( Serial 35 ) - Barlow authorises second 
fraudulent payment to ‘The Muse’ also for $2,200.61 
 
10 December 2007 -  ( Serial 36) - Barlow authorises third 
fraudulent payment to ‘The Muse’ for $6,601.80 
 
January 2007 -  ( Serial 27 ) - Barlow permanently appointed as A04 
Assistant Finance Officer. 
 
July 2007 -  ( Serial 28 ) - Barlow received Q health corporate credit card. 
Barlow’s delegation is $1000 per day, with a monthly limit of $10,000. 
 
29 August 2007 ( Serial 29 ) - QHealth’s ESU received a complaint alleging 
that Barlow miss used an official vehicle. This complaint takes 
approximately 40 months to resole with findings given to Barlow in early 
2011. 
 September 2007 - ( Serial 30 ) - Barlow performs 
higher duties as an A07 in the position of PFO. 
 3 October 2007 -  ( Serial 31 ) - Barlow established Muse 
Business Inspiration (The music) as a QHealth vender. 
 
3 October 2007 ( Serial 32 ) - No vendor address for ‘The 
Muse’ was included in the vendor set up form, nor was an 
ABN search attached. 
 
4 October 2007 (Serial 33 ) - QHealth reported the vehicle 
complaint to the CMC. 
 
Late 2007/ 2008 - (Serial 37 ) - (exact date not listed) 
Staff began voicing concerns about Barlow’s poor 
attendance and work performance. 
 
Late 2007/ 2008 - ( Serial 38 ) - (exact date not listed) 
But was never in the workplace before 10 AM and was 
very inconsistent work. He would disappear for lunch 
breaks for hours on end and didn’t complete timesheets. 
 
Late 2007/ 2008 - Serial 39 - (exact date not listed) 
Barlow was described as very difficult to deal with; 
described as a bully by one colleague. 
 
Late 2007/ 2008 - Serial 40 - (exact date not listed) 
Barlow took a significant amount of leave without pay and 
block periods. 
 2007/2008 - Serial 41 - (exact date not listed) 
Barlow bought a new iPhone to thank and individual for not 
making an official complaint about his mismanagement of 
the budget. The individual refuse to accept the gift. 
 
End of 2007 - ( Serial 42 ) - Barlow had the defrauded 
QHealth of $11,003.02 over the 12 months.   
 
Date Range: January 2007 – End of 2007 
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Fraudulent Transactions 
 
Key Events 
 
15 February 2008 - Serial 43 - Authorized fraudulent 
payment to ‘The Muse’ $7700. 77 (p. 10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 March 2008 - Serial 44 - Authorized fraudulent 
payment to ‘The Muse’ $15,400.00 
 5 May 2008 - Serial 45 - Barlow writes a 
fraudulent letter in which he refers to 
himself as a ‘solicitor’ and ‘legal 
counsel’. 
 
22 May 2008 - Serial 46 - Authorized for payment 
to ‘The Muse’ $15,400.00 
 
6 August 2008 - Serial 47 - Authorized for payment 
to ‘The Muse’ $27,500.00 from the Minister’s 
Grants in Aid (MGIA) cost centre. 
 
26 September 2008 - Serial 49 - HIC was a trading name 
registered to Barlow as the individual operator and 
owner, and was registered choose home address. 
 
 
September 2008 (exact date tbc) - Serial 50 - Barlow 
authorises his first fraudulent payment to HIC for 
$33,000  (p. 12) 
 
26 September 2008 - Serial 48 - Barlow prepared and 
authorized the vendor setup process to establish Healthy 
Initiatives and Choices (HIC) as a QHealth vendor. 
 
21 October 2008 - Serial 51 - Barlow authorises 
fraudulent payment to HIC for $33,000 (p. 12) 
 
10 November 2008 - Serial 52 - Barlow authorises 
fraudulent payment to HIC for $33,000 (p. 12) 
 
 
 
26 November 2008 - Serial 53 - Barlow authorises 
fraudulent payment to HIC for $33,000 (p. 12) 
 
 9 December 2008 - Serial 54 - Barlow authorises 
fraudulent payment to HIC for $33,000 (p. 12) 
 
 16 December 2008 - Serial 55 - Barlow authorises 
fraudulent payment to HIC for $33,000 (p. 12) 
 
 
16 December 2008 - Serial 56 - Barlow had the defrauded 
QHealth of $264,000.77 over the 12 months with a total of 
$275,003.78 having been defrauded since October 2007.   
 
 
Date Range: 15 February 2008 – 16 December 2008 
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Fraudulent Transactions 
 
Key Events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Serial 57 - Barlow authorises fraudulent payment to HIC for 
$33,000 (p. 12) 
 
20 January 2009 - Serial 58 - Barlow authorises fraudulent 
payment to HIC for $66,000 (p. 12) 
 
 10 February 2009 - Serial 59 - Barlow authorises fraudulent 
payment to HIC for $33,000 (p. 12) 
 
 20 February 2009 - Serial 60 - Barlow authorises fraudulent 
payment to HIC for $16,500 (p. 12) 
 
 3 March 2009 - Serial 61 - Barlow authorises fraudulent 
payment to HIC for $33,000 (p. 12) 
 
 
 
26 March 2009 - Serial 62 - Barlow authorises fraudulent 
payment to HIC for $33,000 (p. 12) 
 
 6 April 2009 - Serial 63 - Barlow authorises fraudulent payment to HIC for $33,000 (p. 12) 
 
 27 April 2009 - Serial 64 - Barlow authorises fraudulent 
payment to HIC for $66,000 (p. 12) 
 
 20 May 2009 - Serial 65 - Barlow authorises fraudulent 
payment to HIC for $66,000  (p. 12) 
 
 
22 May 2009 - Serial 66 - Barlow was permanently appointed as PFO. 
 
18 June 2009 - Serial 67 - Barlow authorises fraudulent 
payment to HIC for $68,796.20 (p. 12) 
 
 24 June 2009 - Serial 68 - Barlow authorises fraudulent payment to HIC 
for $34,197.90  (p. 12) 
 
 13 July 2009 - Serial 69 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $68,796.20  
 
 31 July 2009  - Serial 70 -  Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $68,796.20  
 
 18 August 2009 - Serial 71 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $34,398.10  
 
 26 August 2009 - Serial 72 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $34,398.10  
 
 3 September 2009 - Serial 73 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $34,398.10  
 
 10 September 2009 - Serial 74 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $68,796.20  
 
 25 September 2009 - Serial 75 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $68,796.20  
 
 15 October 2009 - Serial 76 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $68,796.20  
 
 4 November 2009 - Serial 77 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $68,796.20  
 
 27 November 2009 - Serial 78 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $68,796.20  
 
 15 December 2009 - Serial 79 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
 
End of 2009 - Serial 80 - Barlow had the defrauded QHealth of $1,204,854 over the last 12 months 
with a total of $1,479,857.98 having been defrauded since October 2007. 
 
Date Range: January 2009 – End of 2009 
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Fraudulent Transactions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 January 2010 - Serial 81 - Fraudulent payment to 
HIC totaling $137,592.40   
 
 
21 January 2010 - Serial 82 - Organizational change at QHealth. Confusion 
regarding responsibility of MGIA cost centre; Barlow exploits confusion 
and fostered the belief that his team was responsible for these codes. 
 
2 February 2010 - Serial 83 - Fraudulent payment to HIC 
totaling $137,592.40  
 
 6 February 2010 - Serial 84 - Barlow hosted and paid for his own birthday 
party at a bar in Fortitude Valley which was attended by some QHealth 
staff; it was reported to have cost $130,000 
 
25 February 2010 - Serial 85 - Fraudulent payment to 
HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
 25 March 2010 - Serial 86 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
 
1 August 2010 - Serial 96 - Criminal history checks were not completed on 
Barlow. 
 
 
28 July 2010 - Serial 94 - Fraudulent payment to 
HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
 
10 May 2010 - Serial 90 - Barlow submitted an additional Ministerial 
Letter (2); the letter was unsigned, undated and did not contain the 
payment limit. 
 
22 April 2010 - Serial 87 - Fraudulent payment to HIC 
totaling $137,592.40  
 
 10 May 2010 - Serial 88 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
 
10 May 2010 - Serial 89 - Barlow received an email questioning 
Ministerial level 1. 
 
31 May 2010 - Serial 91 - Fraudulent payment to 
HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
 
June 2010 - Serial 92 - Finance Officer 1 questioned Barlow about 
recurrent payments being made to HIC and asked to see supporting 
documentation. Barlow told him the April payment would be the last, 
and did not show requested documentation. (p.15) 
 
July 2010 -  Serial 95 - Finance Officer 1 discovered another payment to HIC, 
he question Barlow who said this was the last payment, so Finance Officer 1 
processed it. 
 
17 July 2010 - Serial 93 - Fraudulent payment to 
HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
 
1 August 2010 - Serial 97 - Barlow’s complain history was not checked.   
 
 
1 August 2010 - Serial 98 - The CMC did not respond in a timely manner 
to the complaint. 
 
 5 August 2010 - Serial 99 - CMC receive anonymous email complaint 
alleging that Barlow was defrauding QHealth.  
 
 
17 August 2010 - Serial 100 - Fraudulent payment to HIC 
totaling $137,592.40  
 
 
5-9 August 2010 - Serial 101 - CMC Officer responsible for 
handling the complaint determined that it did not meet the 
          
    
 
24  August 2010 - Serial 102 - Complaint forwarded to QHealth for 
investigation – CMC to be advised of outcome. 
 
 24 -30 August 2010 - Serial 103 - QHealth’s Ethical Standards 
unit (ESU) commence investigation. 
 
 24 -30 August 2010 - Serial 104 - ESO had an attached Police Liaison Officer (PLO). 
This Officer reported Barlow did not have criminal record and was not recorded as 
being wanted in Australia.  
 
 
24 -30 August 2010 - Serial 105 - PLO did not check Barlow’s New Zealand criminal 
history. 
 
 
 
24 -30 August 2010 - Serial 106 - ESU complaints data base did not show Barlow’s 
2007 misuse of a vehicle incident. 
 
 27 August 2010 - Serial 107 - ESU received a reply from their enquiry to Manager 4 (CFO). 
 
 27 August 2010 -  Serial 108 - Manager 4 stated that Barlow’s delegation was reasonable for an officer at his level and that there had been no transactions above this delegation within the last five months. 
He also stated that the accounts are examined on a monthly basis and that nothing untoward had been 
charged to the accounts. (expand) 
 
 Date Range: 14 January 2010 – 27 August 2010 
Key Events 
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24 -30 August 2010 - Serial 109 - No contextual information was 
captured or communicated to the ESU case officer. 
 
 24 -30 August 2010 - Serial 110 - Advise from Manager 4’s email was relied upon heavily by the ESU case officer. Limited additional investigation 
conducted. 
 
 
24 -30 August 2010  - Serial 111 - ESU case officer decides to close the file. 
 
30 August 2010 Serial 112 - CMC advised that the complaint was “Not 
Substantiated”. 
 
September 2010 - Serial 116 - Barlow paid $1700 towards a flight or a 
QHealth officer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 November 2010 - Serial 119 - Fraudulent payment to HIC totaling 
$137,592.40 
  
November 2010 - Serial 122 - Barlow transferred $10,000 to a QHealth 
officers bank account after the individual asked Barlow for money for his 
holiday. 
 
 
 
1 December 2010  - Serial 128 - Internal credit card audit commences. 
Barlow was one of the cardholders chosen a random and the audit 
identified multiple issues with his credit card usage.  
 
 
 
 
 
6 December 2010 - Serial 126 - Barlow given higher duties to act at an AO8 
level in the position of Manager, Governance, Finance Branch. 
 
9 December 2010 - Serial 129 - QHealth internal audit commence liaision 
with Manager 4 and his staff unsuccessfully seeking documents relating to 
Barlow’s credit card transactions. 
 
23 December 2010 - Serial 130 - Barlow paid a deposit on a waterfront 
property in New Farm Brisbane valued at $5.65 million. 
 
December 2010 - Serial 131 - Barlow paid for Finance officer 1 and his 
fiancé to stay up like at hotel in Hong Kong for two nights 
 
December 2010 - Serial 132 - Barlow paid for Finance officer 2 to fly from 
Barcelona to Athens. 
 
End of 2010  - Serial  133 - Barlow had the defrauded QHealth of 
$2,889,440.40 over the last 12 months with a total of $4,369,298.38 having 
been defrauded since October 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
3 September 2010 - Serial 113 - Fraudulent payment 
to HIC totaling $137,592.40 (p. 19) 
 
16 September 2010 -  Serial 114 - Fraudulent 
payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
30 September 2010 - Serial 115 - Fraudulent 
payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
19 October 2010 - Serial 117 - Fraudulent payment 
to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
26 October 2010 - Serial 118 - Fraudulent payment 
to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
11 November 2010 - Serial 120 - Fraudulent 
payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
23 November 2010 - Serial 121 - Fraudulent 
payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
3 December 2010 -  Serial 123 - Fraudulent payment 
to HIC totaling $137,592.40 (p. 19) 
 
3 December 2010 - Serial 124 - Fraudulent payment 
to HIC totaling $137,592.40 (p. 19) 
 
3 December 2010 - Serial 125 - Fraudulent payment 
to HIC totaling $137,592.40 (p. 19) 
 
 
 
 
 
17 December 2010 -  Serial 127 - Fraudulent 
payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date Range: 24 August 2010 – End of 2010 
Fraudulent Transactions 
 
 
 
Key Events 
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Fraudulent Transactions 
 
 
 
 
Key Events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 January 2011 - Serial 137 - Fraudulent 
payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 February 2011 - Serial 143 -Fraudulent 
payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40 (p. 20) 
 
14 February 2011 - Serial 144 - Fraudulent 
payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40 (p. 20) 
 
14 February 2011 - Serial 145 - Fraudulent 
payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40 (p. 20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 April 2011 - Serial 151 - Fraudulent 
payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
28 April 2011 - Serial 152 - Fraudulent 
payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
 
 
 
2011 – Serial 134 - Barlow is absent from work when in the Manager, 
Governance role 28% of the time. 
 
2011 – Serial 135 - Managers at QHealth, rather than performance 
manage him, appeared to reward his poor behavior. For example, one 
Officer said he was told Barlow was allowed to come into work late, so he 
could write his royal correspondence in the morning.  
 
11 January 2011 Serial 136 - Barlow writes fraudulent character reference 
for presentation to  a court; lists fake qualifications (Bachelor of Laws) 
and refers to himself as "1st son of the Royal Family of Tahiti." (p. 20) 
 
January 2011 - Serial 138 - Barlow paid for flights for a QHealth officer 
from Frankfurt to New York, as well as five nights accommodation in 
upmarket hotel New York.  
 
January 2011 - Serial 139 - Barlow is asked by a QHealth Officer for 
money to assist with a mortgage repayment; Barlow provides $1300 cash. 
 
January 2011-  Serial 140 - The 2007 complaint about Barlow (vehicle 
misuse) is substantiated. Barlow was found to have misused an official 
vehicle over a weekend period without  authority;  he travelled 213km, 
incurred a speeding fine and falsified a logbook to cover up the misuse. 
An Executive Director reprimanded Barlow. 
 
1 February 2011 - Serial 141 - Barlow paid for a luxury gift basket at a 
hotel for a senior director. 
 
1 February 2011 - Serial 142 - Barlow actively obtains retentin of MGIA 
accounts by deception. 
 
14 February 2011 - Serial 146 - Two payments made on this day were for 
‘flood relief’, which appear to be an exploitation of the Queensland flood 
crisis. 
 
 
 
 
21 February 2011 - Serial 147 - Credit card allegations were reported to 
the CMC. 
 
21 February 2011 - Serial 148 - The CMC referred the matter to QHealth 
to deal with 
 
1 April 2011 - Serial 149 - Finance Officer 3 identified that the MGIA cost 
centre was significantly overspent. The MGIA budget was $406,000. 
Actual expenditure was over $2.5 million. 
 
1 April 2011 - Serial 150 - Finance Officer 3 spoke with Barlow, who 
advised that there were sufficient funds in another account to complete a 
PBA 
. 
27 May 2011  - Serial 153 - Finance Officer 3 completes the PBA. 
 
27 May 2011  - Serial 154 - The MGIA budget was $406,000. Actual 
expenditure at the time of the PBA was $2,786,596.   
 
27 May 2011 -  Serial 155 - The PBA of $2,380,596 made to the MGIA. 
 
27 May 2011 - Serial 156 - The PBA was processed without being 
questioned further enabling further fraudulent transactions to be 
committed.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date Range: January 2011 – 27 May 2011 
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Fraudulent Transactions 
 
 
 
 
Key Events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 July 2011 - Serial 163 - Fraudulent payment to 
HIC totaling $137,592.40   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 September 2011 - Serial 170 - Fraudulent 
payment to HIC totaling $137,592.40  
 
16 November 2011 - Serial 172 - Barlow sent the 
SSP Officer an “urgent’ GPV for payment from 
MGIA to HIC of $11 million.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 June 2011 - Serial 157 - Internal Audit provided a report to the ESU.  
In relation to the suspicious purchases, Internal Audit found that 
where documents where supplied, the documents indicated on face 
value that the transactions were of an official nature.  
 
21 June 2011 - Serial 158 - Given requested source documentation had 
not been provided and the uncertainty about whether QHealth 
actually used the vendors, Internal Audit recommended that the 
matter be referred back to the ESU to determine whether any action 
should be taken. 
 
21 June 2011 - Serial 159 - No further action was taken by QHealth 
regarding this matter, prior to Barlow’s fraud being discovered in 
December 2011. (p. 21) 
 
Prior to July 2011 (exact date not listed) - Serial 160 - QAO audit 
identified irregularities with a transaction by Barlow. As a result, the 
QAO sought further documentation and a response from QHealth. 
 
Prior to July 2011 (exact date not listed) - Serial 161- Despite 
repeated requests for outstanding documentation, first from the QAO 
and then from the Office of the DDG on behalf of the QAO, it was not 
provide. 
 
Prior to July 2011 (exact date not listed)  - Serial 162 - QAO wrote to 
QHealth to advise of the audit outcomes. QAO also provided a overall 
risk rating relating tostate wide grants expenditure as “low”. 
 
29 August 2011 - Serial 164 - QHealth responds to QOA and 
acknowledges the need for improvement. 
 
17 February 2011 - Serial 165 - QHealth internal audit reported their 
concerns about Barlow’s corporate credit card transactions and his 
failure to provide supporting documentation.  
 
2011 (through out the year) - Serial 166 - Complaints about Barlow’s 
conduct and work performance while in manager, government 
position.  
 
2011 (through out the year) - Serial 167 -Staff at various levels 
continued to have concerns about Barlow’s conduct and performance 
after he was moved into the Manager, Governance role. 
 
1 June 2011 - Serial 168 - Manager 4 and the Senior Executive 
approved Barlow’s application for a Blackberry to make him more 
easily contactable. 
 
1 August 2011 - Serial 169 - When Barlow was asked about the regular 
payments to HIC,he advised that the contract was about to end and it 
would no longer be in issue. 
 
October 2011 - Serial 171 - Manager  3 attended the Rugby World Cup 
in New Zealand after receiving for ‘platinum’ level tickets from Barlow 
were several thousand dollars. 
 
22 November 2011- Serial 173 - Barlow finalized the purchase of a 
property in New Farm, Brisbane for $5.65 million. 
 
8 December 2011 - Serial 175 - Finance Officer 3 looked for supporting 
documentation and searched for HIC in the Australian Business 
Register and discovered that the trading name HIC was registered to 
Barlow. (p. 25) 
 
8 December 2011 - Serial 177 - Finance Officer 3 and his supervisor 
raised the matter with Manager 4.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Date Range: 21 June 2011 – 8 December 2011 
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Appendix H: Queensland Health – Analysis Part 1 - Unknown mandated legislation. 
 
• #9. Entities must ensure that officials who are primarily engaged in 
investigating fraud as a minimum meet the required fraud control competency 
requirements set out in the Australian Government Investigations Standards (AGIS) 
within 12 months of being engaged in investigating fraud. Unknown 
 
• #10. Entities must ensure officials primarily engaged in fraud control 
activities possess or attain relevant qualifications or training to effectively carry out 
their duties within 12 months of being engaged in fraud control activities. Unknown 
 
• #11. When an entity provides third-party services for another entity, the entity 
delivering the service retains responsibility for meeting the first entity’s obligations 
under this Policy and the fraud rule. Unknown 
 
• #18.%Investigations%must%be%carried%out%by%appropriately%qualified%personnel.%%
Unknown%
 
